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iAbstract
This dissertation studies the interaction between environmental policy, market structure and
firms’ incentives to invest in emissions reduction technology or emissions abatement research
and development (R&D). It consists of three individual papers. The first paper examines how
the intensity of market competition may affect the environmental policy. The second paper
studies the conditions under which the design of an environmental policy can be beneficial for
firms and society. The third paper analyses the effect of environmental R&D organisational
structures on firms’ innovation activities, profits, and social welfare when the R&D outcome is
uncertain.
The first paper investigates the optimal environmental policy (the mix of emissions tax and
R&D subsidy) when two firms, producing differentiated products, compete in the output mar-
ket over time. Firms compete over supply schedules, which encompass a continuum of market
structures from Bertrand to Cournot. While production generates environmentally damaging
emissions, firms can undertake R&D, which has the sole purpose of reducing emissions. In ad-
dition to characterising the optimal policy, we examine how the optimal tax and subsidy, and the
optimal level of abatement change as competition intensifies, as the dynamic parameters change
and as the investment in abatement technology changes. In this setting, increased competition
no longer necessarily leads to an increase in welfare. Instead, there are two forces. Competition
increases welfare through its impact on the final goods price. However, lower prices result in
larger quantities and more pollution. Our contribution is to show how this impact depends on
the extent of the market, the nature of preferences and the technology.
The Porter Hypothesis, formulated by Michael Porter (1991), states that a well-designed
environmental policy could encourage innovation and be beneficial for firms and society. In the
second paper, we investigate the conditions under which the design of an environmental policy
can align social and private interests. Results consistent with the Porter Hypothesis are derived
without any behavioural assumptions or bounded rationality arguments, as it is commonly the
case in the related literature. N symmetric firms compete in the output market by producing and
selling homogeneous goods. Production entails the emission of a pollutant, which may be taxed.
The general conditions for firms’ profits and social welfare to be higher under an emissions tax
than under no tax are determined. The key insight is that, for the representative firm’s profit to
increase with an increase in emissions tax, the emissions tax cost pass-through must be greater
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than the net emissions per unit of production, adjusted for the number of competing firms. As
the intensity of competition increases, firms are more likely to benefit from an emissions tax, as
the tax facilitates the exercise of market power.
The third paper analyses firms’ and social planner’s choices of R&D cooperation when the
innovation outcome is uncertain. Two firms compete in the output market by producing and
selling homogeneous goods. Production entails the emission of a pollutant, which is taxed and
induces firms to invest in emissions reduction R&D. It is assumed that the R&D outcome is
uncertain and firms can either choose to fully protect or fully share their R&D results. Under
R&D uncertainty, the highest payoff for the firm is when it succeeds in its R&D efforts whilst
its rival fails. Subsequent ex-post asymmetries can also lead to one firm exiting the market. This
introduces additional strategic elements for the firm, leading to new insights regarding firms’
and social planner’s preferences. It is shown that for lower levels of marginal environmental
damages, firms and the social planner always prefer cooperation in R&D and information shar-
ing as this leads to the highest expected profit and social welfare. For higher levels of marginal
environmental damages, firms always choose to cooperate but not to share information. The
social planner also prefers firms not to share information but only to cooperate when they are
efficient in their abatement R&D; under inefficient abatement R&D conditions, no coopera-
tion in R&D and no information sharing leads to the best social outcome. The private level of
investment in R&D is always smaller than the social optimum.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Objective and Significance
In a recent essay, John Avery describes human society as a "superorganism" with the global
economy being its digestive system (Avery, 2012). It consumes energy (almost all of it coming
originally from the sun) and resources to produce local order, and excretes the waste matter
and heat in an environmentally degrading form. All human activities have an impact on the
environment and the resulting environmental changes may have significant consequences for
future economic development.
Achieving economic growth whilst minimising its impact on the environment is currently
one of the most serious challenges facing humanity. Environmental policy that imposes a re-
quirement to reduce overall pollution, may also significantly stimulate technological change in
order to reduce the costs of complying with this requirement.
Environmental policies, such as pollution charges, research and development (R&D) subsi-
dies and tradable permits, can be classified as market-based policies as they impact on the incen-
tives firms face to reduce pollution or engage in abatement R&D (Stavins, 2003). By optimally
designing market-based instruments, the regulator can strongly influence firms in selecting more
cost effective and superior pollution control technologies. Command-and-control policies, such
as the prohibition of specific inputs and non-tradable discharge permits, impose on firms a sim-
ilar share of the emissions control burden, disregarding the cost. This is often achieved by
regulating uniform standards for firms, which can be expensive and counterproductive, as the
costs of controlling emissions may vary greatly among firms (Jaffe et al., 2003). Theoretical
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findings, confirmed by empirical evidence (Jaffe et al., 2003), suggest that market-based envi-
ronmental policy instruments (instead of command-and-control approaches) are likely to have
greater impact in reducing environmental damage and promoting the invention, innovation and
diffusion of pollution abatement technologies.
A tax on emissions is a widely used and studied market-based environmental policy instru-
ment. It aims to reduce emissions by lowering quantities produced and indirectly by inducing
firms to invest in environmental R&D or emissions reduction technology. Investment in en-
vironmental R&D will be less than is socially optimal because of the appropriability problem
related to the involuntary leakage of technological information or spillover. Firms may be fur-
ther encouraged to increase their investment in emissions reduction by the provision of a R&D
subsidy or by being allowed to cooperate in R&D. Tax on emissions and R&D subsidies are the
two environmental regulatory instruments considered in this dissertation.
The research work presented in this thesis touches aspects of competition, and environmen-
tal and technological policies that may follow different and sometimes conflicting objectives. It
is shown that the intensity of market competition determines the socially optimal combination
of environmental regulatory instruments (emissions tax and R&D subsidy), which encourage
private undertakings of innovation efforts (Chapter 3). However, environmental policies may
have a significant impact on firms’ profitability. The conditions under which firms may benefit
from an environmental policy are investigated (Chapter 4). The uncertain nature of R&D is
important and can influence cooperative behaviour between firms. It is shown that firms’ R&D
cooperative preferences may not always be aligned with social welfare objectives (Chapter 5).
1.2 Framework and Contribution
In this thesis we focus on theoretical microeconomics partial equilibrium models, adopted
from non-tournament models of process R&D. It is also assumed that the social planner is able
to adapt the level of the policy instrument to the respective emissions reduction outcome, which,
in the literature, is commonly referred to as ex-post regulation. This type of policy is always
time-consistent.
In the first paper, the design of a market-based environmental policy is investigated. The out-
put market is a differentiated duopoly, production entails environmentally damaging emissions
and firms can abate their emissions by either reducing output and/or by undertaking emissions
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abatement R&D. Imperfect competition in the output market is considered in addition to the
market failures associated with environmental pollution and technology innovation spillover.
The main aim of this research is to determine the optimal environmental policy (mix of emis-
sions tax and abatement R&D subsidy), in a dynamic setting, that addresses these three market
failures.
R&D is modeled in a differential game where each player maximises the objective function
(discounted profits), subject to a number of constraints, which includes a differential equation
describing the evolution of the state of the game. This constraint describes the capital stock
of the firm. The optimisation problem to be solved (optimal control problem) uses solutions
techniques such as the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation and Pontryagin’s maximum principle
(Dockner et al., 2000). The focus is on using stationary Markovian feedback strategies, which
is a standard approach to solve infinite-horizon differential games in economics.
The first paper is included in Chapter 3 of this document. The contribution is to determine
the optimal environmental policy (emissions tax and R&D subsidies) explicitly as a function
of the intensity of competition in a dynamic setting. It is shown that the interaction between
increased competition and the optimal environmental policy is complex. Competition interacts
in a non-trivial way with the emission of pollution and the incentives to undertake R&D. Social
welfare increases with the intensity of competition only if the emissions tax is set above its
optimum level. The key message is that the optimal emissions tax and R&D subsidy need to be
calibrated to account for the impact of imperfect competition.
Environmental regulation, as covered in the first paper, can be viewed as socially desirable
but also as having a negative impact on firms’ profitability. Michael Porter (1991) challenged
the conventional wisdom about the detrimental impact of environmental regulation on a firm’s
performance by stating that well-designed regulation could actually represent a "win-win" out-
come for firms and society. Porter’s arguments that well-designed regulation may enhance busi-
nesses’ profits are centered around the view that we live in a non-optimising world of imperfect
information and organisational or market failures.
Case studies of environmental regulation that lead to the adoption of new technologies,
apparently beneficial to the firm, were provided by Porter and van der Linde (1995). However,
quantitative evidence is limited. The lack of a rigorous basis for this important argument has
attracted criticism from economists such as Palmer et al. (1995).
In the second paper we investigate under what environmental regulatory arrangements there
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could be a public and private "win-win" outcome. In this model, firms’ profits and social welfare
are analysed in a homogeneous, n symmetric firms oligopoly product market, where production
entails the generation of environmentally damaging emissions, which are taxed. Firms can re-
duce such emissions by engaging in emissions abatement R&D. This analytical approach deals
with a dual market failure problem. Firstly, when the production (or consumption) of certain
goods generates negative externalities in the form of environmentally damaging pollution, and
these costs are not internalised by the producers, there will be excessive production and pollu-
tion from a social viewpoint (Jaffe et al., 2005). Secondly, by considering imperfect competition
in the output markets, firms charge prices above competitive (cost-reflective) prices, which leads
to less production and consumption than socially optimal.
The second paper is presented in Chapter 4 of this document. This paper derives results
consistent with the Porter Hypothesis without any behavioural assumptions or bounded ratio-
nality arguments. The key insight is that, as the intensity of competition increases firms may
benefit more from an environmental policy, which is explained in this paper as an emissions tax
cost pass-through condition. An emissions tax enhances market power in a competitive setting.
Firms operating in a less competitive environment, namely monopolies and Cournot duopolies,
never benefit from an environmental policy.
The models of abatement R&D used in the first two papers follow a large body of literature
that assumes a deterministic relationship between R&D investment and the level of emissions
abatement, ignoring that R&D outcomes can be difficult to predict. The uncertain nature of
R&D may encourage firms to cooperate, which allows firms to improve the management of
R&D by spreading the risks and acting as an insurer, sharing costs, eliminating useless dupli-
cation of efforts and exploiting economies of scale. This cooperation may take the form of a
joint laboratory — once the innovation is introduced it becomes available to all firms. Alterna-
tively, firms may choose to share the research infrastructure but not share the innovation or the
outcome of the R&D activities. Under cooperation, the two firms choose their environmental
R&D cooperatively or coordinate their R&D activities in order to maximise their joint profits,
and then compete in the product market.
In the third paper we determine the impact of environmental R&D organisational structures
on firms’ innovation activities, profits, and social welfare. It is assumed that the R&D outcome
is uncertain and that firms can choose to fully protect or fully share their R&D results. Under
R&D outcome uncertainty, the asymmetric ex-post equilibrium, where the representative firm
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succeeds in its R&D efforts whilst its rival fails, brings about the highest payoff for the firm.
Moreover, for high levels of marginal environmental damages, the success or failure of the R&D
efforts may determine whether the unsuccessful firm exits the market and the firm that succeeds
in R&D becomes a monopoly. Subsequent ex-post asymmetries in solving the model provide
an analytical framework that challenges some of the typical results obtained in deterministic
models of cooperative R&D — an additional strategic element is introduced when considering
uncertainty in firms’ emissions abatement R&D efforts.
The paper shows that firms always want to cooperate in R&D but not necessarily do they
choose to share information. When firms cooperate in R&D, the total research efforts are under
the social optimum. Finally, the results demonstrate that cooperation in R&D does not neces-
sarily lead to a higher social welfare than when firms engage in independent R&D, even if firms
fully share their innovations. The third paper is presented in Chapter 5.
This thesis investigates the interaction between environmental policy, product market struc-
ture and firms’ motivation to engage in emissions abatement R&D or invest in emissions re-
duction technology. This research encompasses aspects of competition, and environmental and
technological policies that may follow different and sometimes conflicting objectives.
This document is organised as follows. In the next Section, we conduct a review of the rel-
evant literature in cooperative R&D and environmental regulation, the Porter’s Hypothesis and
cooperative R&D under uncertainty. The first paper entitled "Emissions Abatement R&D: Dy-
namic Competition in Supply Schedules" (Menezes and Pereira, 2014), is presented in Chapter
3. The second paper entitled "The Porter Hypothesis: Conditions for social and private gains
from an emissions tax under imperfect competition", is presented in Chapter 4. The third pa-
per entitled "Environmental R&D Cooperation under Uncertainty" is presented in Chapter 5.
Finally, Chapter 6 concludes.
Chapter 2
Literature Review
The literature covering the theoretical foundations of the three papers presented in this thesis
(Chapters 3, 4 and 5) is reviewed in the next Section; namely, non-tournament models of process
innovation R&D, competition in supply schedules, which allows to parameterise the intensity
of market competition, and differential games, only used in Chapter 3. A review of the relevant
literature on environmental R&D, the Porter Hypothesis and cooperative environmental R&D
is conducted in the subsequent Sections.
2.1 The Theoretical Underpinnings
2.1.1 Non-Tournament Models of R&D
In this thesis, environmentally damaging emissions are introduced as a side effect of produc-
tion in a product differentiated model (Chapter 3) or homogeneous products models (Chapters 4
and 5) of environmental R&D. Spillovers or involuntary leakages of technological information
are considered only in Chapter 3. Firms are engaged in imperfect competition and we assume
that firms invest in R&D for the sole purpose of reducing emissions, which are taxed. Since the
environmental models used in this thesis are modified extensions of non-tournament process
innovation R&D models from Industrial Organisation (IO), we review the relevant publications
as follows.
The vast literature on R&D differentiates between tournament models, where outcomes
relate to winning an innovation race, and non-tournament models, where firms are not engaged
in a race but can successfully produce innovations at the same time. R&D cooperation is mainly
6
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analysed in the context of non-tournament models. Firms in non-tournament settings can invest
in R&D to reduce their production costs — process R&D — or to improve the quality of a
product — product R&D. Investment in R&D is introduced as an additional strategic variable.
The majority of the theoretical literature on R&D cooperation considers non-tournament
R&D models, where firms undertake simultaneously successful R&D projects. Taking into
account the relevance of knowledge/technological spillovers, R&D cooperation versus compe-
tition is often compared under different types of market structure, as firms cannot always reap
all the benefits of their R&D investments.
In the early eighties, the relationship between innovation and market structure, received
considerable coverage in the IO literature, namely the original contribution by Dasgupta and
Stiglitz (1980). They argue that, in the short run, innovation and market structure are determined
at the same time. Moreover, the degree of industry concentration and innovation should not
be treated as given but are interrelated. Using a model of oligopoly with free entry, where
symmetric firms select their R&D investment and output simultaneously, they conclude that
an increase in the number of competing firms reduces the firm’s R&D efforts — imperfect
competition can be the socially optimal market structure.
The static model of industry structure in Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980) was subsequently
amended by Hartwick (1984), using a Cournot model with free entry. The key insight is that,
by considering R&D spillovers, it cannot be concluded that the resulting equilibrium relates to
excessive duplication as in Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980).
The analytical framework used in this dissertation is an extension of the seminal work of
d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988). Their Cournot-competing duopoly model, with homo-
geneous products and linear demand function, considered cooperation through a deterministic
relationship between R&D investment and reductions in the marginal cost of production. A
quadratic R&D cost function is used to guarantee diminishing returns on the firm’s R&D in-
vestment. The potential R&D spillovers (imperfect appropriability) happen in the final R&D
outcomes and not on their R&D dollar investment. Firms engage in a two-stage game where
they first choose their R&D investment and then compete (Cournot) in the output market. They
found that cooperation in R&D (maximising their joint profits in the first stage of the game)
leads to higher profits for the firms, and higher quantities produced. For large spillovers, firms
cooperating in both R&D and production achieve a total welfare closer to the social optimum.
In contrast, Kamien et al. (1992) assumed that spillovers are in the R&D input or dollars
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spent instead of the final R&D outcomes. The firms’ final R&D investment is the sum of
their own expenditure and a fixed portion (set by the spillover parameter) of the other firms’s
expenditures. Amir (2000) compared the d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) and the Kamien
et al. (1992) models using a common framework of linear demand, homogeneous products and
quadratic R&D costs. His findings included that the first model always leads to higher levels of
R&D (for spillovers greater than zero) and also contradicted the widely accepted stylised fact
that industry R&D investment levels decrease when the spillover rates increase. He argued that
the latter model “is probably more appropriate as a model of strategic R&D with spillovers,
that can apply broadly to a generic industry” (Amir, 2000, p. 1016).
It is important to stress that in the d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) model the spillover
is in the R&D effort, rather than in the R&D investment. Mcdonald and Poyago-Theotoky
(2015) argued that the d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) model may be more suitable for
modelling environmental R&D because "it is the impact of R&D on abatement effort and emis-
sions reduction that is of crucial importance in designing environmental policy" (Mcdonald and
Poyago-Theotoky, 2015, p. 14). All the models used in this thesis are suitable environmental
R&D adaptations of the d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) framework.
Kamien et al. (1992) classified R&D organisational structures in the context of process
R&D, as follows. In the first type of R&D organisational structure considered in their paper,
firms were assumed to compete in both R&D and output market, where levels are decided
independently and spillover is incomplete or they fully shared their R&D results . In the second
type of R&D organisational structure, firms were assumed to coordinate their R&D investment
levels in order to maximise their joint profits but compete in the output market, either under
incomplete spillover or they fully shared their R&D results. They concluded that independent
R&D with full information sharing (complete spillover) is the least desirable organisational
structure as it leads to the highest product prices and the lowest R&D output. The most desirable
structure is when firms cooperate in R&D and fully share information as it leads to the highest
profits for the firms and lowest product prices. In Chapter 5 we follow a similar classification
of R&D organisational structures to Kamien et al. (1992).
Literature on non-tournament models of R&D has grown considerably to cover topics such
as differentiated product R&D and market competition (Lin & Saggi, 2000; Symeonidis, 2003),
R&D cooperatives (Hinloopen, 2000; Suzumura, 1992), firms asymmetry (Dakhlia et al., 2006;
W Salant, 1998), spillovers and endogeneity (Amir et al., 2003; Katsoulakos & Ulph, 1998;
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Poyago-Theotoky, 1999) and firms’ R&D absorptive capacity (the ability of a firm to recog-
nise, assimilate and apply R&D to a commercial end). The important concept of absorptive
capacity was first introduced by Cohen et al. (1990) and has been considered in more recent
studies (Kaiser, 2001; Leahy & Neary, 2007). Although of significance in some non-tournament
R&D models, we did not consider absorptive capacity in our research, as the added analytical
complexity would make it more difficult to draw conclusions from the model.
When specific functional forms are used, and as it is common in the process R&D litera-
ture, the models we propose assume that the representative consumer has a standard quadratic
(strictly convex) utility function as used by Singh and Vives (1984), Vives (1985), Qiu (1997)
and others.
2.1.2 Competition in Supply Schedules
In Chapter 3 and 4 we use the notion of competition in supply schedules to model compe-
tition in the output market (see also, for example, Delgado & Moreno, 2004; Grant & Quiggin,
1996; Grossman, 1981; Kao et al., 2012; Klemperer & Meyer, 1989; Menezes & Quiggin, 2012;
Robson, 1981; Turnbull, 1983; Vives, 2011).
It is assumed that each firm chooses as its strategy a supply function (relating its quantity
to its price) rather than considering the classical Cournot or Bertrand approaches where quan-
tities or prices are strategic substitutes. By considering families of more or less elastic supply
schedules, it is possible to generate spaces of oligopoly games of which Bertrand and Cournot
are polar cases.
A firm’s commitment to a supply function is a more realistic concept as in practice the firm
decides its size, structure, culture and values, including employment-related incentive schemes
and decision rules. The firm adapts to a changing environment by entering into agreements with
customers and suppliers that are reflected in their supply function. This approach provides a
convenient tool for modelling purposes by allowing us to parameterise the nature of competition
in the output market.
Firms face a strictly decreasing demand function for each product and compete in supply
functions qi(β ;θ i); which are continuously differentiable, convex, and increasing in both vari-
ables. In order to simplify the analysis, we restrict our attention to linear supply schedules of
the form qi = βPi+θ i. We note that Kao et al. (2014) show that under some conditions, such a
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restriction involves no loss of generality.
Following Kao et al. (2014), we assume a fixed value for β ; the slope of the firm’s supply
function, and that firms choose θ i, which is a scalar representing upward or downward shifts in
supply. This assumption allows us to focus on the unique equilibrium, and avoid the multiplicity
of supply function equilibria that exists in a general setting.
As in Kao et al. (2014), β can be interpreted as a measure of the intensity of competition1,
varying from Cournot (β = 0) to Bertrand (β ! ∞) market structures. Given β , the choice of
θ i by each firm determines then the equilibrium quantity. For example, if β = 1, the firms’
supply functions are given by a 45 degree line, as illustrated in Figure 2.1. Although, in this
thesis, the parameter β is given exogenously, Delgado and Moreno (2004) provide a more
general analysis of firms’ competition via supply functions and coalition-proof supply function
equilibria in oligopoly.
The oligopolistic equilibrium can be regarded as each firm facing a residual demand curve
defined by the market demand and other firms’ strategies. In other words, the firm acts like a
monopolist deciding upon its optimal price-quantity pair.
Figure 2.1 provides examples of linear supply functions (Pi = 1β qi  θ iβ ). The graph on the
left-hand side depicts a general supply function. It intercepts the vertical axis at θ iβ . The graph
on the right-hand side shows the Cournot case (vertical supply schedule) and the Bertrand case
(horizontal supply-schedule).
1The intensity of competition can also be represented with the degree of product differentiation or the number
of firms, in addition to β . The industrial economics literature treats β , η , and n independently. Typically, they look
at Bertrand and a fixed number of firms and fixed η and compare findings to, say Cournot, with a fixed number
of firms and fixed η . Vives (1985), for example, compares the efficiency of Bertrand and Cournot equilibria with
product differentiation, where the source of market power can be the strategic choice of quantities (Cournot) or the
existence of product differentiation (or both). In general, we can conjecture that there is a relationship between β
and n (see, for example, Menezes & Quiggin, 2012), but there is no general accepted theory. While the relationship
between β , η , and n is an interesting topic of study in industrial economics, it is not the focus of this thesis.
2. Literature Review 11
Figure 2.1: Examples of Linear Supply Functions
Given the linear supply schedules, and a linear demand function, the market clearing prices
and quantities are obtained by substituting the linear supply function into the demand function.
Prices and quantities can then be expressed as a function of the intensity of competition (β )
and the strategic variable (θ i). Sections 3.2.2 and 4.3.1 demonstrate the practical application of
competition in supply schedules used in Chapters 3 and 4.
2.1.3 Differential Games
Environmental economics is about managing resources and environmentally damaging emis-
sions. Resources and pollution both have a stock and a rate of depletion or pollution accumula-
tion. In other words there is a stock-flow dimension to the model. Dynamic models, which in-
volve time derivatives in a continuous or discrete treatment, may be more suitable for analysing
emissions abatement R&D in an environmental regulation context. Dynamic analysis may pro-
vide new insights into the dynamics of emissions accumulation over time.
Several papers have modelled a dynamic process R&D. For example, Cellini and Lamber-
tini (2004) extended the static framework introduced by d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988)
to a dynamic setting in order to assess the influence of market structure on R&D incentives.
Their conclusion that aggregate R&D effort is increasing when the number of competing firms
increases, confirmed the view expressed by Arrow (1962), as opposed to the so-called Schum-
peterian hypothesis, where a monopoly is the market structure that leads to the highest techno-
logical progress (Schumpeter, 1942). This conclusion results from the model’s dynamic setting,
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which allows for smoothing investment over a long time horizon and therefore differentiating
it from the sometimes ambiguous conclusions drawn from static models. Breton et al. (2004)
used an infinite-horizon differentiated duopoly in a differential model to compare Bertrand and
Cournot equilibria. In this dynamic process R&D setting, they found that Bertrand competition
is more efficient than Cournot only if R&D productivity is low or products are very different.
The main difference in findings between the dynamic setting used in their model and the static
setting used in Qiu’s model (1997) is that the results are valid for any spillover not close to zero
and not only for strong spillovers, as it is the case of Qiu (1997). The dynamic model and the
more general investment costs do have an impact on the efficiency results. A dynamic model is
used in Chapter 3 of this thesis.
2.2 Environmental R&D
The analysis of environmental policy aimed at reducing emissions through the introduc-
tion of abatement technology has received considerable interest. A number of authors have
attempted to rank environmental policy instruments, in particular, taxes, subsidies, auctioned
permits, free permits and emissions standards in relation to their performance in inducing firms
to adopt emissions reduction technology (Requate, 2005; Requate & Unold, 2003).
Montero (2002) analyses the R&D investment incentives of tradeable permits, auctioned
permits, emissions standards and performance standards. He assumes ex-ante symmetric firms
producing a homogeneous product and emitting a pollutant. Under imperfect competition (out-
put and permit markets), Montero finds that an emission standard and a regime of auctioned
permits provide a higher incentive to invest in abatement technologies than tradeable permits.
A performance standard may provide a higher, a lower or the same investment incentive than
both free permits and the emissions standard, depending on abatement costs and the R&D pro-
duction function. Finally, both types of standards may provide a higher, a lower or the same
investment incentive than auctioned permits, also depending on abatement costs and the R&D
production function. Under perfect competition in both markets, an emissions standard, and
tradeable and auctioned permits provide the same incentives to invest but the performance stan-
dard provides a lower incentive. For imperfect competition on the output market only, Montero
finds that tradable and auctioned permits provide the same incentives whereas an emissions
standard may provide a higher incentive than permits.
2. Literature Review 13
Requate (2005) surveys and discusses environmental policy instruments and their incentives
to instigate both adoption and development of abatement technology. The main conclusion is
that, under competitive conditions, market-based instruments (i.e., provide incentives through
the price mechanism) usually perform better than command and control. In comparison to
emissions standards, emissions taxes appear to induce more firms to invest in both R&D and
adoption of abatement technology, under a myopic regulator that commits to long-term levels
of policy instruments.
Other authors have analysed environmental policy instruments, such as emissions tax and
environmental R&D subsidies, using Industrial Organisation methodology. They use concepts
of game theory, mostly within partial equilibrium models, in order to analyse strategic behav-
iour in equilibrium. Regulators and firms adopting new or existing technology are assumed to
take sequential decisions; pre-commitment or ex-ante policy game when the regulator moves
first and time-consistent or ex-post policy game when the regulator sets the policy after firms
have selected the abatement level and output. In this dissertation, it is assumed that the reg-
ulator makes the first move or pre-commits to a long-term level of the policy instrument2.
The distinction between investment into adoption and into innovation in these models is of-
ten unclear. Authors such as Phaneuf and Requate (2002), Petrakis and Xepapadeas (2003), or
Gersbach and Requate (2004), Poyago-Theotoky (2003, 2007), Katsoulakos and Xepapadeas
(1995), Mcdonald and Poyago-Theotoky (2015), Petrakis and Poyago-Theotoky (2002) intro-
duce cost functions of the form C(e;x), where e represents emissions and x can be interpreted
as both investment into emissions reduction technology or R&D effort (Requate, 2005).
Chapters 3 and 4 of this thesis are part of this subset of environmental economic literature
that evolved from industrial organisation non-tournament models of process R&D. We kept the
term “R&D investment” used in some of this literature but this could be replaced by a more
appropriate term such as “investment in emissions reduction”. The abatement R&D presented
in Chapters 3 and 4 may represent end-of-pipe technologies, where gross emissions are subse-
quently decreased, for example, by using a filter. This approach contrasts with the one taken in
some environmental economics literature where the R&D outcomes imply a structural change
in the marginal abatement curve (Requate & Untold, 2003; Requate, 2005). The models used
2Requate (2005) concluded that under competitive conditions, timing and commitment of environmental policy
are not critical for the incentives to adopt advanced abatement technology; however, if the R&D sector has market
power, commitment is positive in providing incentives for R&D investment.
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in this thesis are extensions of the seminal work of d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1980). Their
non-tournament model of process R&D, where the firms’ investment in R&D has the sole pro-
pose of reducing the marginal costs of production, is adapted to address emissions abatement
R&D or investment in emissions reduction. Firms now invest in R&D for the sole purpose
of reducing harmful emissions, which are taxed. In our environmental innovation models, the
cost reduction component of typical process R&D models is replaced with the cost reduction of
emissions tax burden that results from an investment in abatement R&D.
The most relevant papers to our research work are reviewed as follows.
Katsoulakos and Xepapadeas (1996) analysed optimal environmental policy (emissions tax
and environmental R&D) in the case of a homogeneous product, Cournot duopoly, with R&D
spillovers between the firms. They included an endogenous emission tax and concluded that the
optimal policy consists of a tax on emissions, which is less than marginal damages and a sub-
sidy on abatement R&D that induces optimal innovation in abatement technology. The tax on
emissions internalises the external costs, restricts outputs and provides firms with an incentive
to undertake environmental R&D. Since the level of output is already under its optimum due
to imperfect competition (oligopoly and monopoly models) the tax is set lower than marginal
damages. The subsidy corrects the under-investment in R&D due to the existence of spillovers.
Petrakis and Poyago-Theotoky (2002) analysed abatement R&D subsidies and R&D coop-
eration in a process R&D model with homogeneous products and technological spillovers. The
model developed considers that production entails environmentally damaging emissions but the
tax on emissions is fixed (exogenous or inactive environmental policy). Firms undertake both
process R&D and environmental R&D to reduce their tax expenditure. The environmental dam-
age function is assumed to be quadratic. They found that the optimal subsidy can be negative
(a tax on R&D), depending on the spillover value and the degree of environmental damage.
When comparing the welfare under R&D cooperation and R&D subsidisation they found that
the comparison depends on the magnitude of the spillover and the steepness of the environmen-
tal damage function. In a large number of cases, R&D subsidisation results in higher welfare
than R&D cooperation.
Poyago-Theotoky (2003) examined the optimal environmental policy in a differentiated
product duopoly with either Bertrand (price) or Cournot (quantity) competition. Firms invest
in emissions abatement R&D to reduce their emissions, which are taxed, and this investment
is subsidised by the government or regulator. It is found that the optimal policy consists of an
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emission tax and an R&D subsidy. The trade-off between over-production due to emissions and
under-production due to market power determines the emissions tax. The emissions tax is lower
than marginal damages except for the case of Bertrand competition and homogeneous products,
where the emissions tax is equal to marginal damages. This result is in direct contrast to Lange
and Requate (1999) where the optimal tax will exceed marginal damages when firms are very
different in terms of costs and emissions coefficients. In Poyago-Theotoky’s (2003) paper con-
text firms are heterogeneous only in terms of product differentiation. It was also shown that the
optimal emissions tax under Bertrand competition always exceeds the optimal emissions tax
under Cournot competition. The intuition behind this result is that the tax is designed to correct
the emissions externality, which is greater in the case of Bertrand competition (higher output
and higher emissions). The relative size of the optimal subsidy under Cournot and Bertrand
competitions depends on the degree of product differentiation and on initial emissions. The ex-
planation provided is based on the interaction of two effects. Firstly, given that the emissions tax
under Bertrand competition is always higher and that it will induce emissions reduction R&D,
it is expected that firms under Bertrand will undertake more environmental R&D, decreasing
the need for the R&D subsidy. Secondly, when the products are similar (differentiation para-
meter close to 1) the increased product competition is more intense under Bertrand, providing a
further incentive for environmental R&D. The first effect dominates for relatively low values of
product differentiation parameter and the second effect dominates for high values of the product
differentiation parameter (homogeneous products). The value of the critical product differenti-
ation parameter above which the R&D subsidy under Bertrand competition exceeds the R&D
subsidy under Cournot competition, decreases when the initial level of emissions coefficient
increases.
The relationship between competition and environmental R&D investment was explored by
Lambertini et al. (2015). An n-firm Cournot model with an exogenous taxation was initially
analysed. It was found that green innovation always increases with an increased competition,
modeled by the number of competing firms. When endogenous taxation was considered, the
two variables show an inverted U-shaped relationship, conditioned by the presence of spillovers,
both in the case of time-consistent policy or an emissions tax pre-commitment.
In Chapters 3 and 4 of this thesis the assumption of constant marginal damages (linear dam-
ages) is made, which is a non-standard assumption in the literature, one exception being Petrakis
and Xepapadeas (1999). Kennedy and Laplante (1999) provide a comprehensive analysis on the
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interaction between linear or convex damages and time-consistency of the first-best emissions
tax policy. The social damage function depicts aggregate emissions in monetary terms, imply-
ing that only aggregate emissions matter. It is common to assume that the damage function
is increasing and convex in aggregate emissions. For tractability reasons, the rather restrictive
assumption of linear damages was made. The standard assumption of environmental damages
increasing and convex on emissions exacerbates the impact of emissions on welfare. The ben-
efits of a more environmentally friendly technology, possibly induced by the introduction of an
emissions tax, will be, in this case, more significant. However, the models in this thesis analyse
a subset of aggregate emissions, which can be approximated by a linear damage function. For
the purpose of this research work, the qualitative results obtained would not change if a more
general damage function (convex on emissions) was considered.
2.3 The Porter Hypothesis
The commonly named Porter Hypothesis (Porter, 1991; Porter & van der Linde, 1995)
suggests that welfare enhancing environmental regulation can also benefit firms. Defying con-
ventional wisdom that environmental regulation has a detrimental impact on business, they as-
serted that well-designed environmental regulation (in particular market-based instruments) can
induce innovation and, as a side-effect, can increase productivity, and therefore firms’ profits.
Strict but effective environmental regulation can stimulate innovation leading to environmental
performance and, sometimes, business performance (Ambec et al., 2013).
Ambec et al. (2013) conducted a comprehensive review of theoretical and empirical stud-
ies on the Porter Hypothesis. The theoretical studies are grouped under organisational and
behavioural economics (departing from the assumption that firms are profit maximising) or
under imperfect competition or market failure (combining firms’ profit maximisation with the
assumption of market failure). The empirical studies literature addresses the impact of envi-
ronmental regulation either on innovation and technology or on productivity. Market-based ad-
justable instruments, such as emissions taxes, are more conducive to environmental innovation
than technological standards as firms are free to find the solution to minimise regulation costs.
Market-based environmental regulation may assist firms in identifying opportunities to both
reduce emissions and increase profits by overcoming possible organisation inertia. Emissions
abatement R&D spurred by environmental regulation may have a positive side effect of reduc-
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ing production costs. As a result, the level of cost reduction may exceed regulation compliance
costs plus R&D costs; therefore, the Porter Hypothesis may hold under specific conditions.
Porter and van der Linde (1995) provided case studies of environmental regulation that led
to the adoption of new technologies, apparently beneficial to the firm. In their paper, two general
forms of innovation triggered by environmental regulation were identified. Firstly, in response
to regulation, firms get better at dealing with recurring pollution, for example by reducing
emissions, processing harmful materials and by implementing methods of improving secondary
treatment. Secondly, environmentally focused innovation often improves product performance
or quality and may also reduce production costs. However, quantitative evidence is limited.
The lack of a rigorous basis for this important argument has attracted criticism from economists
such as Palmer et al. (1995). When it is critical to persuade business to accept environmental
regulation, the Porter Hypothesis has been used successfully in political debate, as it suggests
the possibility of environmental protection actually being conducive to economic growth and
enhancing firms’ profits (Ambec et al., 2013). Most arguments about the Porter Hypothesis
focus on some form of bounded rationality. A firm’s manager may have motivations and incen-
tives that are not aligned with profit maximisation. These may include an under-investment in
risky R&D projects by risk-averse managers (Kennedy, 1994). Also, present-biased preferences
of managers lead to delays in undertaking profitable R&D investments, as they represent higher
costs for the manager but are beneficial for the firm (Ambec & Barla, 2006). Environmental
regulation may assist the manager in overcoming this short-sighted approach by making present
investments in innovation more profitable or mandatory. Moreover, environmental regulation
may also increase firms’ profits by reducing the cost of chemicals, lowering waste disposal and
improving productivity by retiring old technology (Ambec et al., 2013).
Heyes (2009) provides a comprehensive survey of theoretical and empirical research point-
ing to environmental regulation interacting with the strength of competition in product mar-
kets. The impact of regulation on market competition can occur in a number of different ways,
which include firms’ size and costs of regulation compliance, conditions of entry into a par-
ticular market, and competition distortion as regulations may act as subsidies (Heyes, 2009).
The reconciliation between the Porter Hypothesis and firm’s profit maximisation is treated in
the literature by assuming a “market failure”. Under imperfect competition and differentiated
products, Andre et al. (2009) show that all firms may benefit from a minimum standard for
environmental product quality, by solving a coordination problem. Regulation may induce a
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Pareto-improving equilibrium. Considering an upstream market for innovation, Greaker (2003),
provides a theoretical foundation for the Porter Hypothesis by taking technological spillovers
as a market failure. A coordination failure argument is provided by Mohr (2002) and Mohr
and Saha (2008), also using technological spillovers. As the return on a firm’s abatement R&D
investment is partly a public good, firms will under-invest in emissions abatement technology.
Environmental regulation may force firms to reach a Pareto-improving equilibrium of higher
investments in abatement R&D.
In Chapter 4 of this dissertation we determine the conditions under which the design of an
environmental policy can be beneficial for firms and society. Results consistent with the Porter
Hypothesis are derived without the need for behavioural assumptions, bounded rationality type
of arguments nor the assumption that a firm’s investment in emissions abatement R&D results
in productivity gains (or attracts a "green" premium in price), as it is commonly assumed in the
related literature.
2.4 Cooperative Environmental R&D and Uncertainty
The economics of R&D cooperation have been comprehensively examined in industrial eco-
nomics, following the original work by Katz (1986) and d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988)
— see De Bondt (1997) for an extensive survey. In particular, Kamien et al. (1992) considered
a deterministic model related to d’Aspremont and Jacquemin’s (1988) and extended the analy-
sis to a richer set of R&D cooperation scenarios. In relation to a polluting industry, emissions
abatement R&D cooperation vs. independent R&D has received limited attention, with the ex-
ception of deterministic analysis literature by Petrakis and Poyago-Theotoky (2002), Sandonís
and Mariel (2004), Scott (1996), Chiou and Hu (2001), and Poyago-Theotoky (2007). This
literature typically considers non-tournament models of abatement R&D, where a determinis-
tic relationship is assumed between the R&D investment and the level of emissions abatement,
with diminishing returns on investment. These deterministic R&D models fail to address the
uncertain nature of R&D and appear to ignore another extensive body of literature that studies
the stochastic nature of R&D in oligopoly — see Reinganum (1989) for a survey.
In the absence of environmental damages, the process (cost-reduction) R&D cooperation
literature reports the well-known result that cooperation in R&D, in comparison to independent
R&D, is generally socially beneficial when spillovers are relatively large. R&D cooperation
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with full information sharing provides the best social outcome compared to any other form of
R&D organisation for any spillover value (see d’Aspremont & Jacquemin, 1988; De Bondt
& Wu, 1997; Kamien et al., 1992). Furthermore, Kamien et al. (1992) concluded that non-
cooperation with full information sharing is the least desirable organisational structure as it
leads to the highest product prices and the lowest R&D output. The main result of their study
states that full cooperation in R&D is beneficial for everyone concerned, provided that the firms
remain competitors in the product market.
Using Research Joint Ventures (RJV) filed under the National Cooperative Research Act of
1984 (U.S. 98th Congress, 1984), and its sequel, the National Cooperative Research and Pro-
duction Act of 1993 (U.S. 103rd Congress, 1993), Scott (1996) studied environmental Research
Joint Ventures and concluded that RJVs focus on particular types of ventures as it may promote
economic efficiency. An RJV may enable the creation of new products and processes more
efficiently than its individual firms could innovate separately. These findings can be used as a
rationale for governments to allow and even stimulate R&D cooperation in industries charac-
terised by large technological spillovers. Moreover, a special antitrust policy treatment of R&D
has been widely advocated, provided that cooperation does not extend to the product market.
Theoretical aspects of R&D cooperation suggest that the two main factors that provide the
incentives to cooperate are uncertainty and spillovers, which also may affect the size, concen-
tration and nature of R&D cooperation arrangements (Silipo, 2008). Using a simplified model
with uncertainty and no spillovers, Marjit (1991) and Combs (1992) showed that firms prefer
to cooperate only if the probability of success is relatively high. Moreover, if the probabil-
ity of success of the programme is moderate or intermediate, R&D competition is preferred.
In contrast and as described earlier, the models with spillovers and no uncertainty found that
cooperation is always beneficial for everyone concerned.
Choi (1993) analysed the incentive to cooperate in the R&D market with uncertainty and
spillovers. He demonstrated that profitability in R&D cooperation increases with the level of
spillover, and R&D investment is also higher under cooperation only up to a critical level of
spillovers. If the spillover is greater than this level the opposite is true.
Katsoulacos and Ulph (1998) pointed out that spillovers may harm or help the successful
firm, depending on whether the firms are in the same industry or complementary industries. Un-
der a complete contract framework, Silipo and Weiss (2005) studied different types of spillovers
and showed that the level of investment in R&D depends little on the type of spillover but that
2. Literature Review 20
the extent of spillover is often important. When firms form an RJV, the R&D investment may
be under other types of cooperation or competition. Specifically, an R&D cartel performs better
than an RJV if spillovers are large or if probability of success is high. Finally, competition
results in the largest R&D investment, if spillovers are small.
Hackett (1995) looked at pollution-controlling innovation and RJVs under a tournament/patent
race approach. His findings included that firms may have a collective incentive to form industry-
wide pollution control RJVs. Among the different ways of addressing uncertainty, tournament
models typically use a Poisson process where spillovers are captured by the degree of easiness
to imitate.
Beath et al. (1988) studied process R&D cooperation under uncertainty using a model of
R&D rivalry under homogeneous product duopoly where imitation after innovation was consid-
ered. It was found that R&D expenditures will be greater under cooperation than under rivalry,
if imitation is easy. The opposite is true when imitation is difficult. Firms will prefer to coop-
erate, in the sense that the present value of the expected payoff is increased when imitation is
easy, but they may prefer to compete when imitation is difficult especially when product market
competition is intense.
Erkal and Piccinin (2010), researched process R&D cooperation under uncertainty, with free
entry in both the R&D race and product market, using a continuous-time, stochastic Poisson
discovery process model of R&D. Their findings showed that sharing the research outcome is a
necessary condition for the profitability of cooperative R&D arrangements with free entry.
Miyagiwa and Ohno (2002) considered a racing model of process R&D under uncertainty.
They found that firms always want to cooperate in R&D but do not necessarily want to share
information. Also, cooperation increases R&D efforts only if the spillover rate is high enough.
Finally, they found that R&D cooperation with full information sharing does not necessarily
lead to a higher social welfare than the other R&D organisational structures. Their findings
contrast with the results obtained by Kamien et al. (1992) who have studied similar issues. The
difference is due to how cooperative R&D is defined. In Kamien et al. (1992) the coordination
is in R&D inputs whereas in Miyagiwa and Ohno (2002) the coordination is in R&D output
(i.e., diffusion of an innovation).
Poyago-Theotoky (2007) analysed environmental deterministic R&D cooperation under a
Cournot duopoly with homogeneous products, using the Kamien et al. (1992) terminology.
Firms invest in R&D for the sole purpose of reducing emissions that are taxed. It is assumed that
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environmental damages follow a quadratic function. The paper concluded that environmental
R&D is higher when firms cooperate in R&D compared to when they engage in independent
R&D for small damages, and it is also higher for large damages, but only when R&D is efficient.
In contrast, when damages are large and R&D is inefficient, the reverse is true. The same
ranking applies to the comparison of social welfare. Firms find it profitable to cooperate in R&D
but cooperation is only socially desirable when damages are small or when they are relatively
large but R&D is inefficient. Even for large spillovers, cooperation in R&D leads to a socially
worse outcome than independent R&D, as long as environmental damage is large and R&D is
highly efficient. The explanation provided in the paper is as follows. A small environmental
damage implies lower taxes and the R&D returns are high so firms invest a lot in R&D. Since an
environmental R&D cartel maximises joint profits, firms have an additional incentive to invest in
R&D so they undertake more R&D than independent firms. For large environmental damages,
the comparison between the two forms of R&D organisation depends on the efficiency of the
R&D.
In Chapter 5 of this thesis we investigate the impact of environmental R&D organisational
structures on firms’ innovation activities, profits and social welfare, when the innovation out-
come is uncertain. The resulting ex-post firms’ asymmetries lead to new insights regarding
firms and social planner’s preferences.
Chapter 3
Emissions Abatement R&D
Dynamic Competition in Supply Schedules
3.1 Introduction
This paper investigates the design of an optimal environmental policy in a dynamic set-
ting when the output market is a differentiated duopoly, production generates environmentally
damaging emissions and firms can pursue Research and Development (R&D) to reduce such
emissions. By considering a differential game and a supply function equilibrium, we can pa-
rameterise the nature of competition, covering behaviour ranging from Cournot to Bertrand,
and study the impact of this parameter on the choice of the optimal environmental policy (a
combination of tax and subsidy) over time. This is a major departure from the extensive sta-
tic literature where the optimal tax is typically derived in the context of a particular imperfect
competition model (e.g., Bertrand or Cournot).
The economic theory that underpins the impact of the three market failures – negative exter-
nalities (e.g., pollution), the public goods nature of R&D, and imperfect competition – is well
understood. For example, when the production (or consumption) of certain goods generates
negative externalities in the form of environmentally damaging pollution, and these costs are
not internalised by the producers, there will be excessive production and pollution from a social
viewpoint (Jaffe et al., 2005). It is also understood that when R&D generates positive external-
ities in the form of spillovers for firms who free ride on other firms’ investment, there will be
under-investment in R&D (Griliches, 1992).
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Moreover, imperfect competition allows firms to charge prices above competitive (cost-
reflective) prices, which leads to less production and consumption than socially optimal. As it
is well documented in the literature, under imperfect competition, the second best optimal tax
on pollution may be lower than the marginal damages (Buchanan, 1969; Barnett, 1980) and by
a similar second-best logic (à la Lipsey and Lancaster, 1956), the optimal subsidy to R&D may
be different from its marginal benefit. The focus of this paper is on the nature of the trade-offs
between these three market failures and policy interventions.
The literature has typically focused on two of the three market failures. For example, the
interaction between optimal environmental tax and the development and diffusion of new en-
vironmentally beneficial technologies has been studied by Jaffe et al. (2005). These authors
point out that in the absence of environmental tax policies, there will be under-investment in
environmentally friendly technology especially in the presence of adoption spillovers. This is
also a feature of our model. However, our contribution goes further.
By adding imperfect competition, we introduce another market failure; more intense com-
petition leads to lower prices, higher quantities and, therefore, higher emissions. While lower
prices and higher quantities are good for consumers, producer surplus is reduced and pollution
also increases. Therefore, the final impact on social welfare from an increase in the intensity
with which firms compete is a priori ambiguous. As stated above, our contribution is to deter-
mine the optimal environmental policy explicitly as a function of the intensity of competition
in a dynamic setting.
Our model has three key features. First, emission abatement R&D is considered with the
assumption that R&D investment at the firm’s level has the sole purpose of reducing emissions.
The emissions reduction in our model represents a movement along the firm’s marginal emis-
sions abatement cost curve.1 The model is a modified dynamic extension of the seminal work
of D’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) and, more recently, Poyago-Theotoky (2007). In addi-
tion, R&D effective spillovers (Breton & Turki, 2005) are considered where the effectiveness
of involuntary leakage of innovative information is directly linked to how closely related the
two products are. Second, we model a duopoly, producing differentiated goods, and competing
1In contrast, many studies in the environmental economics literature assume that innovation or technological
adoption is captured by a downward shift of a firm’s marginal abatement cost function. Amir et al. (2008), however,
show that, in general, the effects of innovation on the marginal abatement cost curve depend on the nature of the
innovation, and that only innovation in end-of-pipe technology leads to a uniform downward shift of the marginal
abatement cost curve.
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over time in the output market. Each firm decides how much to invest in R&D and chooses a
supply schedule. This approach allows us to parametrise the nature or intensity of competition.
Finally, a social welfare maximising regulator determines a tax per unit of pollution in order to
induce the optimal social level of production and pollution, and a R&D abatement subsidy to
induce the optimal social level of abatement research.2
There are several insights. First, the impact of an increase in the intensity of competition
on equilibrium quantities and consumer surplus is, as expected, positive. However, as more
production involves more pollution, the impact of more intense competition on welfare depends,
in a complex, but quantifiable way, on the environmental policy (emissions tax and abatement
R&D subsidies).
Second, as products become less differentiated, the less firms behave as local monopolists
and, therefore, quantities and consumer surplus increase, as long as the intensity of competition
is sufficiently large.3 However, this increase in equilibrium quantities has an ambiguous impact
on welfare as total emissions increase. The ambiguity of the impact on welfare extends the point
made by Jaffe et al. (2005) that environmental technology policy is plagued by complex trade-
offs, not only between market failures associated with pollution and technological innovation
spillovers, but also their interaction in an environment where competition in output markets is
imperfect.
Third, the optimal (welfare-maximising) emissions tax and the R&D subsidies vary in op-
posite directions with the intensity of competition. The optimal tax needs to rise as a result of an
increase in the intensity of competition to compensate for increased production. The opposite,
however, is true for the optimal R&D subsidy. As competition intensifies, and the optimal tax
is adjusted accordingly, the benefits of R&D subsidies diminish. This result complements the
analysis of Pal and Saha (2014) who studied the implementation of socially optimal outputs and
abatements by a tax-subsidy scheme under a mixed monopoly.
Finally, as the intensity of competition increases, the impact of a tax on emissions is stronger
(but diminishing) than the impact of an R&D subsidy. The reason for such asymmetry is that
the subsidy is applied to total cost, which is a convex function of R&D output à la D’Aspremont
and Jacquemin (1988). We also show that increased competition can reduce welfare when the
2For an examination of the impact of the different forms of organisation of R&D on the optimal emissions
taxation, see Mcdonald and Poyago-Theotoky (2015).
3This is a generalisation of a standard result in industrial organisation comparing Bertrand and Cournot out-
comes when products are differentiated. See, for example, Brander and Spencer (2014).
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emissions tax is set too low and cannot change as a response to changes in the market structure
in the final goods market.
More broadly, the key contribution of this Chapter is to point out the link between the nature
of competition in the output market and the optimal environmental policy. This is a novel
point. For example, there are many areas in competition policy, such as merger guidelines,
whose impact on the environment could be meaningfully considered. Conversely, the design of
environmental policy may need to be more nuanced to consider the competitive environment.
This Chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 describes in detail the various building
blocks of the model whereas Section 3.3 defines the dynamic differential game. Section 3.4
characterises the optimal emissions tax and R&D subsidy. Sections 3.5 and 3.6 analyse how the
intensity of competition and other general parameters (such as the discount rate) impact on the
optimal environmental policy. Section 3.7 concludes.
3.2 The Model
Two firms compete over time in the output market by producing and selling differentiated
goods. Time is continuous. Production entails the emission of a pollutant, which is taxed. Firms
can respond to the tax by decreasing their production or engaging in R&D, which is assumed
to be for the sole purpose of reducing emissions. R&D expenditures are subsidised. Investment
in R&D generates spillovers. Below we expound the different building blocks of our model;
namely, demand, market (imperfect) competition, and the investment in the production of R&D.
For simplicity, we omit the time dimension in most of this Section but the reader should keep
in mind that firms make decisions at each point in time. As fully explained in Section 3.3, we
will focus on the steady state equilibrium.
3.2.1 Demand
We follow Singh and Vives (1984) and assume that the representative consumer has the
following quadratic (strictly concave) utility function:
U(qi;q j;m) = a(qi+q j) 
(q2i +q2j)
2
 ηqiq j+m; i; j = 1;2; i 6= j; (3.1)
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where a > 0 is a constant representing the market size, reservation price or maximum willing-
ness to pay, and the parameter η 2 [0;1] represents the degree of product differentiation with
η = 0 implying that firms are independent monopolists and η = 1 being the case when prod-
ucts are perfect substitutes. In this setting, m is the numeraire good capturing the consumer’s
expenditure on outside goods. The inverse demand function is determined by maximising the
utility function, with the associated first order condition:
max(qi;q j)[U(qi;q j;m)] ;
∂U(qi;q j;m)
∂qi
= 0: (3.2)
The inverse demand function for good i is then given by:
Pi = a qi ηq j: (3.3)
3.2.2 Competition in Supply Schedules
We use the notion of competition in supply schedules to model competition in the output
market.4 By considering families of more or less elastic supply schedules, it is possible to
generate spaces of oligopolistic games of which Bertrand and Cournot are polar cases. This
approach allows us to parameterise the nature of competition in the output market. Firms face
a strictly decreasing demand function for each product qi = D(Pi); and produce with constant
marginal cost c < a. Firms compete in supply functions qi(β ;θ i), which are continuously
differentiable, convex, and increasing in both variables. In order to simplify the analysis, we
restrict our attention to linear supply schedules of the form
qi = βPi+θ i; (3.4)
but we note that Kao et al. (2014) show that under some conditions such a restriction involves
no loss of generality.
The market clearing price for each good satisfies:
Di(Pi(β ;θ i;θ j)) = qi(β ;θ i;θ j): (3.5)
4See, for example, Delgado and Moreno (2004), Grant and Quiggin (1996), Grossman (1981), Kao et al.
(2014), Klemperer and Meyer (1989), Menezes and Quiggin (2012), Robson (1981), Turnbull (1983) and Vives
(2011).
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Firm i’s profit function can be written as follows:
pi i(β ;θ i;θ j) = [Pi(β ;θ i;θ j)  c]qi(β ;θ i;θ j): (3.6)
Following Kao et al. (2014), we assume a fixed value for β the slope of the firm’s supply
function, and that firms choose θ i. This assumption allows us to focus on the unique equilib-
rium, and avoid the multiplicity of supply function equilibria that exists in a general setting.5
As in Kao et al. (2014), β can be interpreted as a measure of the intensity of competition,
varying from Cournot (β = 0) to Bertrand (β ! ∞) market structures. Given β ; the choice of
θ i by each firm determines then the equilibrium quantity. For example, if β = 1, the firms’
supply functions are given by a 45 degree line. Although, in this Chapter, the parameter β
is given exogenously, Delgado and Moreno (2004) provide a more general analysis of firms’
competition via supply functions and coalition-proof supply function equilibria in oligopoly.
Given the linear supply schedules, and a linear demand function (3.3), the market clearing
prices and quantities for the differentiated goods are obtained by substituting (3.4) into the
demand function, yielding:
Pi(β ;θ i;θ j) =
a[1+β (1 η)]  (1+β  βη2)θ i ηθ j
(1+β )2 β 2η2 ; (3.7)
and
qi(β ;θ i;θ j) =
aβ [1+β (1 η)]+(1+β )θ i βηθ j
(1+β )2 β 2η2 : (3.8)
3.2.3 Emissions and Abatement R&D
Firm i, i= 1;2, emits e0qi units of some pollutant when it produces quantity qi. The pollutant
is subject to a per unit tax te. As a response to the tax, firms can either decrease their output or
invest in abatement technology (Poyago-Theotoky, 2003).
Investment in R&D earns a subsidy s, 0 s< 1; on a per unit basis. Similar to d’Aspremont
and Jacquemin (1988) but following Poyago-Theotoky (2007), we assume that, in the absence
of subsidies, if firm i invests ν2 I
2
i in abatement R&D, then i reduces its gross emissions e0qi
5In Klemperer and Meyer (1989), for example, unbounded demand uncertainty yields the Bertrand outcome as
the unique equilibrium. In a deterministic setting, Delgado and Moreno (2004) show that the Cournot outcome is
the unique equilibrium when there are more than three firms and demand is linear.
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by (xi+ ηγx j), where xi represents the ability of firm i to reduce emissions with a similar
definition for firm j, and γ; 0  γ  1; captures the technological spillover. In particular, the
effective R&D spillover is represented by ηγ (Breton and Turki, 2005; Corradini et al., 2014),
0  η  1: This captures the notion that the more two products are related to each other, the
higher is the spillover. For example, if the products are unrelated, then firms will not benefit
from each other’s research effort. Finally, ν relates to the efficiency or productivity of the R&D
activities, where a higher value means lower efficiency. We also assume that firm i0s R&D
emission reduction capital stock evolves over time according to the following standard capital
stock accumulation process:
x˙i = Ii δxi;xi(0) = xi0 (3.9)
where δ , 0 δ  1, is a constant depreciation rate, which measures the instantaneous decrease
in emissions reduction effectiveness due to the ageing of technology, and xi0 is a positive con-
stant. While there is a direct relationship between xi and Ii, and it should be clear that firm i
chooses Ii, for convenience, we will not make this relationship explicit in some of the definitions
that follow. For example, we will write firm i’s net emissions as:
Ei(xi;x j;qi) = e0qi  (xi+ηγx j); (3.10)
which are required to be non-negative. The assumption that abatement R&D results in a re-
duction in gross emissions (not marginal emissions) eliminates an interaction term between the
two strategical variables (qi and xi), as per Poyago-Theotoky (2007). This approach allows a
tractable analytical solution for the model developed in this Chapter.
The environmental damage cost of emissions is assumed to take a linear form6:
D= α(E1+E2) = αd;
where Ei is defined in equation (3.10) and α > 0 is the marginal disutility of pollution. Firm i’s
emissions tax cost function is given by:
6The assumption of linear damages is for simplicity. Non-linear (e.g., quadratic) damages will exacerbate the
impact of emissions on welfare for emissions levels greater than one, but the qualitative results remain the same.
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Ti(xi;x j;qi) = teEi = te[e0qi  (xi+ηγx j)]: (3.11)
The choice of an emissions tax rate te is not entirely unconstrained. In order to ensure an
interior solution we need to impose the following condition:
Assumption A0 a  c  e0te > 0:
This assumption states that the maximum willingness to pay net of the marginal cost of
production and net of the marginal cost of the emissions tax must be nonnegative.
When a per unit subsidy s is applied to R&D investment, the firm’s total cost function can
be expressed as:
Ci(qi;xi;x j; Ii) = cqi+ te[e0qi  (xi+ηγx j)]+(1  s)ν2 I
2
i : (3.12)
Note that the Porter Hypothesis (Porter & van der Linde, 1995) does not hold in our setting
as the investment in R&D has no impact on production costs.
We can write firm i’s profit function as:
pi i(qi;q j;xi;x j; Ii) = (a qi ηq j  c)qi  te[e0qi  (xi+ηγx j)]  (1  s)ν2 I
2
i : (3.13)
As degree of differentiation increases — that is, η decreases — there is a positive impact
via demand and a negative impact as the ability of the firms to free ride on their opponent’s
R&D decreases.
3.2.4 Social Welfare
The regulator sets its emissions tax and R&D subsidies to maximise the discounted stream
of social welfare over an infinite horizon. Consumer surplus is defined as:
CS=U(qi;q j) 
2
∑
i=1
piqi = a
2
∑
i=1
qi  12
2
∑
i=1
q2i  ηqiq j 
2
∑
i=1
piqi: (3.14)
Firm i’ profits, excluding emissions taxation cost and R&D subsidy, are given by
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pi i = (a  c)qi q2i  qiq jη 
ν
2
I2i : (3.15)
Social welfare is defined by consumer surplus plus the profits of both firms (excluding taxes
and subsidies) minus the environmental damage:
W =CS+pi1+pi2 D: (3.16)
3.3 The Differential Game
We analyse a non-cooperative differential game where firms 1 and 2 each choose quantity
(qi; i = 1;2) and investment in R&D (Ii; i = 1;2) to maximise the following discounted stream
of profits over an infinite horizon:
pi i =
Z ∞
0
e rtf(a qi ηq j  c)qi  te[e0qi  (xi+ηγx j)]  (1  s)ν2 I
2
i gdt (3.17)
where r (0  r  1) is the discount rate. The functional objective (profit function) above can
also be expressed in terms of the strategic variables θ i;θ j. In differential game terminology, xi
are the state variables and Ii and θ i are the control variables, where xi and Ii are related through
(3.9) and θ i and qi are linked through (3.4).
The differential game is linear both in state and control variables and, therefore, it fol-
lows that the value functions and strategies are also linear. As it is standard in the analysis of
infinite-horizon differential games, the analysis is confined to stationary Markovian feedback
strategies. Applying a standard sufficient condition for a stationary feedback equilibrium, the
objective is to find bounded and continuously differentiable value functions V (xi;x j), satisfying
the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations (Dockner et al., 2000):
rVi(xi;x j) = max(Ii;θ i)f(a qi ηq j  c)qi  te[e0qi  (xi+ηγx j)]  (1  s)
ν
2
I2i
+
∂Vi(xi;x j)
∂xi
(Ii δxi)+ ∂Vi(xi;x j)∂x j (I j δx j)g: (3.18)
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The above equation can be expressed in terms of the strategic variables by replacing the
quantities using equation (3.8).
Differentiating the right-hand side with respect to Ii and θ i and equating it to zero yields:
θ i =
a[1 β 2(1 η2)]  (c+ e0te)(1+β )[1+β (1+η)]
2+η+β (2 η)(1+η) : (3.19)
Therefore, the equilibrium quantities can be determined as follows:
qi =
(a  c  e0te)(1+β )
2+η+β (2 η)(1+η) (3.20)
Remark: From (3.20), setting β = 0 we obtain the Cournot equilibrium quantity (a c e0te)2+η ;
where e0te represents the incremental cost associated with the emissions tax. Similarly,
when β ! ∞, we obtain the Bertrand equilibrium quantity (a c e0te)(2 η)(1+η) .
We are now ready to state our first result characterising the steady state equilibrium.
Proposition 3.1: Suppose assumption A0 holds and that
ν  te(1+ γη)[2+η+β (2 η)(1+η)]
e0(1  s)(a  c  e0te)(1+β )δ (r+δ ) : (3.21)
Then the general feedback equilibrium steady state is given by:
xi =
te
(r+δ )(1  s)δν ; (3.22)
the steady state value for the control variable is expressed by:
Ii =
te
(r+δ )(1  s)ν ; (3.23)
and the dynamic emissions reduction function is given by:
xi(t) =
e δ t [(r+δ )(1  s)δνxi0  (1  eδ t)te]
(r+δ )(1  s)δν : (3.24)
The proof of Proposition 3.1 is included in Appendix A.
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Note that (3.21) places a bound on how easy/effective emissions-reducing R&D is. Also,
(3.21) implies that e0qi  xi (1+ γη), which ensures that post innovation costs remain non-
negative and also that firms’ emissions are nonnegative.
The following corollary summarises how equilibrium steady state quantities (3.20), invest-
ment in abatement R&D (3.23), consumer surplus (CS), producer surplus (PS), environmental
damage cost of emissions (D) and welfare (W) vary with the emissions tax (te), R&D subsidy
(s), intensity of competition (β ), discount rate (r), technology depreciation rate (δ ) and product
differentiation (η):
Corollary 1 The table below summarises the comparative statics. 7.
Table 3.1: Comparative Statics — Welfare Components
∂
∂ te
∂
∂ s
∂
∂β
∂
∂ r
∂
∂δ
∂
∂η
qi < 0 n=a > 0 n=a n=a > 0
if 1=2< η  1 and β > 12η 1
Ii > 0 > 0 n=a < 0 < 0 n=a
CS < 0 n=a > 0 n=a n=a > 0
if β > 13(1+η)
PS i=t < 0 i=t > 0 > 0 i=t
D < 0 < 0 > 0 > 0 > 0 i=t
W i=t i=t i=t i=t i=t i=t
The proof is straightforward but is provided in Appendix A for completeness.
There are several noteworthy features in the table above. First, the impact of an increase
in the intensity of competition on equilibrium quantities and consumer surplus is, as expected,
positive. However, as more production involves more pollution, for a fixed emission tax rate,
the impact of more intense competition on welfare is ambiguous. This will be explored further
in Section 3.5 below.
Second, as products become less differentiated (that is, η increases), the firms behave less
as local monopolists and, therefore, quantities and consumer surplus increase, as long as the
7n=a : not applicable. i=t : indeterminate or determinate only under complex conditions.
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fixed intensity of competition is sufficiently large. This is a generalisation of the standard result
in industrial organisation literature where, in the absence of pollution taxes, quantities increase
with η under Bertrand Competition only if η > 0:5 (Brander & Spencer, 2014) 8. As in the case
of an increase in the intensity of competition, here too a reduction in product differentiation that
leads to greater equilibrium quantities has, ceteris paribus, an ambiguous impact on welfare as
total emissions increase.
Finally, we note that the marginal impact of all the variables of interest on welfare is un-
clear. This extends the point made by Jaffe et al. (2005) that environmental technology policy
is plagued by complex trade-offs not only between market failures associated with pollution
and with the diffusion of new technologies but also with their interaction when competition is
imperfect in output markets.
In the next Section we study the combination of emissions tax and R&D subsidies that can
be designed to overcome these market failures and the trade-offs that they entail.
3.4 Optimal Emissions Tax and R&D Subsidies
A regulator, who can fully commit to policy and is able to perfectly assess firms’ individual
emissions, sets its emissions tax and R&D subsidies to maximise the discounted stream of
social welfare over an infinite horizon. As hinted in the introduction, the tax is to address the
pollution externality and the subsidy is to address the public good nature of R&D. In choosing
the optimal tax and subsidy, however, the regulator takes into account the nature of the imperfect
competition in the output market.
The regulator’s dynamic control problem can be defined as maximising:
Wc =
Z ∞
0
e rtf(1+η)q2+2q[a  c q(1+η)] νI2 αdgdt (3.25)
subject to
˙d = 2[e0q  (1+ηγ)x] ρd: (3.26)
8Equilibrium quantities on a Bertrand duopoly with differentiated products and symmetric/constant marginal
cost: qB = a c(2 η)(1+η) (output falls if 06 η < 0:5; reaches a minimum at η = 0:5 and rises for η > 0:5).
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where r (0 r 1) is the discount rate and ρ is an environmental purification factor (0 ρ  1).
The environmental damage is assumed to be subject to exponential decay. The constraint (3.26)
determines how emissions generated today add to the current stock of environmental damages
d(t). The initial stock is d(0) = d0. The term ρd is included in the above equation as it is
assumed that the natural rate of purification is proportional to the existing stock. The state
variable is d(t) and the control variables are the tax on emissions (te) and R&D subsidies (s).
The tax revenue and the subsidy expenditures are simply transfers and, therefore, can be omitted
from the welfare function. The government in this setting is not budget constrained.
3.4.1 Current Value Hamiltonian
Given the equilibrium steady state, the emissions reduction, and equilibrium quantities given
by, respectively, (3.22), (3.23), and (3.20), we can write the current value Hamiltonian function
as:
Hc(d; te;s) = (1+η)q
2
+2q[a  c q(1+η)] νI2 αd (3.27)
+λf2[e0q  (1+ηγ)x] ρdg:
Costate variable λ is a measure of the sensitivity of the optimal total welfare to the given
initial level of environmental damage. In general, λ (t) is the shadow price of environmental
damage at a given point in time. From an economics perspective, this problem can be viewed
as an autonomous problem as the t argument only appears explicitly via the discount factor.
The first four terms of the Hamiltonian function represent the welfare value at time t, based
on the current environmental damage and the current policy decisions in terms of emissions
taxes and R&D subsidies, taken at this point in time. The last component of this function
represents the rate of change of environmental damages corresponding to tax and subsidy policy.
When multiplied by the shadow price λ (t), it is converted to a monetary value. Unlike the first
four terms, which relate to the current welfare effect of the tax/subsidy policy, the last term
can be viewed as the future welfare impact of the policy. The current environmental damage
accumulation leads to future deterioration of general welfare.
Applying the maximum principle conditions (Pontryagin et al., 1962), the problem can now
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be solved for te(t), s(t), d(t) and λ (t), satisfying the following conditions:
∂Hc
∂ te
= 0; ∂Hc
∂ s
= 0; (3.28)
 ∂Hc
∂d + rλ =
˙λ ; (3.29)
˙d = ∂H
∂λ
= 2[e0q  (1+ γη)x] ρd (3.30)
=
2e0(a  c  e0te)(1+β )
2+η+β (2 η)(1+η)  
2te(1+ γη)
(1  s)δ (r+δ )ν  ρd;
d(0) = d0; and (3.31)
limt!∞e rtλ (t)d(t) = 0 (transversality condition): (3.32)
The conditions for the maximum principle are sufficient for the global maximisation in the
infinite-horizon problem provided that the current value Hamiltonian is concave in the state
and control variables (second derivatives of the Hamiltonian with respect to these variables are
negative) for all t and that the transversality condition is met.
Assumption A1 s> 1  3teδ (r+ρ)2α(r+δ )(1+γη) :
This assumption ensures that the current value Hamiltonian is concave in te:(second deriv-
ative of the Hamiltonian with respect to te is negative). The next proposition characterises the
optimal solutions.
Proposition 3.2: Suppose that assumption A1 holds. The maximisation of (3.25) subject to
(3.26) yields the optimal tax
te =
α[2+η+β (2 η)(1+η)]
(1+β )(1+η)(r+ρ)
  (a  c)[1+β (1 η
2)]
e0(1+β )(1+η)
; (3.33)
and the optimal abatement R&D subsidy
s =
(a  c)δ [1+β (1 η2)](r+ρ)
e0α(1+β )(r+δ )(1+η)(1+ γη)
(3.34)
 δf1+(1+η)[β (1 η)  γη(1+β )]g
(1+β )(r+δ )(1+η)(1+ γη)
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+
r
(r+δ )
:
The proof of Proposition 3.2 is included in Appendix A.
Note that when the optimal emissions tax and the optimal abatement R&D subsidy are
considered, Assumption 1 is satisfied provided that the optimal emissions tax is positive (te >
0() e0α[2+η+β (2 η)(1+η)]> (a  c)[1+β (1 η2)](r+ρ)).
It is worth pointing out that when the pollution stock is small (i.e., low values of e0α), the
optimal tax on emissions is small and the optimal abatement R&D subsidy is large. This result is
broadly in line with Benchekroun and Long (1998), who find that it can be optimal to subsidise
firms when the stock of pollution is small, under a model that only considers emissions tax.
From inspection of (3.33), we note that the optimal emissions tax increases as the disutility
of pollution (α) increases but it does not depend on the level of industry spillover (γ) nor does it
depend on the level of technology depreciation (δ ). The emissions tax is introduced to correct
the negative externality of firms producing more than what is socially desirable, due to the ac-
companying generation of harmful emissions The first term of the optimal emissions tax (3.33)
represents the net present value of the disutility of emissions adjusted by product differentiation
and intensity of competition. The second term represents the maximum willingness to pay net
of marginal cost, per unit of emissions, also adjusted by product differentiation and intensity
of competition. This term implies a decrease in the tax due to the benefit of consuming the
product.
Similarly, inspection of (3.34) reveals that the optimal subsidy decreases as α increases.
This is as a result of an increase in the optimal emissions tax as α increases, reducing the
need for the abatement R&D subsidy. The social returns of R&D may often exceed firms’
returns due to the presence of spillovers. The abatement R&D subsidy addresses this externality.
The technology depreciation is compensated through the subsidy, as indicated in (3.34). We
note that the introduction of an effective spillover (γη) implies that as products become more
differentiated, the importance of spillovers decreases, and so does the optimal R&D subsidy.
This suggests that R&D subsidies will be less relevant in industries characterised by a high
degree of product differentiation.
We note that if the regulator only had access to a tax on emissions, the optimal tax would be
higher and the resulting social welfare would be lower than those obtained in our analysis.
Finally, it is important to point out that the optimal tax does not depend on the industry R&D
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spillover (γ) as the emissions abatement R&D subsidy was introduced precisely to correct the
under-investment in R&D due to spillovers. Furthermore, if the regulator was to use only a tax
on emissions, the optimal tax would depend on the spillover parameter.
3.4.2 Characterising Equilibrium Outcomes
This subsection computes the equilibrium values of the various variables of interest. The
next two sections then investigate how the maximised values of these variables change with
exogenous variables such as the discount rate, the nature of the abatement technology and the
intensity of competition.
The steady state welfare for given values of emissions tax and abatement R&D subsidy
can be calculated by substituting the steady state quantity and investment values into (3.16),
yielding:
W ss =
(a  c  e0te)(1+β )[(3a 3c+ e0te)(1+β )+(a  c+ e0te)(1+β )η 2(a  c)βη2]
[2+η+β (2 η)(1+η)]2
  t
2
e
(r+δ )2(1  s)2ν  
2α
ρ
[
e0(a  c  e0te)(1+β )
[2+η+β (2 η)(1+η)]  
te(1+ γη)
(1  s)δ (r+δ )ν ]: (3.35)
Steady state damage accumulation for given values of emissions tax and abatement R&D
subsidy is similarly computed as:
dss = 2
ρ
[
e0(a  c  e0te)(1+β )
[2+η+β (2 η)(1+η)]  
te(1+ γη)
(1  s)δ (r+δ )ν ] =
2
ρ
[e0qi   xi (1+ γη)]: (3.36)
We can then compute the steady state welfare and damage accumulation function for the
optimal tax and subsidy by simply substituting (3.33) and (3.34) into the equations above, ob-
taining:
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W ss(s=s;te=te ) =
a[aρ 2(e0α+ cρ)]
(1+η)ρ
+
α2(1+ γη)2(2r+ρ)
δ 2νρ(r+ρ)2
+
[e0α+ c(r+ρ)][cρ(r+ρ)+ e0α(2r+ρ)]
(1+η)ρ(r+ρ)2
(3.37)
and
dss(s=s;te=te ) =
2e0[(a  c)(r+ρ)  e0α]
(1+η)ρ(r+ρ)
 2α(1+ γη)
2
δ 2νρ(r+ρ)
: (3.38)
In order to ensure that the steady state emissions damage accumulation is non-negative:
(a  c)(r+ρ)  e0α > α(1+η)(1+γη)
2
e0δ 2ν
:
The steady state quantities and abatement R&D outcomes, at the optimum, are given by:
qssi =
(a  c)(r+ρ)  e0α
(1+η)(r+ρ)
=
(a  c)
(1+η)
  e0α
(1+η)(r+ρ)
(3.39)
and
xssi =
α(1+ γη)
δ 2ν(r+ρ)
: (3.40)
Note that the optimised values expressed in equations (3.37) to (3.40) do not depend on the
market competitiveness parameter β . The dynamic optimisation process adjusts the emissions
tax and R&D subsidy in an optimal way to account for the different levels of competitive in-
tensiveness. This is a major departure from the static case where more competition may have a
negative impact on welfare as more quantity implies more pollution. This effect is again present
when taxes and/or subsidies are not set at the optimal level as explored in the next Section.
In our framework, it is possible to reproduce the Cournot and Bertrand cases, which are
dealt with in the literature, as special cases:
Remark: From the linear supply schedules the Cournot duopoly game or corresponding mar-
ket structure can be analysed by setting the competitiveness parameter β = 0 . The
Bertrand duopoly game or corresponding market structure can be analysed by setting the
competitiveness parameter β ! ∞ .The optimal pollution or emissions tax in a Cournot
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setting is
tCe =
α(2+η)
(1+η)(r+ρ)
  (a  c)
e0(1+η)
: (3.41)
The optimal pollution or emissions tax in a Bertrand setting is
tBe =
α(2 η)
r+ρ
  (a  c)(1 η)
e0
: (3.42)
The optimal subsidy in a Cournot setting is:
sC=
(a  c)δ (r+ρ)
e0α(r+δ )(1+η)(1+ γη)
  δ [1  γη(1+η)]
(r+δ )(1+η)(1+ γη)
+
r
(r+δ )
: (3.43)
The optimal subsidy in a Bertrand setting is:
sB=
(a  c)δ (r+ρ)(1 η)
e0α(r+δ )(1+ γη)
  δ [1 η(1+ γ)]
(r+δ )(1+ γη)
+
r
(r+δ )
: (3.44)
As tBe   tCe = η
2[(a c)(r+ρ) e0α]
e0(1+η)(r+ρ) > 0 for all admissible levels of the several variables, the optimal
tax under Bertrand competition is always larger than under Cournot competition but below
marginal damage of emissions. Katsoulacos and Xepapadeas (1995) also found that under
imperfect or oligopolistic competition, the optimal emission tax should be smaller than the
marginal damage of emissions. Moreover, our model shows that, under a static setting ( r = 0,
δ = 1 and ρ = 1), when the products are near perfect substitutes (that is, as η increases and
approaches 1) the optimal emission tax under Bertrand competition is equal to the marginal
damage of emissions (α).
These results are similar to Poyago-Theotoky (2003) and in line with Pigou (1932) who
established that, under perfect competition the optimal tax on emissions should equal the mar-
ginal damage of emissions. Our approach is more general as it covers a continuum of strat-
egy behaviour, yielding Cournot and Bertrand as special polar cases. Moreover, as sB  sC =
  δη2[(a c)(r+ρ) e0α]
e0α(r+δ )(1+γη)(1+η) < 0 for all admissible levels of the several variables, the optimal abate-
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ment R&D subsidy under Bertrand competition is always smaller than under Cournot compe-
tition. The intuition behind this result is that, as the optimal tax increases with the level of
competition, and the R&D activities are undertaken for the sole purpose of decreasing emis-
sions (lowering the tax burden), the increase in the emissions tax lowers the need for a subsidy
to foster R&D.
3.5 The Impact of the Intensity of Competition
As discussed above, when both tax and subsidy are set optimally, they change in a way to
perfectly offset any changes in the intensity of competition. That is, setting the tax/subsidy
combination optimally addresses not only the market failures associated with emissions and
R&D production but also those associated with the existence of imperfect competition in the
output market.
A key contribution of this Chapter is to determine the optimal environmental policy ex-
plicitly as a function of the intensity of competition, using the notion of competition in supply
schedules in a dynamic setting. The next proposition establishes how the change in intensity of
competition affects the optimal tax and subsidy. It also establishes how the steady state damage
accumulation and welfare are impacted by changes in the intensity of competition when the tax
and subsidy cannot be instantaneously adjusted.
Proposition 3.3: The impact of changes in the intensity of competition is summarised in the
following table:
Table 3.2: Impact of Intensity of Competition
∂
∂β
∂ 2
∂β 2
te > 0 < 0
s < 0 > 0
dss > 0 < 0
W ss > 0 if te > α(2 η)r+ρ   (a c)(1 η)e0
< 0 if te < α(2+η)(1+η)(r+ρ)  
(a c)
e0(1+η)
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The proof of Proposition 3.3 is straightforward and is included in Appendix A.
This proposition establishes that the optimal tax needs to rise as a result of an increase in
the intensity of competition. This arises as more competition implies more output and, con-
sequently, more pollution. Of course, more competition also implies higher consumer surplus
(gross of pollution). From a welfare perspective, these two effects (increase in both consumer
surplus and pollution) work in opposite directions. As β approaches infinity (Bertrand case),
the required increase in the optimal tax decreases as the first effect becomes more important
than the second effect.
Similarly, the optimal R&D subsidy decreases with the increase in the intensity of com-
petition — more competition implies more pollution, which requires a higher optimal tax to
induce firms to invest more in R&D. There is less of a need for a subsidy when the emission
tax increases. Unlike the impact on tax, as β approaches infinity, the decrease in optimal R&D
subsidy diminishes. From a welfare perspective, as the intensity of competition increases, the
impact of a tax on emissions is stronger (but diminishing) than a subsidy on R&D activities.
The reason for such asymmetry is that the subsidy is applied to total cost, which is a convex
function of R&D output à la d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988).
As mentioned before, when the intensity of competition increases, quantities produced also
increase. For given values of emissions tax and R&D subsidy, damage accumulation increases
when the intensity of competition increases since emissions are proportional to output. Quanti-
ties produced show a diminishing increase with the intensity of competition; therefore, damage
accumulation behaves in a similar manner (concave shape).
An increase in the intensity of competition generates two opposing effects on welfare. More
competition results in lower prices and higher quantities increases consumer surplus (gross of
pollution). When the tax on emissions is lower than the optimal Cournot tax (equation (3.44))
the welfare always decreases with the intensity of competition. On the other hand, when the
tax on emissions is higher than the optimal Bertrand tax (equation (3.45)) the welfare always
increases with the intensity of competition (Appendix A, Proof of Proposition 3.3). An emis-
sions tax lower than the optimal Cournot emissions tax (the lowest optimal tax) will result
in emissions damage being under-priced. An increase in competition will increase quantities
produced and, therefore, an increase in under-priced emissions — welfare will decrease. Con-
versely, an emissions tax higher than the optimal Bertrand emissions tax (the highest optimal
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tax) will result in emissions damage being overpriced. In summary, social welfare increases
with the intensity of competition only if the emissions tax is set above its optimum level. An
increase in quantities produced due to an increase in competition will increase emissions that
are overpriced. The additional consumer surplus will imply an increase in welfare.
The relationship between intensity of competition and welfare is an important and novel
finding. Only when the emissions tax is sufficiently high (above its optimum for a given level
of intensity of competition) will it be socially beneficial for policy makers to foster market
competition. As in the case of a natural monopoly where competition inefficiently duplicates
fixed costs, here, competition can be detrimental when the emissions tax is set too low and
cannot change as a response to changes in the market structure in the final goods market.
3.6 Some General Comparative Statics
The next proposition shows how the optimal tax, the optimal subsidy, and the steady state
values of the damage accumulation function and welfare change with the discount rate (r);
the R&D emission reduction capital stock depreciation (δ ); and the environmental purification
factor (ρ).
Proposition 3.4: Key comparative statics results are summarised in the following table:
Table 3.3: Comparative Statics — Steady State
∂
∂ r
∂ 2
∂ r2
∂
∂δ
∂ 2
∂δ 2
∂
∂ρ
∂ 2
∂ρ2
te < 0 > 0 n=a n=a < 0 > 0
s > 0 < 0 > 0 < 0 > 0 = 0
if δ > ρ if (a  c)(1 η)(r+ρ)> e0α(2 η)
dss > 0 < 0 > 0 < 0 < 0 < 0
W ss < 0 > 0 < 0 > 0 > 0 < 0
if r > ρ2
Moreover, te does not depend on δ :
The proof of Proposition 3.4 is straightforward but for completeness is included in Appendix
A.
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Optimal emissions tax and R&D subsidy
Proposition 4 provides an important insight on the interaction between the values of the
dynamic parameters and the optimal environmental policy. The optimal value of the tax on
emissions (te ) and emissions abatement R&D subsidy (s) (per unit of R&D investment, there-
fore varying from 0 to 1) were determined simultaneously in order to maximise the discounted
stream of social welfare over an infinite time horizon (at a steady state). The cumulative emis-
sions damage increases when future generations are less important (meaning an increase in the
discount rate). The optimal tax maximises welfare through the reduction in cumulative damage.
It follows general intuition that, as the discount rate increases (so individuals value the present
increasingly more than the future), the optimal emissions tax decreases (in a diminishing way).
The optimal tax on emissions decreases when the environmental purification factor increases.
It stands to reason that, as the natural decay of emissions increases, lower taxes can deliver the
same social welfare, which means that the optimal emissions tax decreases.
Both producer surplus and damage accumulation increase when either (or both) discount
rate or technology depreciation increases. These have opposite effects in the total welfare.
Technology depreciation has a stronger effect on damage accumulation (square term in the
denominator). This eliminates the effect of the increase in decay in pollution so the optimal
subsidy increases with the discount rate as long as the technology depreciation is greater than
pollution decay. Investment in R&D decreases when either (or both) discount rate or technol-
ogy depreciation increase. By definition, the optimal R&D subsidy varies between 0 and 1;
therefore, in order to compensate for the decrease in R&D investment we find a diminishing
increase in optimal subsidy or a concave function of r, if δ > ρ and a diminishing decrease or
a convex function of r, if δ < ρ:
Our results show a linear increase in optimal R&D subsidy when the environmental purifi-
cation factor increases. Since we consider a linear environmental damage function, at steady
state, the optimal subsidy is a linear function of the environmental purification factor but a
more complex function of r and δ . The optimal R&D subsidy increases (in a diminishing way)
when the depreciation rate of technology increases only if a  c  e0α(2 η)(r+ρ)(1 η) > 0 (the maxi-
mum willingness to pay, net of the marginal cost of production and net of the present value of
the marginal cost of the emissions tax, adjusted for product differentiation, must be positive).
When the products are close to perfect substitutes (η approaching 1) the optimal subsidy always
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decreases when the depreciation rate of technology increases.
Environmental damage and welfare
Damage accumulation increases when investment in R&D decreases. Since investment in
R&D decreases when the discount rate or the technology depreciation increases, the steady
state damage accumulation increases (in a diminishing way) when the discount rate increases
and when the depreciation of technology increases. The steady state damage accumulation de-
creases when the environmental purification factor increases. Taking into account that, when
emissions decay at a higher rate, damage accumulation will be reduced, these results are unsur-
prising.
It also follows general intuition that steady state social welfare increases (in a diminish-
ing way, as the decay factor is just multiplied by the value of damage accumulation) when the
environmental purification factor increases. A higher factor is better for welfare as the emis-
sions damage dissipates quicker. The welfare decreases in a straightforward manner when the
discount rate increases and when depreciation decreases.
If the emissions tax and R&D subsidy were to be set at the optimal level (given an intensity
of competition), then the welfare is maximised for each value of the intensity of competition
parameter. However, often the tax and subsidies are not reset with the changes in other para-
meters (intensity of competition, level of product differentiation, etc.). This Chapter provides a
framework to study the inherent trade-offs when some of the underlying primitives are fixed.
In summary, ceteris paribus, a lower discount rate, lower technology depreciation and a
high decay of pollution are preferable from a social welfare perspective. However, we show
how a tax on emissions and an abatement R&D subsidy can be adjusted to optimally manage a
variation in the above dynamic parameters.
3.7 Concluding Remarks
This Chapter studies environmental policy design when there are three sources of market
failure (imperfect competition, R&D spillovers and pollution). Understanding the impact of
imperfect competition on environmental policy is a novel contribution as existing research fo-
cuses by and large on competitive markets or on particular market environments (e.g. Cournot
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or Bertrand, or both)9.
Through a novel use of supply schedules in a dynamic setting, we determine the optimal
environmental policy (emissions tax and R&D subsidies) explicitly as a function of the intensity
of competition. The interaction between increased competition and the optimal environmental
policy is complex. Competition interacts in a non-trivial way with the emission of pollution and
the incentives to undertake R&D. The key message is that the optimal emissions tax and R&D
subsidy need to be calibrated to account for the impact of imperfect competition.
More broadly, the key contribution of this Chapter is to point out the link between the nature
of competition in the output market and the optimal environmental policy. While this is done
through a model, involving some specific function forms, the results suggest that in general the
nature of the interaction is complex and that it is important to consider competition policy and
environmental policy in tandem rather than in isolation of each other. This is a new and impor-
tant point. For example, there are many areas in competition policy, such as merger guidelines,
that could meaningfully consider their impact on the environment. Conversely, the design of
environmental policy may need to be more nuanced to consider the competitive environment.
9Requate (2005) surveys the theoretical literature on environmental policy under imperfect competitive markets.
Chapter 4
The Porter Hypothesis: Conditions for
social and private gains from an emissions
tax under imperfect competition
4.1 Introduction
This Chapter investigates the conditions under which the design of an environmental policy
can align social and private interests. Our contribution is to determine the general conditions
for firms’ profits and social welfare to be higher under the implementation of an environmental
policy (an emissions tax) than under no policy. Prior to Michael Porter’s publication in 1991
(Porter, 1991) environmental regulation was viewed by economists as socially desirable but
also as having a negative impact on firms’ profitability. Michael Porter (1991) challenged the
conventional wisdom about the detrimental impact of environmental regulation on a firm’s per-
formance by stating that well-designed regulation could actually represent a "win-win" outcome
for firms and society. Porter’s arguments that well-designed regulation may enhance businesses’
profits are centered around the view that we live in a non-optimising world of imperfect infor-
mation and organisational or market failures.
In our model, we determine the conditions under which the firm’s profit increases with an
environmental policy (emissions tax) without the need to assume that the firm’s investment in
emissions abatement research and development (R&D) leads to gains in productivity (or attracts
a “green” premium in price), as per some literature on the Porter Hypothesis. Environmental
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regulation, through the reduction of product market competition (Heyes, 2009), enables firms to
gain from the regulation, under certain conditions specified in our analytical framework. Firms’
profits and social welfare are analysed under a homogeneous, n symmetric firms oligopoly
product market, where production entails the generation of environmentally damaging emis-
sions, which are taxed. Firms can reduce such emissions by engaging in emissions abatement
R&D. Each firm decides on the R&D investment, which at the firms’ level has the sole purpose
of reducing emissions, and chooses a supply schedule. This approach allows us to parameterise
the degree of market competition. We refer to this parameter as the intensity of competition,
and it varies continuously from Cournot to Bertrand strategic behaviour.
Our analytical approach deals with a dual market failure problem. Firstly, when the produc-
tion (or consumption) of certain goods generates negative externalities in the form of environ-
mentally damaging pollution, and these costs are not internalised by the producers, there will
be excessive production and pollution from a social viewpoint (Jaffe et al., 2005). Secondly, by
considering imperfect competition in the output markets, firms charge prices above competitive
(cost-reflective) prices, which leads to less production and consumption than socially optimal.
Technological spillovers, or involuntary leakage of innovation information are not considered
in our approach1. This Chapter derives results consistent with the Porter Hypothesis without
any behavioural assumptions or bounded rationality arguments. The key insight is that, as the
intensity of competition increases, firms will benefit more from an environmental policy, which
is explained in this Chapter as an emissions tax cost pass-through condition. An emissions tax
enhances market power in a competitive setting. Firms operating in a less competitive environ-
ment, namely monopolies and Cournot duopolies, never benefit from an environmental policy.
As per our findings, Heyes (2009) identified a considerable body of research work suggesting
that environmental regulation may reduce product market competition. Since environmental
policy has the ultimate aim of reducing emissions by providing an incentive for firms to invest
in abatement technology2 and/or reducing output levels, there may be a conflict with competi-
tion policy, which is about increasing competition to increase output levels, decrease price and
therefore increase consumer surplus.
1Taking into account the main objective of this Chapter, industry R&D spillovers would complicate the analysis
and would not qualitatively change the results. In contrast, the model in Chapter 3 considers spillovers, as the social
returns of R&D may often exceed the firms’ returns due to the presence of R&D spillovers. The abatement R&D
subsidy addresses this externality and, therefore, it is an important assumption in Chapter 3.
2As strongly stated in the Stern Review (Stern, 2007), environmental policy should focus on technology policies
that aim to reduce the cost of emissions abatement.
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We determine the condition for firms’ profits to increase with an increase in emissions tax,
under general functional forms for demand and emissions, and abatement R&D investment.
This is the necessary condition for firms to benefit from a tax on emissions. The key insight is
that, for the representative firm’s profit to increase with an increase in emissions tax, the emis-
sions tax cost pass-through (the proportion of tax increase that is reflected in consumer prices)
must be greater than the net emissions per unit of production, adjusted for the number of firms.
As the intensity of competition increases, firms are more likely to benefit from an environmental
policy, as an emissions tax facilitates the exercise of market power. The number of firms and
the intensity of competition are substitutes in the condition under which firms’ profits increase
with an increase in emissions tax. The emissions abatement R&D must be efficient enough and
under a certain threshold, determined by the intensity of competition and the number of firms,
for firms to benefit from regulation. In the case of a Cournot duopoly setting or a monopoly, we
conclude that the representative firm never benefits from an environmental policy. An increase
in market competition enables an emissions tax to facilitate the exercise of market power in the
oligopoly market. The broad message is that society must value the environment sufficiently
and firms must be efficient in undertaking R&D for the so called "win-win" outcome, which is
more likely to be achieved in the presence of intense product market competition.
This Chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 describes the several building blocks of
the model, namely demand, supply and emissions abatement R&D. In Section 4.3, we analyse
how an environmental policy affects the profitability of the representative firm and introduce in
the model competition in supply schedules. In Section 4.4, we establish the sufficient condition
for environmental policy to benefit firms under a linear demand and a linear damage function.
We consider a modified extension of the seminal work of d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988),
applied to environmental R&D, and, more recently, Poyago-Theotoky (2007). In Sections 4.4.4
and 4.4.5 we find the optimal (second best) emissions tax and the conditions under which private
and social interests are aligned, i.e., the conditions under which a benevolent regulator would
choose an optimal emissions tax that also benefits the firm. Section 4.5 concludes.
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4.2 The Model
N symmetric firms compete in the output market by producing and selling homogeneous
goods. Production entails the emission of a pollutant, which is taxed if there is an environ-
mental policy. In the absence of an environmental policy, firms do not invest in environmental
R&D. Firms can respond to an emissions tax by decreasing their production output or engag-
ing in environmental or emissions abatement R&D, or both — an emissions tax has an impact
by reducing environmental damaging quantities produced and encouraging firms to invest in
abatement technology.
Below we expound the different building blocks of our model; namely, demand, market
(imperfect) competition and the firms’s investment in R&D.
4.2.1 Demand
Consumers preferences are represented by a general inverse demand function and the fol-
lowing assumption is made:
Assumption A0 The inverse demand function P(Q) :R+!R+ is determined only by the total
industry output Q and
i) it is twice differentiable for all Q> 0 , with P(Q)> 0:
ii) it is strictly decreasing in Q and concave: ∂P∂Q < 0 and ∂
2P
∂Q2 6 0:
4.2.2 Emissions and Abatement R&D
We assume that a firm’s emissions are proportional to the quantities produced. Represen-
tative firm i, i = 1; :::;n, emits E(qi) units of some pollutant when it produces quantity qi. If
there is an environmental policy, the pollutant is subject to a per unit tax te, which is assumed
to be nonnegative As a response to the tax, firms can either decrease their outputs or invest in
abatement technology (or both).
We assume that, if firm i invests I(xi) in emissions abatement R&D, then i reduces its gross
emissions E(qi) by xi: This reduction in gross emissions (not marginal emissions) simplifies
the analytical treatment because there is no interaction term between the two strategic vari-
ables, as per Poyago-Theotoky (2007). We also assume that there are no technological adoption
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spillovers. We write firm i’s net emissions as:
N(qi;xi) = E(qi)  xi; (4.1)
which is required to be nonnegative.
The environmental damage cost of emissions is assumed to take a linear form3:
D= α
n
∑
i=1
N(qi;xi); (4.2)
where α > 0 is the marginal disutility of pollution.
Assumption A1 The representative firm’s emissions function E(qi) : R+! R+ is determined
only by the firm’s output qi and:
i) it is twice differentiable for all qi > 0 , with E(qi)> 0
ii) it is non-decreasing and convex in qi : ∂E(qi)∂qi > 0 and
∂ 2E(qi)
∂q2i
> 0:
Assumption A2 The representative firm’s abatement effort xi results from an investment in
emissions abatement R&D, I(xi) : R+! R+ and:
i) it is twice differentiable for all xi > 0 , with I(xi)> 0
ii) it is strictly increasing and convex in xi : ∂ I(xi)∂xi > 0 and
∂ 2I(xi)
∂x2i
> 0:
4.2.3 Profit Function
The introduction of an environmental regulation consists of a tax on emissions only. A tax on
emissions induces firms to engage in environmental R&D. Firms invest I(xi) in environmental
R&D, which results in an emissions abatement R&D output of xi, in a deterministic way (see
Poyago-Theotoky, 2007).
We can write firm i’s profit function as:
pi i(qi;q i;xi) = [P(qi;q i)  ci]qi  te[E(qi)  xi]  I(xi); (4.3)
3The non-standard assumption of linear damages is made for tractability reasons. The standard assumption of
environmental damages increasing and convex on emissions exacerbates the impact of emissions on welfare. The
benefits of a more environmentally friendly technology, possibly induced by the introduction of an emissions tax,
will be, in this case, more significant. For the purpose of this research work, the qualitative results obtained would
not change if a more general damage function was considered.
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where ci > 0 represents the firm’s unit cost of production. Firms will only invest in emissions
abatement R&D if there is a positive return on investment : texi  I(xi)> 0:
A tax on emissions leads to a reduction in the quantities produced by the representative firm
and increases its investment in emissions abatement R&D. The intensity of competition, the
number of firms and their abatement R&D efficiency level will determine whether they may
benefit from an environmental policy.
4.3 Environmental Policy and the Firm
In this Section we determine the condition for firms’ profits to increase with an increase in
the emissions tax, under general functional forms for demand, emissions and abatement R&D
investment. This is the necessary condition for firms to benefit from a tax on emissions. We
introduce competition in supply schedules into the model as it assists in studying the role of the
intensity of competition in enabling firms to benefit from an environmental policy.
4.3.1 Competition in Supply Schedules
We use the notion of competition in supply schedules to model competition in the output
market. (see also, for example, Grant & Quiggin, 1996; Grossman, 1981; Kao et al., 2012;
Klemperer & Meyer, 1989; Menezes & Quiggin, 2012; Robson, 1981; Turnbull, 1983; Vives,
2011). By considering families of more or less elastic supply schedules, it is possible to gener-
ate spaces of oligopoly games of which Bertrand and Cournot are polar cases. This approach
allows us to parameterise the nature of competition in the output market. Firms face a strictly
decreasing demand function for each product qi = Di(Pi); and produce with constant marginal
cost. Firms compete in supply functions qi(β ;θ i), which are continuously differentiable, con-
vex, and increasing in both variables. In order to simplify the analysis, we restrict our attention
to linear supply schedules of the form
qi = βPi+θ i; (4.4)
but we note that Kao et al. (2014) show that, under some conditions, such restriction involves
no loss of generality.
The market clearing price for each good satisfies:
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Di(Pi(β ;θ i;θ i)) = qi(β ;θ i;θ i): (4.5)
Following Kao et al. (2014), we assume a fixed value for β , the slope of the firm’s supply
function, and that firms choose θ i. β can be interpreted as a measure of market competitiveness.
This representation allows us to cover a continuum of market structures from Cournot (β = 0)
to Bertrand (β ! ∞).
We consider now a homogeneous product, non-cooperative oligopoly two-stage game where
firms each first choose the level of environmental R&D and, based on this strategic choice, they
compete in supply schedules in the market place.
The problem consists in solving two optimisation problems through backward induction.
First, we find the firms’s equilibrium levels of the strategic variables (θ i;θ i) as a function
of R&D efforts (emissions abatement R&D). Second we find the equilibrium levels of R&D
efforts.
The representative firm’s profit function in a duopoly competing in supply schedules under
environmental regulation is given by
piSi (β ;θ i;θ i;xi) = [P(β ;θ i;θ i)  ci]qi(β ;θ i;θ i)  te[E(qi(β ;θ i;θ i))  xi]  I(xi): (4.6)
Applying the first order condition for profit maximisation, when the decision is on the strate-
gic variables (θ i;θ i), yields:
∂Pi
∂θ i
qi+(Pi  ci) ∂qi∂θ i   te
∂E
∂qi
∂qi
∂θ i
= 0 jθ i=θ e : (4.7)
Under our initial assumptions, the second order condition is always satisfied.
Applying the first order condition for profit maximisation, when the strategic decision is
abatement R&D investment, yields:
te  ∂ I(xi)∂xi = 0 jxi=xe : (4.8)
This simply states that firms optimally decide on their marginal abatement R&D investment
to be equal to the emissions tax.
Under the initial assumptions, the second order condition is always satisfied.
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The impact of an environmental policy (tax on emissions) on the representative firm’s profits
is analysed in the following Section.
4.3.2 Tax on Emissions, Profits and Cost Pass-Through Condition
Now we set the general conditions for a firm’s profit to increase with the tax on emissions.
This is the necessary condition for firms to benefit from an environmental policy but it is not
sufficient since the firms’ profit must be greater than the profit without an environmental policy
(no emissions tax). In the previous Section, the assumption of constant marginal costs was
made. However, given the equilibrium strategic variables (θ e(te) and xe(te)) obtained from
maximising a general profit function, the following condition is applicable to a general firm’s
cost structure and does not rely on the assumption of only constant marginal costs.
Proposition 4.1: Given the equilibrium strategic variable, θ e(te); determined by the number
of firms and their general cost structure and type of market competition (quantities, in
Cournot competition or prices, in Bertrand competition), the equilibrium investment in
R&D, xe(te), and the firm’s gross profit, pie(θ e; te), (revenue minus production costs, i.e.,
net of tax on emissions and investment in R&D), the general condition for a firm’s profit
to increase with tax on emissions is:
[
∂pie(θ e; te)
∂θ e
  te∂E(θ e)∂θ e ]
∂θ e
∂ te
> E(θ e)  xe: (4.9)
Proof: The firm’s profit at the game’s profit maximising equilibrium conditions, can be ex-
pressed as:
Π(te) = pie(θ e(te))  te[E(θ e(te))  xe(te)]  I(xe(te)): (4.10)
For the firm’s profit to increase with the tax on emissions we have:
∂Π(te)
∂ te
= [
∂pie(θ e; te)
∂θ e
  te∂E(θ e)∂θ e ]
∂θ e
∂ te
  [E(θ e)  xe]> 0: (4.11)
As per the previous Section, we now determine the condition for a firm’s profit to increase
with the tax on emissions for the specific case of constant marginal costs, as it provides a clearer
insight into the findings.
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Corollary: Assuming that the representative firm has only constant marginal costs, the condi-
tion set in the above Proposition can be stated as a cost pass-through (the proportion of
the emissions tax that is reflected in consumer prices) condition:
∂P(θ e; te)
∂ te
>
n
n 1
E(θ e)  xe
qe
: (4.12)
Proof: The first order condition for profit maximisation is given by equation (4.7). The left-
hand side term of equation (4.9) can be expanded as follows:
[
∂pie(θ e; te)
∂θ e
  te∂E(θ e)∂θ e ]
∂θ e
∂ te
= [n
∂Pi
∂θ i
qi+(Pi  ci) ∂qi∂θ i   te
∂E
∂qi
∂qi
∂θ i
]
∂θ i
∂ te
jθ i=θ e (4.13)
= (n 1) ∂Pi
∂θ i
∂θ i
∂ te
qi =
n 1
n
∂P(θ e; te)
∂ te
qe:
which results in the above condition.
The expression defined in the above Corollary simply states that for the representative firm’s
profit to increase with tax on emissions, the emissions tax cost pass-through must be greater
than the net emissions per unit of production, adjusted by the number of firms. In the duopoly
case the adjustment factor ( n
n 1 ) is 2. When n! ∞; the adjustment factor tends to 1. As the
number of firms increases, the emissions tax cost pass-through necessary for firms’ profits to
increase with emissions tax, decreases. The key insight is that, as the intensity of competition
increases, firms will benefit more from an environmental policy. An emissions tax facilitates
the exercise of market power; therefore, firms will benefit more from an environmental policy
when there is a higher intensity of market competition. In the case of a monopoly (n = 1) the
cost pass-through condition is never met. Under our model, a monopoly never benefits from an
environmental policy. The intuition for this finding is that a tax on emissions does not increase
the market power in a monopoly setting as it already operates at maximum market power.
In our model, the necessary condition for a firm’s profit to increase with the tax on emis-
sions is expressed using general functional forms for demand, emissions and abatement R&D
investment. The sufficient condition depends on specific functional forms, as per the example
covered in the next Section.
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4.4 Example: Specific Functional Forms
4.4.1 Functional Forms and Equilibrium Outcome
We now assume a linear demand and linear emissions functions, and an emissions abatement
R&D investment, as per the functional forms expounded below.
Following Singh and Vives (1984), the representative consumer has a quadratic (strictly
concave) utility function, resulting in the following inverse demand function:
Pi = a  (qi+q i): (4.14)
Given the linear supply schedules, the market clearing prices and quantities for the homo-
geneous goods are obtained by substituting equation (4.4) into the demand function, yielding:
Pi(β ;θ i;θ i) =
a θ i θ i
1+nβ
; (4.15)
and
qi(β ;θ i;θ j) =
aβ +[1+(n 1)β ]θ i βθ i
1+nβ
: (4.16)
We will write firm i’s net emissions as:
N(qi;xi) = E(qi)  xi = e0qi  xi; (4.17)
where e0 represents the units of pollutant per unit of quantity produced. Without loss of gener-
ality we will assume that e0 = 1.
Adopted from typical models of process R&D (d’Aspremont & Jacquemin, 1988), we as-
sume that, if firm i invests ν2 x
2
i in emissions abatement R&D, then firm i reduces its gross emis-
sions e0qi by xi, where xi represents the outcome of the firm’s emissions reduction effort. This
reduction in gross emissions (not marginal emissions) simplifies the analytical treatment be-
cause there is no interaction term between the two strategic variables, as per Poyago-Theotoky
(2007). Finally, ν relates to the efficiency or productivity of the R&D activities, where a higher
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value means lower efficiency. The investment in abatement R&D is now expressed as:
I(xi) =
ν
2
x2i : (4.18)
Following equation (4.3), we defined firm i’s profit function:
pi i(qi;q i;xi) = (a qi q i  c)qi  te(qi  xi)  ν2 x
2
i : (4.19)
The quantities can be expressed in supply schedules and the functional objective (profit
function) above can also be expressed in terms of the strategic variables θ i;θ i. Differentiating
the right-hand side with respect to xi and θ i and equating it to zero yields the equilibrium
equations for these variables:
θ i =
a[1+(n 2)β ]  (c+ te)(1+nβ )[1+(n 1)β ]
n+1+nβ (n 1) ; (4.20)
qi =
(a  c  te)[1+β (n 1)]
n+1+nβ (n 1) ; (4.21)
and
xi =
te
ν
: (4.22)
Remark: From equation (4.21), setting β = 0 we obtain the Cournot equilibrium quantity
(a c te)
n+1 ; where te represents the emissions tax. Similarly, we obtain the Bertrand equilib-
rium quantity (a c te)
n
when β ! ∞.
The equilibrium prices can now be determined as follows:
pi =
a+n(c+ te)[1+β (n 1)]
n+1+nβ (n 1) : (4.23)
Substituting the equilibrium variables in the profit function we obtain:
pii (te) =
(a  c  te)2[1+(n 1)β ]
[n+1+n(n 1)β ]2 +
t2e
2ν
: (4.24)
As a result of the simple functional forms used, the equilibrium profit function is quadratic
and convex in relation to the emissions tax (te).
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4.4.2 Cost Pass-Through Condition
The proportion of the emissions tax that is reflected in consumer prices or tax cost pass-
through can now be determined for the specific functional forms. By partially differentiating
equation (4.23) with respect to te we obtain the expression for emissions tax cost pass-through
as:
∂ pi (te)
∂ te
=
n[1+β (n 1)]
n+1+nβ (n 1) : (4.25)
Note that the tax cost pass-through is positive, which means that some portion of a tax on
emissions will be passed through to prices regardless of the intensity of competition.
Remark: In the case of a monopoly (n= 1) the cost pass-through rate of taxation is 50 percent
while in the case of perfect competition, (Bertrand: β ! ∞) the cost pass-through rate
of taxation is complete. In the case of homogeneous Cournot competition (β = 0) the
cost pass-through rate is n
n+1 . These results are in line with those reported in cost pass-
through literature (see Bulow & Pfleiderer, 1983; Zimmerman & Carlson, 2010).
It is easy to see that the emissions tax cost pass-through rate increases with an increase in
the number of firms (n) and also with an increase in the intensity of competition (β ):
∂ 2 pi (te)
∂ te∂n
=
1+β (2n 1)
[n+1+nβ (n 1)]2 > 0; (4.26)
and
∂ 2 pi (te)
∂ te∂β
=
n(n 1)
[n+1+nβ (n 1)]2 > 0: (4.27)
In the following Section we will analyse the effect of an emissions tax on firms’ profits.
4.4.3 Tax on Emissions and Profits
For the representative firm to benefit from an environmental policy its profit must be greater
than under no environmental policy (te = 0). Given a quadratic and convex profit function, as
per equation (4.24), its profit must be increasing with an increase in emissions tax for the firm
to benefit from an environmental policy.
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The positive emissions condition (qi xi > 0) implies that the tax on emissions must satisfy
the following condition:
te jpos_em<
(a  c)ν [1+(n 1)β ]
n+1+ν+(n+ν)(n 1)β : (4.28)
We can now determine the conditions under which a firm will benefit from a tax on emis-
sions, as per the following proposition.
Proposition 4.2: Under the positive emissions condition and given the above specific func-
tional forms (as per Section 4.4.1) the representative firm will benefit from an environ-
mental policy only if:
te j f irms_ben>
4(a  c)ν [1+(n 1)β ]
n(n+2)+1+2ν+2(n 1)(n+n2+ν)β +(n 1)2n2β 2 : (4.29)
Proof: The representative firm’s profit function is now quadratic in te and convex (∂
2pie(te)
∂ t2e
=
1
ν +
2[1+(n 1)β ]
[n+1+n(n 1)β ]2 > 0). The profits must be greater than under no environmental policy
(te = 0) as follows:
(a  c  te)2[1+(n 1)β ]
[n+1+n(n 1)β ]2 +
t2e
2ν
>
(a  c)[1+(n 1)β ]
[n+1+n(n 1)β ]2 : (4.30)
Solving the above inequality for a positive te; we obtain the condition (4.29).
The tax on emissions under which firms benefit from environmental policy (profits are
greater than under no environmental policy) ranges from the minimum threshold given by equa-
tion (4.29) to the maximum value under non-negative emissions given by equation (4.28). The
following graph illustrates how the profit function varies with the emissions tax.
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Figure 4.1: Profit Function
As depicted in Figure 4.1, the firm’s profit function, equation (4.24), has a market competition-
based component ( (a c te)2[1+(n 1)β ]
[n+1+n(n 1)β ]2 ), which decreases when the emission tax increases and it
is convex. The other profit term reflects the firm’s investment in emissions abatement R&D ( t2e2ν ),
which increases when the emissions tax increases, it does not depend on the intensity of mar-
ket competition and it is also convex. The firm’s benefits from investing in R&D are modelled
deterministically and are the same for all types of market structure (from a monopoly setting
to perfect competition). As the intensity of competition increases, the firm’s profits under no
emissions tax decreases—the higher the intensity of competition (lower profitability starting
point), the more likely the firm is to benefit from an emissions tax.
Under these specific functional forms, the resulting profit function, equation (4.24), is
quadratic and convex and has a minimum at:
tem =
2(a  c)ν [1+(n 1)β ]
n(n+2)+1+2ν+2(n 1)(n+n2+ν)β +(n 1)2n2β 2 :
The following proposition establishes the relationship between the number of firms (n), the
intensity of competition (β ) and the efficiency of emissions abatement R&D (ν) in order for
firms to benefit from environmental policy, as per condition (4.29).
Proposition 4.3: For a representative firm to benefit from environmental policy, the number of
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firms (n), the intensity of competition (β ) and the efficiency of emissions abatement R&D
(ν) satisfy the following condition:
3+2ν n(n 2)+2β (n 1)[ν n(n 1)]  (n 1)2n2β 2 < 0: (4.31)
Proof: The positive emissions condition is given by (4.28). For the representative firm to benefit
from the emissions tax, condition (4.29) must be satisfied, therefore:
(a  c)ν [1+(n 1)β ]
n+1+ν+(n+ν)(n 1)β >
4(a  c)ν [1+(n 1)β ]
n(n+2)+1+2ν+2(n 1)(n+n2+ν)β +(n 1)2n2β 2 :
(4.32)
It can be easily shown that the algebraic simplification of the above expression results in
the condition (4.31).
The above condition (4.31) can also be written as:
ν <
[n 3+nβ (n 1)][n+1+nβ (n 1)]
2+2(n 1)β : (4.33)
This expression simply states that, for a representative firm to benefit from an environmental
policy, its efficiency in abatement R&D must be high enough, implying a lower value of ν that
satisfies equation (4.33).
It is easy to verify that the condition set out by equation (4.31) is always satisfied provided
that the number of firms is greater than 3 and that ν < 12(n  3)(n+ 1) (obtained by setting
β = 0 in equation (4.31)). In other words, for n > 3 and assuming Cournot competition, if
the emissions abatement R&D is efficient enough (under the threshold given by this condition),
firms will always benefit from environmental policy. Otherwise, firms will only benefit from
environmental policy if the intensity of competition is above a threshold set by the following
expression:
β >
1
n2(n 1)[ν n(n 1)+
q
2n(2n+ν)+ν2]: (4.34)
If the emissions abatement R&D is not efficient enough, the intensity of competition must
be high and comply with the above equation for firms to benefit from an environmental policy.
The following Corollaries from Proposition 4.3 address the conditions for firms to benefit
from an environmental policy in the case of a Cournot duopoly.
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Corollary 1: For a n-firm Cournot setting (β = 0) the representative firm will benefit from
environmental policy only if:
n>
p
2(ν+2)+1: (4.35)
Proof: The positive emissions condition is now te < (a c)νn+1+ν . For the representative firm to
benefit from the emissions tax te > 4(a c)ν(n+1)2+2ν , therefore:
(a  c)ν
n+1+ν
>
4(a  c)ν
(n+1)2+2ν
; (4.36)
which can be simplified as condition (4.35).
Corollary 2: For a duopoly (n = 2) the representative firm will benefit from environmental
policy only if :
β >
ν+
p
16+ν(ν+4) 2
4
: (4.37)
Proof: The positive emissions condition is now te < (a c)ν(1+β )3+ν+(ν+2)β . For the representative firm
to benefit from the emissions tax te > 4(a c)ν(1+β )2ν(1+β )+(3+2β )2 , therefore:
(a  c)ν(1+β )
3+ν+(ν+2)β >
4(a  c)ν(1+β )
2ν(1+β )+(3+2β )2 ; (4.38)
which can be simplified as condition (4.37).
To study the interaction between β and n in relation to the threshold above which firms
benefit from environmental policy, let us define (from (4.31)) the following constraint function:
F(n;β ) = 3+2ν n(n 2)+2β (n 1)[ν n(n 1)]  (n 1)2n2β 2: (4.39)
Applying the implicit function theorem:
∂β
∂n
=  ∂F(n;β )=∂n
∂F(n;β )=∂β
=
1 n+β [ν 1+n(4 3n)]+β 2[(3 2n)n 1]
(n 1)[n(n 1)(1+nβ ) ν ] : (4.40)
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Under the last two equations it is easy to prove that ∂β∂n > 0. In other words, the intensity
of competition and the number of firms are substitutes for the condition under which a firm’s
profits increase with an increase in emissions tax, as illustrated in the following figure.
Figure 4.2: Intensity of competition (β ) and number of firms (n)
The shaded area in Figure 4.2 represents the combination of intensity of competition and
number of firms under which firms benefit from an environmental policy i.e., that satisfy the
condition set out in equation (4.31). The lower boundary of this area shifts down (lower bound-
ary values for β and n) when the efficiency of emissions abatement R&D increases (the value of
ν decreases). Along the vertical axis we can find the threshold value of the intensity of compe-
tition for a duopoly, as per equation (4.37). Along the horizontal axis we can find the threshold
value of the number of firms in a Cournot setting, as per equation (4.35). As the number of
firms (n) and/or the intensity of competition (β ) increase, the firms don’t need to be as efficient
in their emissions abatement R&D, in order to benefit from an environmental policy.
As per our analytical framework, we can observe that a monopoly and a Cournot duopoly
never benefit from an environmental policy.
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Having shown that firms can actually benefit from an environmental tax policy under certain
conditions, we now ask whether a benevolent government would ever choose an emissions tax
rate that satisfies these conditions. To this end, in the next Section we determine the optimal
(second best) emissions tax to find the conditions under which private and social interests align.
4.4.4 Social Welfare
The regulator sets its emissions tax to maximise the social welfare, taking into account the
equilibrium quantities/prices and investment in abatement R&D that firms choose in order to
maximise their profits4.
Using the specific functional forms explained in the previous Section, consumer surplus can
be defined as:
CS= a
n
∑
i=1
qi  12
n
∑
i=1
q2i  ∑
i6= j
qiq j 
n
∑
i=1
piqi = (4.41)
=
n2(a  c  te)2[1+(n 1)β ]2
2[n+1+nβ (n 1)]2 :
Firm i’s profit, excluding emissions taxation cost, is given by:
pi i = (a  c 
n
∑
j=1
q j)qi  ν2 x
2
i : (4.42)
Producer surplus is represented by the following expression:
PS= npi i = (4.43)
= te[
2av nte 2v(c+ te)
2v
]+
(a  c  te)fn(a  c 2te)[1+β (n 1)]  teg
[n+1+nβ (n 1)]2 :
Following equation (4.2), environmental damages is given by:
D= α[
v(a  c  te) nte
v
  (a  c  te)
n+1+nβ (n 1)]: (4.44)
4We analyse the case of a regulator who fully commits to a tax policy. That is, the regulator moves first
by determining the emissions tax and then firms decide on the level of emissions abatement R&D investment
and compete in the market place. While considering the case of a regulator who cannot commit to a policy is
interesting, this is not the most appropriate setting to examine this question, and is left for future work.
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Social welfare is defined by consumer’s surplus plus the profits of the n-firms (excluding
taxes and subsidies) minus the environmental damage, as per the following expression:
W =CS+npi i D= (4.45)
=
nte(2α  te)+(a  c  te)v(a  c+ te 2α)
2ν
 
  (a  c  te)
2
2[n+1+nβ (n 1)]2 +
(a  c  te)(α  te)
n+1+nβ (n 1) :
A tax on emissions will reduce consumer surplus and environmental damage but will have
an ambiguous impact on producer surplus.
Given the specific functional forms used, the equilibrium social welfare, equation (4.45), is
quadratic and concave in relation to the emissions tax (te), as depicted in the following graph.
Figure 4.3: Welfare, PS, CS, and Environmental Damages
Figure 4.3 shows that consumer surplus (4.41) decreases with an increase in the emissions
tax in a quadratic and convex way and environmental damages (4.44) also decrease with an in-
crease in the emissions tax, but linearly. Producer surplus (4.43) initially increases with taxation
and then decreases (concave). Under the specific functional forms the resulting social welfare,
equation (4.45), is a quadratic and concave function.
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4.4.5 Optimal Emissions Tax
A social welfare maximising regulator, who can fully commit to policy and is able to assess
firms’ individual emissions (a strong assumption), sets its emissions tax to maximise the so-
cial welfare. Knowing that firms will choose equilibrium conditions that maximise their profit
(second best), the regulator induces the optimal social level of production and pollution.
Applying the first order condition for welfare maximisation, when the decision is on the
emissions tax (te), yields:
max(te>0)[W (te)];
with the associated first order conditions:
∂W (te)
∂ te
= 0 , (n+ v)(α  te)
ν
+
a  c  te
[n+1+n(n 1)β ]2  
a  c 2te+α
n+1+n(n 1)β = 0: (4.46)
Solving for te we obtain the optimal emissions tax (second best)5:
te jopt= α[n+1+n(n 1)β ][n+1+ν+(n+ν)(n 1)β ]  (a  c)ν [1+(n 1)β ]1+n[1+(n 1)β ][n+2+ν+(n+ν)(n 1)β ] : (4.47)
Remark: From the linear supply schedules the Cournot duopoly game or corresponding mar-
ket structure can be analysed by setting the competitiveness parameter β = 0. The
Bertrand duopoly game or corresponding market structure can be analysed by setting the
competitiveness parameter β ! ∞ .The optimal pollution or emissions tax in a Cournot
setting is given by:
tCe =
α(1+n)(1+n+ v)  v(a  c)
1+n(2+n+ v)
: (4.48)
The optimal pollution or emissions tax in a Bertrand setting is given by:
tBe = α: (4.49)
5Analysing the second order conditions, it is clear that this expression is indeed a maximum as ∂
2W (te)
∂ t2e
=
  nf1+n[1+(n 1)β ]g[n+2+ν+(n+ν)(n 1)β ]ν [n+1+n(n 1)β ]2 < 0:
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As it is well-understood, under imperfect competition, the second best optimal tax may be
less than marginal damages (Barnett, 1980; Buchanan, 1969). Katsoulacos and Xepapadeas
(1995) also found that considering imperfect or oligopolistic competition, the optimal emission
tax should be smaller than the marginal damage of emissions. Assuming Bertrand competition
and homogeneous products, the optimal emission tax is equal to the marginal damage of emis-
sions (α). These results are similar to Poyago-Theotoky (2003) and in line with those of Pigou
(1932), which established that, under perfect competition the optimal tax on emissions should
equal the marginal damage of emissions.
From inspection of equation (4.47), we note that the optimal emissions tax increases as the
disutility of pollution (α) increases. The first term of the optimal emissions tax (4.47) represents
the net present value of the disutility of emissions adjusted by the intensity of competition.
The second term represents the maximum willingness to pay net of marginal cost, per unit of
emissions, also adjusted by the intensity of competition. This term implies a decrease in the
emissions tax due to the benefit of consuming the product.
If the regulator sets an optimal emissions tax, firms will produce the following equilibrium
quantity:
qi jopt=
(a  c α)[1+β (n 1)][n+1+ν+(n+ν)(n 1)β ]
1+n[1+(n 1)β ][n+2+ν+(n+ν)(n 1)β ] : (4.50)
Under optimal emissions tax, the representative firm’s profit can be obtained by substituting
the optimal emissions tax, equation (4.47); in the equilibrium profit function, equation (4.24).
Likewise, the total welfare can be obtained by substituting the optimal emissions tax, equation
(4.47), in the equilibrium welfare, equation (4.45).
In the next Section we will analyse the conditions under which a firm can benefit from an
optimal environmental policy.
4.4.6 Firms Profits and Optimal Policy
For firms to benefit from an optimal environmental policy the optimal tax must be greater
than the tax above which firms benefit from an environmental policy but under the positive
emissions tax. The general condition can be set as
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te jpos_em> te jopt> te j f irms_ben; (4.51)
where the three emissions tax thresholds are given by the conditions set out in (4.47), (4.28) and
(4.29).
At the level of emissions tax where the firm’s profit is equal to the profit with no emis-
sions tax, for society to also benefit from an environmental policy, social welfare must also be
increasing with an increase in emissions tax, as per the analysis conducted in the next Section.
4.4.7 Increase in Welfare with Tax at Firms Break-even Point
For social welfare to be increasing when emissions tax increases, the first derivative of
welfare with respect to tax must be positive, as follows:
∂W (te)
∂ te
> 0 , (n+ v)(α  te)
ν
+
a  c  te
[n+1+n(n 1)β ]2  
a  c 2te+α
n+1+n(n 1)β > 0: (4.52)
Under the positive emissions condition (4.31), the level of emissions tax at the firm’s profit
break-even point, where the firm’s profit with an emissions tax is equal to its profit without the
tax, is set by the condition (4.29).
Proposition 4.4: Assuming that the positive emissions condition (4.31) is met and under an
environmental policy, firms’ profits are higher than under no policy and social welfare
increases when emissions tax increases, if the following conditions are met:
α >
(a  c)ν [1+(n 1)β ]K1
K2K3K4
and ν < K
2
2
2+2(n 1)β ; (4.53)
where
K1 = 5+2ν+n(10+5n+4ν)+2β (n 1)[ν+n(5+5n+4ν)]+nβ 2(n 1)2(5n+4ν);
(4.54)
K2 = [1+n+nβ (n 1)]; (4.55)
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K3 = [n+1+ν+(n+ν)(n 1)β ]; (4.56)
and
K4 = (n+1)2+2v+2(n 1)(n+n2+ v)β +(n 1)2n2β 2: (4.57)
Proof: The above condition on α results from substituting the emissions tax given by (4.29)
into the inequality (4.52) and solving it for α . In order to ensure positive quantities, as
per (4.33), under optimal emissions tax a  c> α; therefore:
ν [1+(n 1)β ]K1
K2K3K4
< 1 (4.58)
or
ν <
K22
2+2(n 1)β : (4.59)
The above proposition simply states that, for firms to benefit from an environmental policy,
whilst welfare increases with an increase in emissions tax, the marginal disutility of emissions
(the cost that society allocates to environmental damage) must be high enough and above the
threshold set by Proposition 4.4. The firm must also be efficient in undertaking emissions
abatement R&D (lower value of ν). When the above conditions are met, the social benefits
from an increase in emissions tax are aligned with the private benefits.
Under a Bertrand setting (prices are strategic substitutes), these conditions are always met as
the above conditions reduce to: α > 0. In other words, in a price competition setting (Bertrand)
with an environmental policy, firms’ interests (profits) are always aligned with social interests.
Under a Cournot setting (quantities are strategic substitutes), the above conditions are simplified
as follows:
α >
(a  c)ν [5(n+1)2+2ν(1+2n)]
(n+1)(n+1+ν)[(n+1)2+2v]
and ν < (1+n)
2
2
: (4.60)
In the case of a Cournot duopoly, the positive emissions condition states that firms will never
benefit from a tax on emissions.
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4.5 Concluding Remarks
This Chapter investigates the conditions under which an environmental policy (emissions
tax), can lead to both social and private benefits. Considering an imperfect competition, ho-
mogeneous product and a symmetric n-firm oligopoly setting, we find that a welfare enhancing
environmental regulation can also benefit a profit maximising representative firm. Importantly,
the model does not need to assume that investment in R&D leads to gains in productivity (or
attracts a “green” premium in price), as per some literature on the Porter Hypothesis, for firms’
profits to increase with an environmental policy.
Under general functional forms for demand, emissions and abatement R&D investment, the
key insight is that, for the representative firm’s profit to increase with an increase in emissions
tax, the emissions tax cost pass-through (the proportion of tax increase that is reflected in con-
sumer prices) must be greater than the net emissions per unit of production, adjusted for the
number of firms. As the intensity of competition increases, firms are more likely to benefit from
an environmental policy, as an emissions tax facilitates the exercise of market power. In the
special cases of a monopoly or a Cournot duopoly, this condition is never met.
The necessary condition for a firm to benefit from an environmental policy is that the firm’s
profit increases with an increase in emissions tax. Using a linear demand function, linear
emissions and an abatement R&D investment similar to d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988), a
widely used model of process R&D, we determine the sufficient conditions for the firm to ben-
efit from a tax on emissions as well as for the social welfare and private interests (firms’ profits)
to be aligned. For firms to benefit from an environmental policy, whilst welfare increases with
an increase in emissions tax, the marginal disutility of emissions (the cost that society allocates
to environmental damage) must be above a critical level determined by the extent of the market,
the intensity of competition, the number of firms and the abatement R&D efficiency. Under a
Bertrand setting (prices are strategic substitutes), these conditions are always met, i.e., with an
environmental policy, firms’ interests (profits) are always aligned with social interests.
The new insight is that industries that are subject to a higher degree of competition are more
likely to support the introduction of an emissions tax.
In this Chapter, we assume a deterministic relationship between a firm’s investment in emis-
sions abatement R&D and its benefits from the investment, which do not depend on the type
of market structure. Although we use a rather specific framework, we derive results consistent
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with the Porter Hypothesis, i.e., we determine the conditions under which an emissions tax can
be beneficial for firms and society.
Chapter 5
Environmental R&D Cooperation under
Uncertainty
5.1 Introduction
Governments have supported various efforts to promote research and development (R&D)
cooperation among industries, universities and public R&D establishments with the aim to en-
courage innovation in products, processes and services. In the US, the passage of the National
Cooperation Act of 1984 supported the view that R&D cooperation can contribute to an in-
crease in inventive activities. Also in 1984, the European Commission adopted Regulation No.
418/85, which enhanced the special antitrust treatment of R&D. If a firm’s market share does
not exceed 20%, the legislation provides exceptions for horizontal R&D arrangements, includ-
ing commercialisation, distribution and sales. Underpinning these policy developments, is a
large body of theoretical and empirical literature on the nature of R&D cooperation, research
joint ventures (RJV) and associated technological spillovers. Cooperation in R&D is particu-
larly important when dealing with environmental concerns; the focus being to foster innovation
in pollution abatement technologies.
This Chapter investigates the impact of environmental R&D organisational structures on
firms’ innovation activities, profits, and social welfare. It is assumed that the R&D outcome
is uncertain. We consider an ex-ante symmetric duopoly producing an homogeneous product,
where production entails the emission of a pollutant. Environmental policy imposes a Pigouvian
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emission tax1 per unit of output — firms are charged a tax equal to the environmental damage
caused by their business activities2. The environmental policy (Pigouvian tax) induces firms to
undertake a potentially high risk breakthrough emissions abatement R&D project3, resulting in
full emissions abatement, if successful. The probability of success is assumed to increase when
the investment in "green" R&D increases, with diminishing returns. Motivated by Amir et al.
(2000), establishing that firms always prefer extreme spillovers (full or no information sharing),
two extreme cases of spillovers are considered: no spillover (firms fully protect their R&D) or
the spillover is complete (firms’ R&D results are fully shared).
Under R&D outcome uncertainty, the asymmetric ex-post equilibrium, where the represen-
tative firm succeeds in its R&D efforts whilst its rival fails, brings about the highest payoff for
the firm. Moreover, for high levels of marginal environmental damages (i.e., Pigouvian emis-
sions tax results in a firm’s high marginal production costs) the success or failure of the R&D
efforts may determine whether the unsuccessful firm exits the market and the firm that succeeds
in R&D becomes a monopoly. Subsequent ex-post asymmetries in solving our model combined
with an endogenous treatment of the probability of success provide an analytical framework that
challenges some of the typical results obtained in deterministic models of cooperative R&D —
an additional strategic element is introduced when considering uncertainty in firms’ emissions
abatement R&D efforts.
We found that for lower levels of marginal environmental damages, firms always choose to
cooperate and share information as it leads to their highest expected profits. The social plan-
ner also prefers firms to share information; however, the R&D investment level selected by the
representative firm is under the social optimum. For higher levels of marginal environmental
1Pigouvian taxation introduced by a social planner has been comprehensively covered in the literature, going
back to Keeler et al. (1972). The assumption of a Pigouvian emission tax simplifies the analysis and it does not
compromise our aim to study the impact of R&D uncertainty on the private and social incentives to cooperate in
R&D.
2Measuring exact emissions and determining the environmental damages, especially from mobile sources such
as transportation, can pose significant challenges to policy makers. A new tax collection infrastructure may be
needed as well as monitoring systems.
3Examples of innovation/breakthrough technologies that, if successful, may result in complete abatement of
emissions or pollution include:
- Carbon Capture and Storage and Enhanced Geothermal Systems for electrical power generation (Stephens
& Jiusto, 2010).
- Capturing Carbon dioxide from air (Lackner et al., 2001, and Pielke, 2009)
- Fuel cell technology (Hall & Kerr, 2003)
- Polymers for water purification (Chu & Hsiao, 2009)
- Green iron and steel manufacturing (Quader et al., 2015)
- Batteries for home and electrical vehicles (Scrosati & Garche, 2010)
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damages, firms always choose to cooperate and not share information as it leads to the high-
est expected profit. The social planner also prefers firms not to share information and only to
cooperate when they are efficient in their abatement R&D. Under cooperation with no informa-
tion sharing, the private level of investment in R&D is always smaller than the social optimum.
When firms display a low efficiency in their R&D efforts and for environmental damage above
a certain threshold, the social planner would prefer firms not to cooperate and not share infor-
mation as it leads to a higher level of R&D investment and a higher social welfare.
Process R&D cooperation has been extensively investigated in Industrial Organisation liter-
ature (see De Bondt, 1997, for a comprehensive survey), establishing the well-known result in
the literature that full cooperation in R&D with complete information sharing is beneficial for
everyone concerned, provided that the firms remain competitors in the product market. These
findings have been used to advocate a special antitrust regulatory treatment of R&D so gov-
ernments can allow and even stimulate R&D cooperation in industries characterised by large
technological spillovers. In environmental economics, cooperation vs. independent emissions
abatement R&D has received limited attention, with the exception of deterministic analysis lit-
erature by Petrakis and Poyago-Theotoky (2002), Sandonís and Mariel (2004), Scott (1996),
Chiou and Hu (2001), and Poyago-Theotoky (2007). This literature typically considers non-
tournament models of abatement R&D, where there is a deterministic relationship between the
R&D investment and the level of emissions abatement. These deterministic R&D models fail
to address the uncertain nature of R&D. In contrast to the findings in process R&D cooperation
literature, our results show that R&D cooperation may not always be socially desirable and that
the highest R&D investment is obtained when firms do not cooperate.
Theoretical aspects of R&D cooperation suggest that the two main factors that provide the
incentives to cooperate are uncertainty and spillovers, which also may affect the size, concen-
tration and nature of R&D cooperation arrangements (Silipo, 2008). Process R&D cooperation
under uncertainty has been examined under various modeling approaches. Under uncertainty
and no spillovers, Marjit (1991) and Combs (1992) showed that firms prefer to cooperate only
if the probability of success is relatively high. Moreover, if the probability of success of the
programme is moderate or intermediate, R&D competition is preferred. The driving differ-
ence under our model is that the probability of success is endogenous (firms choose the level
of investment, which determines the probability of success). Therefore, contrasting with the
findings of Marjit (1991) and Combs (1992), our results show that firms always prefer to co-
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operate. Choi (1993) analysed the incentive to cooperate in the R&D market with uncertainty
and spillovers. He demonstrated that profitability in R&D cooperation increases with the level
of spillover and that R&D investment is also higher under cooperation, but only up to a critical
level of spillovers. If the spillover is greater than this level the opposite is true. Our results
also show that profitability in R&D cooperation is higher when spillover is complete (full infor-
mation sharing) only for lower values of environmental damage, as the probability of success
determined by the level of R&D investment is also higher when spillover is complete for lower
values of environmental damage.
Among the different ways of addressing uncertainty, tournament models typically use a
Poisson process where spillovers are captured by the degree of easiness to imitate. Beath et
al. (1988) used a homogeneous product duopoly model of R&D rivalry, where imitation after
innovation was introduced. It was found that R&D expenditure is greater under cooperation
than under rivalry if imitation is easy. This result contrasts with our findings as, under our
model, the highest R&D investment level is achieved when firms do not cooperate. Erkal and
Piccinin (2010), researched process R&D cooperation under uncertainty, with free entry in both
the R&D race and the product market. It was established that sharing the research outcome is
a necessary condition for the profitability of cooperative R&D arrangements with free entry.
Under our model, the representative firm always chooses to cooperate in R&D. The firm’s
choice to cooperate does not depend on information sharing.
Poyago-Theotoky (2007) analysed environmental deterministic R&D cooperation under a
Cournot duopoly with homogeneous products. The paper concluded that environmental R&D
and social welfare are higher when firms cooperate in R&D, compared to engaging in indepen-
dent R&D, for small damages and also for large damages; but, only when R&D is efficient.
These results contrast with our findings as, in our model, cooperation with information sharing
is preferred by firms for lower values of environmental damage but their investment in R&D is
always lower than under non-cooperative R&D and lower than the social optimum. For large
environmental damages, firms choose to cooperate but not share information. For large envi-
ronmental damages and/or inefficient R&D efforts, the social planner would prefer firms not to
cooperate.
In Chapter 4 it was shown that industries that are subject to a higher degree of competition
are more likely to support the introduction of an emissions tax, which induces innovation. In
this Chapter, we establish a new insight into competition policy at the abatement R&D level:
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we find that the social planner may prefer firms to compete rather cooperate in R&D if the envi-
ronmental damages are high and also if they are inefficient in undertaking their R&D activities.
This Chapter is organised as follows. In Section 5.2 we present the model building blocks;
in Section 5.3 we analyse the impact of the R&D organisational structure on the firms’ profits
and R&D investment levels; in Section 5.4 we determine the social planner’s preferences in
organisational structures of R&D and the socially optimum level of R&D investment. Finally,
in the last Section, we provide the concluding remarks.
5.2 The Model
Two firms compete in the output market by producing and selling homogeneous goods.
Production entails the emission of a pollutant, where one unit of output produces ε units of
emissions. One unit of emission causes environmental damages denoted by h.
Environmental policy imposes a Pigouvian emission tax per unit of output t = εh. We
assume that firm i’s only cost is the emissions tax given by:
T (qi) = tqi = εhqi:
The use of a Pigouvian emission tax simplifies the model and its results. Environmental
damages are now fully paid by the firms; therefore, they are not explicitly included in the welfare
function. This assumption does not compromise the main aim of this Chapter, which is to study
the impact of R&D uncertainty on the private and social preferences for R&D cooperation.
Firms can respond to the tax by decreasing their production or engaging in R&D, which
is assumed to be for the sole purpose of reducing emissions. If the innovation is successful it
will fully abate the firm’s emissions, i.e., it will reduce emissions to zero. The probability of
success depends on the emissions abatement R&D investment. For the firm to have a probability
of success of pi, it needs to invest ν2 p
2
i dollars (à la d’Aspremont & Jacquemin, 19884). If
successful, firm i will generate zero emissions and will pay no emissions tax. The parameter ν
4In the AJ model the spillover is in the R&D effort, rather than in the R&D investment. Mcdonald and Poyago-
Theotoky (2015) argued that the AJ model may be more suitable for modelling environmental R&D because "it
is the impact of R&D on abatement effort and emissions reduction that is of crucial importance in designing
environmental policy." (Mcdonald and Poyago-Theotoky, 2015, p. 14).
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relates to the efficiency or productivity of the R&D activities, where a higher value means lower
efficiency.
We analyse a two-stage game where firms 1 and 2 each first choose their level of investment
in R&D (pi; i= 1;2) and second, they compete in the product market.
The firm’s only marginal cost is the existence of an emissions tax. The marginal cost can
take the value 0 with probability pi, meaning a successful R&D outcome, or the value εh with
probability (1  pi), if its R&D activities are unsuccessful. The ex-ante representative firm’s
profit function is defined as:
pi i(ci;qi;q j; pi) = P(qi;q j)qi T (qi)  ν2 p
2
i :
Technology policy may stimulate R&D by allowing firms to cooperate at the emissions
abatement R&D stage only. In the context of this Chapter, R&D cooperation considers that
firms set their R&D cooperatively to maximise joint first-stage profits, while competing in the
second stage of the game.
Consumers preferences are represented by a general inverse demand function and the fol-
lowing assumption is made:
Assumption A0 The inverse demand function P(Q) :R+!R+ is determined only by the total
industry output Q and
i) it is twice differentiable for all Q> 0 , with P(Q)> 0
ii) it is strictly decreasing in Q and concave: ∂P∂Q < 0 and ∂
2P
∂Q2 6 0:
Emissions tax and firm’s investment in abatement R&D affects the competing firms equi-
librium profits. Under the generic setting considered in the first part of this Chapter, we will
assume general equilibrium profits, as follows.
1. Let pi11 = pid(0;0) denote the firm’s profits if both firms are successful in R&D and
emissions free.
2. Let pi10=pi01 denote the successful / unsuccessful firm’s profits, respectively, if one
firm only is successful in its R&D outcomes and emissions free. It holds that
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pi10 = f pi
d(0;εh) if h< h
pim(0) if h> h
g :
Under cooperation pi10 = pi11 = pid(0;0) if h> h
pi01 = f pi
d(εh;0) if h< h
0 if h> h
g ;
where h= fhjqd(εh;0) = 0g. Under non-cooperation, this is the value of marginal damage
(h) above which the firm ceases to exist if it fails to succeed in its abatement R&D (it has
zero market share, due to its high cost; the equilibrium quantity produced is zero), and its rival
succeeds (i.e., it becomes a monopoly).
3. Let pi00= pid(εh;εh) denote the firm’s profits if both firms are unsuccessful in R&D.
It holds that
pi00 = f pi
d(εh;εh) if h< h
0 if h> h
g ;
where h= fhjqd(εh;εh) = 0g. This is the value of marginal damage (h) above which both
firms cease to exist if they both fail to succeed in their abatement R&D — equilibrium quantities
produced are zero.
4. Let pim(c) denote the monopoly profit and, similarly, c can take the value 0 with
probability pi or the value εh with probability (1  pi).
5.3 Organisation of R&D and the Firm
In this Section we analyse the impact of the organisational structure of environmental R&D,
on the firm’s profit and its R&D investment level. The general case is investigated, when it
is analytically possible. From Section 5.3.3 onwards, the particular case of a linear demand
function and Cournot competition is considered. In order to establish a comparison between the
firm’s expected profits, according to the organisation of R&D, we assume the following ranking
of profits, based on the firm’s outcome of emissions abatement R&D.
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Assumption A1 The representative firm’s profit has the following ranking:
pim > pi10 > pi11 > pi00 > pi01:
and
pi01+pi10  pi00 pi11 > 0:
The above assumption states that the highest profit the firm can achieve is when it operates
as a monopoly. Under duopoly competition, the highest payoff for the firm is when it succeeds
in R&D whilst its rival fails. Conversely, the lowest payoff is when the firm fails whilst its rival
succeeds. Furthermore, we assume that the sum of the firm’s possible asymmetric payoffs is
greater than the sum of the symmetric ones. This will ensure that R&D investment levels are
strategic substitutes. Assumption A1 holds under standard Cournot competition.
Two extreme cases of spillovers are considered: no spillover (firms fully protect their R&D)
or the spillover is complete (firms’ R&D results are fully shared). This assumption was moti-
vated by the findings of Amir et al. (2000), where it was established that firms always prefer
extreme spillovers (full or no information sharing).
Note that firms always compete in the output market. We follow a similar classification of
R&D organisational structures put forward by Kamien et al. (1992), and used in the context of
process R&D:
1. Firms choose their environmental R&D investment, pi, independently and don’t share
information ex-post (NC — Non-Cooperation).
2. Firms coordinate their choices of environmental R&D investment, p1 and p2, but do not
share information (C — Cooperation).
3. Firms choose their environmental R&D investment, pi, independently and fully share
information ex-post (NCI — Non-Cooperation with Information Sharing).
4. Firms coordinate their choices of environmental R&D investment, p1 and p2, and fully
share information (CI — Cooperation with Information sharing).
Under cooperation with no information sharing (C) or simple coordination of R&D activ-
ity, firms may enter into an agreement whereby they decide the level of R&D investment by
maximising their joint expected profits; but, R&D activities are conducted separately and they
remain competitors in the product market. Cooperation with Information Sharing (CI) may
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involve R&D coordination plus fully sharing of the knowledge acquired — spillovers become
complete. Complete information sharing may result from a cross-licensing agreement, assumed
enforceable and costless. In this form of cooperation, firms may form a joint lab, which avoids
duplication of efforts, saving costs, and further facilitates complete information sharing.
In the next Section, we define the equilibrium conditions for the four types of R&D organ-
isational structures.
5.3.1 Organisation of R&D and Equilibrium Conditions
Case 1: Non-Cooperation (NC)
Firms choose pi independently and don’t share information ex-post. Firm i’s expected profit
is given by
Epi i(pi; p j)(NC)= pi p jpi11+ pi(1  p j)pi10+(1  pi)p jpi01+(1  pi)(1  p j)pi00  ν2 p
2
i : (5.1)
The first term of the firm’s expected profit states that, with probability pi p j , both firms are
successful in their R&D activities, and firm i’s profit is pi11. Similarly, with probability pi(1 
p j), firm i is successful and its rival unsuccessful (firm i’s profit is pi10), with probability (1 
pi)p j, firm i is unsuccessful and its rival successful (firm i’s profit is pi01), and with probability
(1  pi)(1  p j), both firms are unsuccessful (firm i’s profit is pi00). The last term represents
firm i’s investment cost in emissions reduction R&D.
Applying the first order condition for profit maximisation, when the decision is on the strate-
gic variable pi, yields:
p j(pi11 pi01)+(1  p j)(pi10 pi00) = ν pi: (5.2)
The first term of the left-hand side (LHS) represents the gain from marginal investment if the
rival is successful. The second term of the LHS represents the gain from marginal investment if
the rival is unsuccessful.
Lemma 1: The LHS is downward sloping in p j. R&D investments are strategic substitutes.
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Proof: The LHS is downward sloping in p j as  pi01 pi10+ pi00+pi11 < 0; therefore, R&D
investments are strategic substitutes.
Equilibrium conditions yield:
pi = p j = p(NC) =
pi10 pi00
ν+pi01+pi10  pi00 pi11 : (5.3)
It can be easily shown that ∂ p

∂h > 0 if
ν > [∂ (pi
10 pi00)
∂h ]
 1∂pi01
∂h (pi
10 pi00)+pi11 pi01: (5.4)
Note that ∂ (pi
10 pi00)
∂h > 0 and
∂pi01
∂h 6 0 .
If h6 h6 h, (where pi01 = 0 and pi10 = pim and denoted as h) then
p(NC_h) =
pim pi00
ν+pim  pi00 pi11 : (5.5)
Assumption A2 The representative firm’s emissions abatement R&D probability of success
must be pi 6 1. In order to ensure an interior solution then ν > pi11.
Under this assumption, the condition expressed in equation (5.4) always holds (∂ p∂h > 0)
— the equilibrium level of R&D investment always increases with an increase in marginal
environmental damages (h).
If h> h, (where pi01 = pi00 = 0 and pi10 = pim and denoted as h) then
p(NC_h) =
pim
ν+pim pi11 : (5.6)
Case 2: Cooperation with No Information Sharing (C)
Firms coordinate the choices of p1 and p2 but do not share information. Expected JOINT
profit is given by
Epi(pi; p j)(C) = pi p j2pi11+ pi(1  p j)(pi10+pi01)+(1  pi)p j(pi01+pi10) (5.7)
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+(1  pi)(1  p j)2pi00  ν2 p
2
i  
ν
2
p2j :
Applying the first order condition for profit maximisation, when the decision is on the strate-
gic variable pi, yields:
p j(2pi11 pi01 pi10)+(1  p j)(pi10+pi01 2pi00) = ν pi: (5.8)
The first term of the LHS represents the gain from marginal investment if the rival is suc-
cessful. The second term of the LHS represents the gain from marginal investment if the rival
is unsuccessful.
Lemma 2: When firms do not share information, there is less R&D investment under coopera-
tion than under non-cooperation.
Proof: As 2pi11 pi01 pi10 < pi11 pi01 (since pi11 < pi10), and pi10+pi01 2pi00 < pi10 pi00
(since pi01 < pi00) the LHS of (5.8) is smaller than the LHS of (5.2), meaning that there is
less R&D investment under cooperation.
Equilibrium conditions yield:
pi = p j = p(C) =
pi10+pi01 2pi00
ν+2(pi01+pi10  pi00 pi11) : (5.9)
If h6 h6 h, then
p(C_h) =
pim 2pi00
ν+2(pim  pi00 pi11) : (5.10)
If h> h , then
p(C_h ) =
pim
ν+2(pim pi11) : (5.11)
Case 3: Non-Cooperation with Information Sharing (NCI)
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Firms choose pi independently and fully share information ex-post. If at least one firm
succeeds in its R&D activities both firms will reap the benefits: pi10 = pi01 = pi11. Firm i’s
expected profit is given by
Epi i(pi; p j)(NCI) = pi p jpi11+ pi(1  p j)pi11+(1  pi)p jpi11+(1  pi)(1  p j)pi00  ν2 p
2
i :
(5.12)
Applying the first order condition for profit maximisation, when the decision is on the strate-
gic variable pi, yields:
p j(pi11 pi11)+(1  p j)(pi11 pi00) = ν pi: (5.13)
The first term of the LHS represents the gain from marginal investment if the rival is success-
ful, which is zero. The second term of the LHS represents the gain from marginal investment if
the rival is unsuccessful.
Lemma 3: When firms do not cooperate in R&D, there is less R&D investment with informa-
tion sharing than with no information sharing.
Proof: The LHS of (5.13) is smaller than the LHS of (5.2).
Equilibrium conditions yield:
pi = p j = p(NCI) =
pi11 pi00
ν+pi11 pi00 : (5.14)
Same as above if h6 h6 h:
If h> h , then
p(NCI_h ) =
pi11
ν+pi11
: (5.15)
Case 4: Cooperation with Information Sharing (CI)
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Firms coordinate the choices of p1 and p2 and fully share information. If at least one firm
succeeds in its R&D activities, both firms will reap the benefits: pi10 = pi01 = pi11. Expected
JOINT profit is given by
Epi(pi; p j)(CI) = pi p j2pi11+ pi(1  p j)(pi11+pi11)+(1  pi)p j(pi11+pi11) (5.16)
+(1  pi)(1  p j)2pi00  ν2 p
2
i  
ν
2
p2j :
Applying the first order condition for profit maximisation, when the decision is on the strategic
variable pi, yields:
p j(2pi11 pi11 pi11)+(1  p j)(2pi11 2pi00) = ν pi: (5.17)
The first term of the LHS represents the gain from marginal investment if the rival is success-
ful, which is zero. The second term of the LHS represents the gain from marginal investment if
the rival is unsuccessful.
Lemma 4: If pi10+pi01 < 2pi11and p j < 1=2, there is less R&D investment under cooperation
with no information sharing than with information sharing.
Proof: The LHS of (5.8) is smaller than the LHS of (5.17) if pi10+pi01 < 2pi11and p j < 1=2,
meaning that, under these conditions, there is less R&D investment under cooperation
with no information sharing than with information sharing.
Equilibrium conditions yield:
pi = p j = p(CI) =
2(pi11 pi00)
ν+2(pi11 pi00) : (5.18)
Same as above if h6 h6 h:
If h> h , then
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p(CI_h ) =
2pi11
ν+2pi11
: (5.19)
In the next Section we determine the firms’ preferences for the organisation of R&D, based
on the equilibrium conditions stated above.
5.3.2 Firms under General Setting
We now compare the firms’ cooperative choices and resulting R&D investment for the dif-
ferent forms of R&D organisational structure and for h< h. The full ranking comparison is not
possible under a general setting and Assumption A1, as the expected profit functions are not
continuous due to the possibility of a monopoly profit.
Firms always prefer to cooperate in emissions abatement R&D as opposed to engaging
in independent R&D. The following propositions summarises this result (for h < h ) and its
implication to the level of R&D investment (NC vs. C and NCI vs. CI). The results for h > h
can only be determined under specific functional forms, as per the analysis in the next Section.
Proposition 5.1: In the absence of information sharing, if h < h, firms prefer to cooperate in
R&D. Their choice, based on a higher expected profit, leads to a lower R&D investment.
Proof: Given the equilibrium choice of R&D investment in the case of non-cooperation, as
per equation (5.3), and in the case of cooperation with no information sharing, as per
equation (5.9), and that 2pi11 pi01 pi10 < pi11 pi01; since pi11 < pi10, it always holds
that p(C) < p(NC).
Note that Epi(p; p)(C) = 2Epi i(p; p)(NC). Since p(C) = argmax[Epi i(p; p)(NC)] < p(NC)
it follows that Epi i(p(C); p(C))(C) > Epi i(p(NC); p(NC))(NC).
Proposition 5.2: If firms share information about the results of their R&D success, if h < h,
firms ALSO choose to cooperate, as it leads to a higher expected profit. Their choice
results in a higher R&D investment.
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Proof: Given the equilibrium choice of R&D investment in the case of non-cooperation as per
equation (5.14), and in the case of cooperation with information sharing, as per equation
(5.18), it always holds that p(NCI) < p(CI).
Note that Epi(p; p)(CI)= 2Epi i(p; p)(NCI). Since p(CI)= argmax[Epi i(p; p)(NCI)]> p(NCI)
it follows that Epi i(p(NCI); p(NCI))(NCI) < Epi i(p(CI); p(CI))(CI).
If firms cooperate in R&D, their preferences in sharing the outcome or not, have an impact
on the level of R&D investment. The following proposition sets out the conditions under which
firms may choose to share information, when they cooperate in R&D (CI vs. C).
Proposition 5.3: If firms cooperate in R&D (maximise their joint profit), if h< h, firms always
prefer information sharing (Epi(CI)i > Epi(C)i ) if pi10+pi01 < 2pi11. Firms’ investment in
R&D is higher when they share information (p(CI) > p(C)) if
f pi
10+pi01 < 2pi11 and
p(CI) < 12
gor f pi
10+pi01 > 2pi11 and
p(CI) > 12
g : (5.20)
The proof of Proposition 5.3 is included in Appendix C.
If firms share information, it only takes one firm to succeed in R&D for both firms to reap the
benefit. The above result simply states that the firm’s expected profit is higher under information
sharing when the sum of the possible asymmetric payoffs is smaller than twice the payoff when
both firms are successful.
In the next Section, we show that the condition p(CI)< 12 can be expressed as a condition on
the parameter ν being above a certain threshold (a higher value means lower R&D efficiency).
When firms choose to cooperate and share information (pi10+pi01 < 2pi11), their investment in
R&D is higher than when they do not share information (p(CI) > p(C)) only when they are
inefficient in their R&D activities, as per the discussion in the next Section.
5.3.3 Firms under Cournot and Linear Demand
For rest of this Chapter, including the welfare analysis (Section 5.4), we solve the model
under specific functional forms and type of market competition. We assume a linear demand
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under a Cournot competition setting. Following Singh and Vives (1984), the representative
consumer has a quadratic (strictly concave) utility function, resulting in a linear inverse demand
function. The ex-ante representative firm’s profit function, excluding emissions abatement R&D
investment cost (ν2 p2i ), is given by
pi i(ci;qi;q j) = [a  (qi+q j)  ci]qi:
Firm i has a marginal cost, which can take the value 0 with probability pi, meaning a suc-
cessful R&D outcome, or the value εh with probability (1  pi), if its R&D activities are unsuc-
cessful. Firms compete in the product market under four different scenarios, based on the out-
come of their emissions abatement R&D. Cournot duopoly competition (quantities are strategic
substitutes) leads to equilibrium quantities and firms’ profits (excluding the R&D investment
cost), as per the following table.
Table 5.1: Cournot Equilibrium Outcome
R&D OUTCOME q pi
BOTH FIRMS FAIL (q00;pi00) a εh3 (a εh)
2
9
BOTH FIRMS SUCCEED (q11;pi11) a3 a
2
9
FIRM 1 FAILS / RIVAL SUCCEEDS (q01;pi01) a 2εh3 (a 2εh)
2
9
FIRM 1 SUCCEEDS / RIVAL FAILS (q10;pi10) a+εh3 (a+εh)
2
9
When the firms do not cooperate and the marginal emissions damage is above h = a2ε , the
firm exits the market if it fails to succeed in its abatement R&D (the equilibrium quantity pro-
duced is zero) whilst its rival succeeds (i.e., it becomes a monopoly). When the marginal emis-
sions damage is above h= aε , if both firms fail to succeed, they both exit the market (equilibrium
quantities produced are zero).
The monopoly’s profit maximising results, when it succeeds in R&D, excluding the emis-
sions abatement R&D investment cost (ν2 p2m), is given by
q1m =
a
2
and pim = a
2
4
:
Firm’s expected profit, equilibrium R&D investment and expected profit at the profit max-
imising investment level for the four different organisational structures of abatement R&D,
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under Cournot and linear demand, are provided in Appendix B.
Proposition 5.3 sets out the conditions under which firms may choose to share information,
when they cooperate in R&D (CI vs. C). Under the specific functional forms, firms choose to
share information (Epi(CI)i > Epi(C)i ) only if h < 2a5ε (pi10+ pi01 < 2pi11). If the environmental
damage is h0 = 2a5ε , firms are indifferent between sharing and not sharing information as their
expected profit is the same (see Figure 4.1). However, if the firms select to share information
(h< 2a5ε ), their investment in R&D is only higher if they are inefficient in conducting their R&D
activities (p(CI) < 12 is equivalent to ν > 29εh(2a  εh)). Under linear demand and Cournot
competition, the condition (5.20) is given by:
p(CI) > p(C) =) f h<
2a
5ε and
ν > 29εh(2a  εh)
gor f h>
2a
5ε and
ν < 29εh(2a  εh)
g : (5.21)
Proposition 5.4: Under linear demand and Cournot setting, the highest firms’ investment in
R&D occurs when firms do not cooperate in R&D and do not share information.
The proof of Proposition 5.4 is included in Appendix C.
Note that full R&D investment ranking is only possible under complex conditions. It follows
from the previous propositions that non-cooperative R&D and no information sharing leads to
the highest level of a firm’s investment in R&D:
p(NC) >max
n
p(CI); p(C); p(NCI)
o
:
As stated in Section 5.3.1 (under cooperation with no information sharing), when firms
cooperate in R&D it reduces their gains from marginal investment in R&D, compared with
non-cooperation. By considering uncertainty in the R&D outcome, firms cooperate precisely
because it reduces their equilibrium investment in R&D.
Also, it can be easily shown that non-cooperation and information sharing results in the
lowest level of the firm’s R&D investment:
p(NCI) <min
n
p(CI); p(C); p(NC)
o
:
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A non-surprising result is that investment in R&D always decreases when the R&D effi-
ciency decreases (greater values of ν). The parameter always appears as a positive term in
the denominator. Furthermore, investment in R&D always increases when the environmental
damages (h) increase, simply because the tax burden also increases.
R&D investment under cooperation approaches non-cooperative R&D investment when the
R&D efficiency decreases (greater values of ν) as the gains from a marginal investment in
non-cooperative R&D start to diminish when R&D is conducted inefficiently.
Figure 5.1 depicts a firm’s R&D investment ranking, as per the above comments.
Propositions 5.1 and 5.2 (general setting) established that, if h < a2ε , firms always want to
cooperate in R&D but only share information if h< 2a5ε . The next proposition determines firms’
cooperative preferences if h> a2ε :
Proposition 5.5: Under linear demand and Cournot setting, if h> a2ε , firms always choose to
cooperate in R&D but do not share information.
The proof of Proposition 5.5 is included in Appendix C.
Ranking between other organisational structures is only possible under complex conditions.
In summary, for low values of the marginal environmental damage (in the case of Cournot
with linear emissions: h< 2a5ε ) firms always prefer to cooperate in R&D and share the outcome
of their R&D activities:
Epi(CI)i >max
n
Epi(NC)i ;Epi
(C)
i ;Epi
(NCI)
i
o
:
For high values of the marginal environmental damage (in the case of Cournot with linear
emissions: h> 2a5ε ) firms always prefer to cooperate in R&D but not share information:
Epi(C)i >max
n
Epi(NC)i ;Epi
(CI)
i ;Epi
(NCI)
i
o
:
Figure 5.1 clearly depicts a firms’s expected profit ranking, as per the above remarks.
The surprising result that firms always prefer cooperation in R&D stems from the endogene-
ity of the probability of firms succeeding — firms can increase that probability by increasing
their investment in R&D. There are two opposite effects on the firms’ incentives to cooperate.
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First, when firms cooperate in R&D, the probability of success decreases. Second, their com-
bined R&D investment cost, also decreases. The second effect always more than offsets the
first one on the joint firms’ payoff. However, cooperation always leads to a lower R&D invest-
ment than non-cooperation with no information sharing. These results are partially in line with
Poyago-Theotoky (2007) but differing in the sense that her paper concluded that investment in
R&D is also higher under cooperation, compared to engaging in independent R&D, for small
damages and also for large damages; but, only when R&D is efficient. Under our model, which
considers uncertainty in the R&D outcome, firms are induced to cooperate in R&D precisely
because it reduces their investment in R&D but also reduces the probability of a successful
outcome. As per Section 5.3.1 (under cooperation with no information sharing), cooperation
always reduces the gain from marginal investment, regardless of the rival’s R&D outcome, as
the firms are maximising joint profits. Our results contrast with those of Erkal and Piccinin
(2010), who researched process R&D cooperation under uncertainty with free entry in both the
R&D race and product market, using a continuous-time, stochastic Poisson discovery process
model of R&D. Their paper showed that sharing the research outcome is a necessary condition
for the profitability of cooperative R&D arrangements with free entry.
In our model, for highly inefficient R&D activities and high marginal environmental dam-
ages, firms prefer to cooperate but not share information, which also results in a higher invest-
ment in R&D than cooperation with information sharing. The intuition behind these results
can be described in terms of two conflicting effects. The first is an efficiency effect, similar to
Cournot competition profits that increase as marginal cost declines, therefore encouraging in-
formation sharing. The second effect is the firm’s preference for ex-post cost asymmetry. Since
total Cournot profits are convex in the marginal costs, the joint payoff may be the highest under
the maximum cost differentiation between the two firms or no information sharing.
The following graphs illustrate the results presented in the Propositions 5.1 to 5.5. They
show how R&D investment (left-hand side) and firms’ expected profits (right-hand side) vary
with the marginal environmental damage. The graphs were plotted for specific values of con-
sumers’ maximum willingness to pay a = 50; and marginal emissions ε = 1; depicting the
four types of R&D organisational structures under three levels of R&D efficiency: ν = a29 ;ν =
2a2
9 ;ν =
4a2
9 . The three vertical lines shown on the graphs represent the following levels of
marginal environmental damages:
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1. Firms are indifferent between sharing and not sharing information, if they cooperate
in R&D: h0 = 2a5ε .
2. Under no information sharing, the value above which the firm ceases to exist if it
fails to succeed in its abatement R&D whilst its rival succeeds (i.e., it becomes a monopoly):
h= a2ε :
3. The value above which both firms cease to exist if they both fail to succeed in their
abatement R&D: h= aε .
The three graphs on the right-hand side show that, for marginal environmental damages
lower that h0 = 2a5ε , firms’ highest expected profit is achieved when they cooperate in R&D and
share information. For marginal environmental damages higher than h0 = 2a5ε , cooperation in
R&D and no information sharing leads to the firms’ highest expected profit (see Proposition
5.3).
The three graphs on the left-hand side demonstrate that the firms’ R&D investment increases
when the environmental damages increase; the highest R&D investment occurs when firms do
not cooperate in R&D and do not share information, and the lowest R&D investment occurs
when firms do not cooperate in R&D but share information. As expected, when firms are less
efficient in their R&D activities, their R&D investment decreases. Under R&D cooperation
(firms’ preferred organisation structure of R&D), and for lower values of marginal environmen-
tal damages, information sharing results in a higher R&D investment. The graphs p(CI) and p(C)
cross at p(CI) = p(C) = 12 and h0 =
2a
5ε (see Proposition 5.3). However, for higher values of ν
(lower R&D efficiency) the graphs only cross at h0 = 2a5ε , as investment levels are under 1/2. In
summary, for lower levels of R&D efficiency and higher levels of marginal environmental dam-
ages, firms’ R&D investment is higher when firms do not share information; firms also prefer
to cooperate and not share information.
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Figure 5.1: R&D Investment and Expected Profits vs. Environmental Damages
(a= 50;ε = 1 and 3 cases: ν = a29 ;ν = 2a
2
9 ;ν =
4a2
9 )
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5.4 Organisation of R&D and Welfare
In this Section, we first formulate the social planner’s optimal choices, assuming a linear
inverse demand function in a Cournot competition setting. If the regulator could choose on
behalf of the firms their level of R&D investment (optimal level of R&D investment from a
social perspective), this socially optimal level of R&D investment is determined when R&D
information is shared and when is not shared between firms.
Given the firms’ four possible organisational structures of R&D and the resulting equilib-
rium level of R&D investment, the social planner’s cooperative preferences are then investi-
gated.
5.4.1 Characterising the Social Planner’s Optimal Policy
The social planner endeavours to maximise the expected welfare net of environmental dam-
ages. Emissions tax and the firm’s investment in abatement R&D affect the total welfare, de-
fined as the sum of producer (2pid) and consumer (Sd) surplus. Note that the environmental
damages of emissions is fully paid by the firms, if they are not successful in their R&D activi-
ties. The emissions damage is therefore not explicitly included in the welfare function.
1. Let w11 = wd(0;0) = 2pid(0;0)+ Sd(0;0) denote the welfare if both firms are suc-
cessful in R&D and emissions free.
2. Let w10 = w01 denote the welfare, if one firm only is successful and emissions free.
It holds that
w10 = f pi
d(0;εh)+pid(εh;0)+Sd(0;εh) if h< h
wm(0) = pim(0)+Sm(0) if h> h
g :
where h= fhjqd(εh;0) = 0g.
Under cooperation wd(0;0) = pid(0;0)+Sd(0;0) if h> h:
3. Let w00 = wd(εh;εh) denote the welfare if both firms are unsuccessful in R&D. It
holds that
w00 = f 2pi
d(εh;εh)+Sd(εh;εh) if h< h
0 if h> h
g ;
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where h= fhjqd(εh;εh) = 0g.
Assuming an equilibrium investment level in R&D denoted by p, which may take differ-
ent values according to the organisational structure of R&D, the expected welfare under no
information sharing is defined as:
Ew(p) = p2w11+ p(1  p)(w10+w01)+(1  p)2w00; (5.22)
and the expected welfare under information sharing is defined as:
Ew(p)(I) = p2w11+2p(1  p)w11+(1  p)2w00; (5.23)
where
w11 = 2(q11)2+2pi11 ν p2; (5.24)
w10 = w01 = (q10)2+(q01)2+(pi10+pi01) ν p2; (5.25)
and
w00 = 2(q00)2+2pi00 ν p2: (5.26)
The expected welfare under information sharing and under no information sharing can be
obtained by substituting the values for the specific functions in the above equations (see proof
of next proposition in Appendix C).
The optimal welfare only depends on firms sharing or not sharing information and the level
of their investment in R&D. The next proposition establishes the optimal preferences from a
social perspective.
Proposition 5.6: If h< 2a5ε , the social planner would prefer firms to share information and the
investment in R&D that maximises welfare with information sharing is given by pwI =
4εh(2a εh)
4εh(2a εh)+9ν . If h> 2a5ε , the social planner would prefer firms NOT to share information.
The investment in R&D that maximises welfare with NO information sharing is given by
pw =
2εh(2a+3εh)
16ε2h2+9ν , if
2a
5ε < h<
a
2ε
;
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pw_h =
a2+8εh(2a  εh)
2[a2+4εh(2a  εh)+9ν ] , if
a
2ε
< h< a
ε
;
and
pw_h =
9a2
2(5a2+9ν) , if h>
a
ε
:
The proof of Proposition 5.6 is included in Appendix C.
Following, we demonstrate that the firms’ competitive equilibrium choices of emissions
abatement R&D investment are always under the social optimum, which is explained by the
consumer surplus component of the welfare.
If h< 2a5ε , firms prefer to cooperate and share information. Firms’ equilibrium level of R&D
investment (p(CI)), from the first order condition, is given by equation (30):
pwI  p(CI) = 18εh(2a  εh)ν
[4εh(2a  εh)+9ν ][2εh(2a  εh)+9ν ] > 0:
If a2ε < h<
a
ε , firms prefer to cooperate and not share information. Firms’ equilibrium level
of R&D investment (p(C_h)), from the first order condition, is given by equation (20):
pw_h  p(C_h) = 9ν [a
2+8εh(2a  εh)]
2[a2+4εh(2a  εh)+9ν ][(a2+4εh(2a  εh)+18ν ] > 0:
If h> aε , firms also prefer to cooperate and not share information. Firms’ equilibrium level
of R&D investment (p(C_h )), from the first order condition, is given by equation (22):
pw_h   p(C_h ) = 81a
2ν
50a4+270a2ν+324ν2 > 0:
Given the firms’ competitive equilibrium level of R&D investment, the welfare analysis un-
der Cournot and linear inverse demand for the four different organisational structures of abate-
ment R&D is provided in Appendix D.
In the following section, the social cooperative preferences are investigated, taking into
account that the level of R&D investment is determined by the firms’ first order conditions for
profit maximisation, for the four types of R&D organisational structures.
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5.4.2 Organisation of R&D comparison - Welfare
The social welfare is now analysed at the firms’ optimal level of R&D investment, for the
four types of R&D organisational structure.
As discussed before, if h< 2a5ε , firms always prefer to cooperate in R&D and share informa-
tion; social and private interests are aligned in the sense that the social planner also prefers firms
to share information. However, firms’ level of R&D investment falls short of the social opti-
mum. If h> 2a5ε , firms always prefer to cooperate in R&D and not share information; the social
planner also prefers firms not to share information but, under certain conditions, the (second)
best social outcome may be achieved under no cooperation.
If 2a5ε < h<
a
ε , social and private interests are aligned (cooperation and no share information)
only for lower values of the R&D efficiency parameter (ν), but the mathematical condition is
complex and difficult to document. For higher values of the R&D efficiency parameter (ν),
which represents lower R&D efficiency, the social planner prefers firms not to cooperate.
If h> aε , the conditions under which social and private interests are aligned, are determined
in the following proposition.
Proposition 5.7: At the firms’ optimal levels of R&D investment, if h> aε and ν < 5(
p
33 1)
144 a
2
,
the social planner would prefer firms to cooperate and not share information. Otherwise
the social planner would prefer firms not to cooperate.
The proof of Proposition 5.7 is included in Appendix C.
The intuition behind this result is that when environmental damage is high and the R&D
efficiency is low, it is socially preferable that firms do not cooperate as it leads to a higher total
investment in R&D and, therefore, a higher probability of an R&D breakthrough outcome. The
new insight is that the social planner may prefer firms to compete rather cooperate in R&D if
the environmental damages are high and also if they are inefficient in undertaking their R&D
activities.
The following graphs (Figures 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4) were plotted for specific values of con-
sumers’ maximum willingness to pay a = 50; and marginal emissions ε = 1. They illustrate
Propositions 5.6 and 5.7 and show how the expected social welfare varies with the marginal
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environmental damage (top graph) and how it varies with the R&D investment level (horizontal
axis ranges from 0 to 1) for three ranges of the marginal environmental damages (three bottom
graphs).
The graphs depict the four types of R&D organisational structures under three levels of R&D
efficiency: ν = a29 .(Figure 5.2); ν = 2a
2
9 (Figure 5.3); and ν = 4a
2
9 (Figure 5.4). The welfare
vs. marginal damages graphs (top graphs) were create by substituting the firms’ equilibrium
level of R&D investment (p(NC); p(NCI); p(C); p(CI)) in the expected welfare functions. As
per our previous discussion (Propositions 5.6 and 5.7), for higher values of the R&D efficiency
parameter (ν), Figures 5.3 and 5.4, when firms do not cooperate and do not share information, it
leads to the best social outcome (second-best), for values of the marginal environmental damage
above a certain threshold.
On the three bottom graphs for each figure (welfare vs. R&D investment), the vertical lines
(pNC, pNCI, pC and pCI) represent the firm’s equilibrium R&D investment level for the four
types of R&D organisational structures. Information sharing (Ew_I) is socially preferable if
h < 2a5ε . It is clearly shown on these graphs that the social optimum level of R&D investment
(maximum point of the concave functions) is higher than the firms’ equilibrium level of R&D
investment, given that they prefer to cooperate in R&D.
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Figure 5.2: Welfare vs. Marginal Damage (h) and vs. R&D Investment (p)
(a= 50;ε = 1;ν = a29 )
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Figure 5.3: Welfare vs. Marginal Damage (h) and vs. R&D Investment (p)
(a= 50;ε = 1; ν = 2a29 )
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Figure 5.4: Welfare vs. Marginal Damage (h) and vs. R&D Investment (p)
(a= 50;ε = 1; ν = 4a29 )
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5.5 Concluding Remarks
The ex-post asymmetries encountered in our environmental R&D model with outcome un-
certainty, combined with complete or no spillover (full or no information sharing between
firms), provide an analytical framework that challenges the typical results obtained in determin-
istic models of cooperative R&D. Furthermore, our model differs from the existing literature
on environmental R&D under uncertainty (see, for example, Marjit, 1991; Combs, 1992) be-
cause the probability of firms succeeding is endogenous — firms can increase that probability
by increasing their investment in emissions abatement R&D.
We found that for lower levels of marginal environmental damages (h < 2a5ε ), firms always
choose to cooperate and share information as it leads to their highest expected profits. The
social planner would also prefer firms to share information but the social optimum abatement
R&D investment is higher than the level of R&D investment selected by the representative firm,
when they cooperate and share information.
For higher levels of marginal environmental damages (h > 2a5ε ), firms always choose to co-
operate and not share information as it leads to their highest expected profits. The social planner
also prefers firms not to share information but only cooperate when they are efficient in their
abatement R&D (lower levels of ν). The private level of investment in R&D under cooperation
is always smaller that the social optimum. When firms display a low efficiency in the R&D
efforts (high level of ν) and for large values of environmental damage (h) the social planner
would prefer firms not to cooperate and not to share information.
The main policy implication of this research is that the social planner may prefer firms to
compete rather cooperate in R&D if the environmental damages are high and also if they are
inefficient in undertaking their R&D activities.
Chapter 6
Conclusion
The research presented in this thesis started with studying the role of environmental R&D
on the optimal environmental policy, in a dynamic setting. We show how this policy can be
affected by the market structure that characterises a particular industry—the socially optimal
(second-best) combination of an emissions tax and an environmental R&D subsidy is explicitly
determined as a function of the intensity of market competition. However, environmental poli-
cies that encourage private undertakings of innovation efforts, can be welfare enhancing but also
have a significant impact on firms’ profitability. The conditions under which firms may benefit
from an environmental policy are investigated. As an emissions tax may facilitate the exercise
of market power, firms are more likely to benefit from an environmental policy when the in-
tensity of market competition increases. Finally, the uncertain nature of R&D is important and
can influence cooperative behaviour between firms. It is shown that firms’ R&D cooperative
preferences may not always be aligned with social welfare objectives.
In Chapter 3, the design of a second-best environmental policy (a mix of emissions tax and
R&D subsidy), that address the interaction of three market failures, is investigated. Firstly, pro-
duction generates environmentally damaging emissions and firms can either abate their emis-
sions by reducing output or by undertaking emissions abatement R&D. Secondly, if firms un-
dertake abatement R&D, technology innovation spillovers will reduce the incentive to innovate
(R&D appropriability market failure), Thirdly, the firms operate under imperfect competition
in the output market. The contribution is to determine the optimal environmental policy (emis-
sions tax and R&D subsidies) explicitly as a function of the intensity of competition in a dy-
namic setting. The interaction between increased competition, the emission of pollution and the
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incentives to undertake R&D is complex. Social welfare increases with the intensity of compe-
tition only if the emissions tax is set above its optimum level. The key policy message is that
the optimal emissions tax and R&D subsidy need to be calibrated to account for the impact of
imperfect competition. It is shown that, for example, if a regulator pre-commits to an emissions
tax that is under the socially optimum, an increase in market competition is socially detrimental,
which is in direct conflict with a competition policy.
A well-designed environmental regulation may be welfare enhancing but can also have a
negative impact on firms’ profitability. In Chapter 4 it is determined under which regulatory
conditions there could be a public and private "win-win" outcome. Results consistent with the
Porter Hypothesis, without any behavioural assumptions or bounded rationality arguments, are
derived. The key insight is that as the intensity of competition increases, firms will benefit
more from an environmental policy, which is explained in Chapter 4 as an emissions tax cost
pass-through condition. An emissions tax enhances market power in a competitive setting. It
demonstrates that firms operating in a less competitive setting, namely monopolies and Cournot
duopolies, never benefit from an environmental policy. Our results provide a novel understand-
ing on how an emissions tax can influence firms’ profitability and, therefore, how it can impact
on a particular industry. An important policy implication is that regulatory arrangements should
be sensitive to the industry level of market competition.
In Chapter 4 it was shown that industries that are subject to a higher degree of product mar-
ket competition are more likely to support the introduction of an emissions tax, which induces
innovation. Government policy can support firms’ efforts to cooperate in environmental R&D
as they may contribute to an increase in inventive activities. In Chapter 5, the impact of environ-
mental R&D organisational structures on firms’ innovation activities, profits, and social welfare
is investigated. It is assumed that the R&D outcome is uncertain. It was found that firms always
want to cooperate in R&D but not necessarily want to share the results of their R&D efforts.
When firms cooperate in R&D, the total research efforts are under the social optimum. The key
message is that when the R&D outcome is uncertain, R&D cooperation does not necessarily
lead to a higher social welfare than when firms engage in independent R&D, even if firms fully
share their innovations. Supported by a large body of literature, R&D cooperation has been
encouraged by various governments through the relaxation of antitrust regulation. Challenging
previous results of deterministic R&D cooperation, a policy implication of our research is that,
if firms are inefficient in conducting environmental R&D and if the social cost of emissions is
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high, ensuring non-cooperation in R&D (through antitrust legislation) leads to a higher welfare
outcome.
This dissertation covers three fundamental aspects of environmental economics: environ-
mental policy and innovation under imperfect market competition, private impact of an envi-
ronmental policy (Porter Hypothesis) and organisational structures of environmental R&D. Our
work generated policy conclusions that contrast with existing findings. The results provide new
insights on how an environmental policy can be tailored to a particular industry characterised by
a certain level of market competition. Furthermore, it analysis the impact of an environmental
policy on firms profitability and sets out the conditions under which the policy may be bene-
ficial for firms and society. Finally, our research contributes to a better understanding on how
non-cooperation in environmental R&D, at the firms level, can lead to an increase in innovation
outcomes and be socially beneficial.
6.1 Future Research
In Chapter 3 of this thesis, the optimal combination of an emissions tax and an emissions
abatement R&D subsidy was determined explicitly as a function of the intensity of competition,
which was taken as exogenous. Further research is needed to explore the links between the na-
ture of competition and the firms’s choices about abatement technology, investment in R&D and
the environmental policy. While this Chapter takes the intensity of competition as exogenous,
it is very likely that firms (and governments) may attempt to influence it through their actions.
The model limitations include the use of specific functional forms, linear environmental dam-
age and a deterministic relationship between R&D investment and its outcomes, which fails to
take into account the uncertain nature of R&D. As previously discussed, the assumption of lin-
ear damages is for simplicity. Non-linear damages will exacerbate the impact of emissions on
the welfare, but the qualitative results remain the same. In our approach, the emissions reduc-
tion represents a movement along the firm’s marginal emissions abatement curve. In contrast,
many studies in the environmental economics literature assume that innovation or technological
adoption is captured by a downward shift of a firm’s marginal abatement cost function.
The model presented in Chapter 4 has similar limitations. Moreover, emissions abatement
R&D spillover is not included in our model. Further research using a model with spillovers
would enable us to understand how this would affect our findings — would R&D spillovers
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facilitate firms to benefit from an environmental policy? Also, in this Chapter, emissions abate-
ment R&D is taken to be deterministic. The inclusion of uncertainty in modeling R&D, perhaps
following a similar approach to the one taken in Chapter 5, could provide new insights into the
conditions for firms to benefit from an environmental policy.
Cooperation versus independent emissions abatement R&D was investigated in Chapter 5,
assuming that the R&D outcome is uncertain and firms compete in the product market. In the
first part of Chapter 5, we used general functional forms, however, the welfare analysis was
undertaken using specific functional forms. Further work is needed to investigate the use of
general functions in the welfare analysis, maybe by altering the modelling approach. An im-
portant extension of this research would be to analyse how firms’ R&D cooperation will affect
the intensity of product market competition — under what environmental regulatory conditions
would R&D cooperation increase product market competition? Moreover, the study could be
extended to incorporate an n-firm oligopoly with product differentiation, which may accentuate
the free-rider problem. This more complex model could be used to study clusters of R&D in
an industry and investigate cluster cooperation. Multiple competing R&D cooperatives could
also be addressed. Further research is needed to analyse the impact of other market struc-
tures (maybe by explicitly modelling the intensity of competition through supply schedules)
and product differentiation on social and private environmental R&D cooperative preferences.
The interaction between an environmental policy and the firms’ incentives to cooperate
in abatement R&D is also an interesting topic for further research. Furthermore, would an
optimal emissions tax lead to a higher welfare, under cooperation than under non-cooperation?
In other words, under an optimal emissions tax it may or may not be socially beneficial if firms
cooperate.
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Appendices
Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 3.1: The equilibrium investment in R&D is determined by:
Ii =
1
(1  s)ν
∂Vi(xi;x j)
∂xi
(1)
Replacing (1) in (3.18) yields:
rVi(xi;x j) = f(a qi  ηqj   c)qi   te[e0qi   (xi+ηγx j)] 
 (1  s)ν
2
[
1
(1  s)ν
∂Vi(xi;x j)
∂xi
]2+
∂Vi(xi;x j)
∂xi
[
1
(1  s)ν
∂Vi(xi;x j)
∂xi
 δxi]+
+
∂Vi(xi;x j)
∂x j
[
1
(1  s)ν
∂Vj(xi;x j)
∂x j
 δx j]g: (2)
Replacing (3.20) in the above equation, we can show that the following linear value func-
tions are solutions to the above system of partial differential equations:
V i (xi;x j) =
1
2r
f2(a  c  e0te)
2(1+β )[1+β (1 η2)]
[2+η+β (2 η)(1+η)]2 +
te2(1+2γη)
ν(1  s)(r+δ )2g+
+
te
(r+δ )
xi+
teγη
(r+δ )
x j: (3)
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Equations (3.22) and (3.23) are obtained by substituting the first derivative of the value
function (equation (3)) with respect to xi in equation (1) and then using equation (3.9).
Proof of Proposition 3.2: Conditions (3.28) to (3.32) yield:
∂Hc
∂ te
= 2e0(1+β )f[a  c+ e0te(1+η)](1+β )+(a  c)βη
2g
[2+η+β (2 η)(1+η)]2  
  2te
(1  s)2(r+δ )2ν  λ [
2e20(1+β )
2+η+β (2 η)(1+η) +
2(1+ γη)
(1  s)δ (r+δ )ν ] = 0;
∂Hc
∂ s
=
2te[ teδ   (1  s)(r+δ )(1+ γη)λ ]
(1  s)3δ (r+δ )2ν = 0; and
∂Hc
∂d = α λρ;α+λ (ρ+ r) =
˙λ :
At steady state we have ˙λ = 0; ˙d = 0: We can then use the three equations to solve for λ ; te
and s, yielding the optimal emissions tax (3.33) and the optimal abatement R&D subsidy (3.34).
Table 3.1: Steady state quantities are given by (3.20) and investment in abatement R&D are
given by (3.23). As per Section 3.2.3, consumer surplus (CS), producer surplus (PS),
environmental damage cost of emissions (D) and welfare (W) are defined as follows:
CS= (a  c  e0te)
2(1+β )2(1+η)
[2+η+β (2 η)(1+η)]2 ;
PS= 2(a  c  e0te)(1+β )[(a  c  e0te)(1+β )+ e0te(1+β )η  (a  c)βη
2]
[2+η+β (2 η)(1+η)]2
  t
2
e
(r+δ )2(1  s)2ν ;
D=
2α
ρ
[
e0(a  c  e0te)(1+β )
[2+η+β (2 η)(1+η)]  
te(1+ γη)
(1  s)δ (r+δ )ν ],
and
117
W =CS+PS D:
The signs of the first derivatives with respect to the parameters of interest are as follows.
Quantities:
∂qi
∂ te
=  e0(1+β )
2+η+β (2 η)(1+η) < 0
∂qi
∂β
=
(a  c  e0te)η2
[2+η+β (2 η)(1+η)]2 > 0
∂qi
∂η
=
(a  c  e0te)(1+β )[β (2η 1) 1]
[2+η+β (2 η)(1+η)]2 > 0 if 1=2< η  1 and β >
1
2η 1
Abatement R&D investment:
∂ Ii
∂ te
=
1
(r+δ )(1  s)ν > 0
∂ Ii
∂ s
=
te
(r+δ )(1  s)2ν > 0
∂ Ii
∂ r
=  te
(r+δ )2(1  s)ν < 0
∂ Ii
∂δ
=  te
(r+δ )2(1  s)ν < 0
Consumer surplus:
∂CS
∂ te
< 0
∂CS
∂β
=
2(a  c  e0te)2(1+β )η2(1+η)
[2+η+β (2 η)(1+η)]2 > 0
∂CS
∂η
=
(a  c  e0te)2(1+β )2η [3β (1+η) 1]
[2+η+β (2 η)(1+η)]3 > 0 if β >
1
3(1+η)
Producer surplus:
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∂PS
∂ s
=  2t
2
e
(r+δ )2(1  s)3ν < 0
∂PS
∂ r
=
2t2e
(r+δ )3(1  s)2ν > 0
∂PS
∂δ
=
2t2e
(r+δ )3(1  s)2ν > 0
∂PS
∂β
= 2(a  c  e0te)η
2[ 2e0te(1+β )(1+η)+(a  c)η(1+β +βη)]
[2+η+β (2 η)(1+η)]3
The producer surplus always decreases with the competition (∂PS∂β < 0) if
a  c> 2e0te(1+η)]
η
or if
(a  c)η
(1+η)
< 2e0te < (a  c)η and β > (a  c)η 2e0te(1+η)
(1+η)[2e0te  (a  c)η ]
Under the classic duopoly competition model (Cournot setting when β = 0 and Bertrand
setting when β ! ∞), producer surplus always decreases with the intensity of competition.
This can be easily understood since the firm’s profit function is concave on quantities and
the equilibrium quantities are greater than the quantity corresponding to the maximum profit
(qMaxi = a c2(1+η)) ; monopoly quantity: qMon = a c2 ). In our model, the equilibrium quantities
contain an additional term: e0te. The emissions tax value, te, determines whether the equilib-
rium quantities are greater or smaller than the quantity corresponding to the maximum profit.
The above conditions simply state that, if the emissions tax is sufficiently low (te < (a c)η2e0(1+η)),
producer surplus will always decrease with the intensity of competition. If the emissions tax is
sufficiently high (te > (a c)η2e0 ), producer surplus always increases with the intensity of competi-
tion. For values in-between, producer surplus decreases with the intensity of competition only
if β > (a c)η 2e0te(1+η)(1+η)[2e0te (a c)η ] .
Damage accumulation:
∂D
∂ te
< 0
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∂D
∂ s
=  2teα(1+ γη)
(r+δ )δ (1  s)2νρ < 0
∂D
∂β
=
2e0(a  c  e0te)η2α
ρ[2+η+β (2 η)(1+η)]2 > 0
∂D
∂ r
=
2teα(1+ γη)
(r+δ )2(1  s)ρδν > 0
∂D
∂δ
=
2teα(r+2δ )(1+ γη)
(r+δ )2(1  s)ρδ 2ν > 0
Proof of Proposition 3.3: The first and second derivatives of te with respect to β are given by:
∂ te
∂β
=
η2[(a  c)(r+ρ)  e0α]
e0(1+β )2(1+η)(r+ρ)
> 0 and
∂ 2te
∂β 2
=  2η
2[(a  c)(r+ρ)  e0α]
e0(1+β )3(1+η)(r+ρ)
< 0: (4)
The first and second derivatives of s with respect to β are given by:
∂ s
∂β
=   δη
2[(a  c)(r+ρ)  e0α]
e0α(1+β )2(r+δ )(1+η)(1+ γη)
< 0 and
∂ 2s
∂β 2
=
2δη2[(a  c)(r+ρ)  e0α]
e0α(1+β )3(r+δ )(1+η)(1+ γη)
> 0: (5)
The first and second derivative of the steady state accumulation function with respect to
β are given by:
∂dss
∂β
=
2e0(a  c  e0te)η2
[2+η+β (2 η)(1+η)]2ρ > 0 and
∂ 2dss
∂β 2
=  4e0(a  c  e0te)(2 η)η
2(1+η)
[2+η+β (2 η)(1+η)]3ρ < 0 (6)
Finally, the derivative of the steady state welfare function for given values of emissions
tax and abatement R&D subsidy with respect to β is given by:
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∂W ss
∂β
=
2(a  c  e0te)η2f(a  c)[1+β (1 η2)]ρ+ e0te(1+β )(1+η)ρg
[2+η+β (2 η)(1+η)]3ρ
  2(a  c  e0te)η
2e0α
[2+η+β (2 η)(1+η)]2ρ (7)
Recall that all parameters are positive, 0η  1; 0 ρ  1; and, by assumption, a c> e0te
and (a  c)(r+ρ)> e0α . Thus, it follows that ∂W ss∂β > 0 when
(a  c)[1+β (1 η2)]ρ+ e0te(1+β )(1+η)ρ  e0α[2+η+β (2 η)(1+η)]> 0;
or
a  c> e0
[1+β (1 η2)]ρ fα[2+η+β (2 η)(1+η)]  te(1+β )(1+η)ρg:
Taking the limits on β (zero and infinity) of the above inequality’s right-hand side yields:
limβ!∞
e0
[1+β (1 η2)]ρ fα[2+η+β (2 η)(1+η)]  te(1+β )(1+η)ρg
=
e0
(1 η)[
α(2 η)
ρ
  te]
limβ!0
e0
[1+β (1 η2)]ρ fα[2+η+β (2 η)(1+η)]  te(1+β )(1+η)ρg
= e0[
α(2+η)
ρ
  te(1+η)]
Since e0(1 η) [
α(2 η)
ρ   te]> e0[α(2+η)ρ   te(1+η)] for all admissible values of the variables,
it follows that ∂W ss∂β > 0 when te >
α(2 η)
r+ρ   (a c)(1 η)e0 (emissions tax greater than the optimal
Bertrand emissions tax (3.45)).
It also follows that ∂W ss∂β < 0 when te <
α(2+η)
(1+η)(r+ρ) 
(a c)
e0(1+η) (emissions tax smaller than the
optimal Cournot emissions tax (3.44)).
If α(2+η)(1+η)(r+ρ)  
(a c)
e0(1+η) < te <
α(2 η)
r+ρ   (a c)(1 η)e0 ; it follows that
∂W ss
∂β > 0 when β >
e0α(2+η) [a c+e0te(1+η)]ρ
(1+η)f(a c)(1 η)ρ e0[α(2 η) ρte]g :
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Proof of Proposition 3.4: The proof is straightforward but included here for completion:
∂ te
∂ r
= α[2+η+β (2 η)(1+η)]
(1+β )(1+η)(r+ρ)2
< 0
∂ 2te
∂ r2
=
2α[2+η+β (2 η)(1+η)]
(1+β )(1+η)(r+ρ)3
> 0
∂ te
∂ρ
= α[2+η+β (2 η)(1+η)]
(1+β )(1+η)(r+ρ)2
< 0
∂ 2te
∂ρ2
=
2α[2+η+β (2 η)(1+η)]
(1+β )(1+η)(r+ρ)3
> 0
∂ s
∂ r
=
δfe0α[2+η+β (2 η)(1+η)]+(a  c)[1+β (1 η2)](δ  ρ)g
e0α(1+β )(r+δ )2(1+η)(1+ γη)
> 0
if δ > ρ
∂ 2s
∂ r2
= 2δfe0α[2+η+β (2 η)(1+η)]+(a  c)[1+β (1 η
2)](δ  ρ)g
e0α(1+β )(r+δ )3(1+η)(1+ γη)
< 0
if δ > ρ
∂ s
∂δ
=
rf(a  c)[1+β (1 η2)](r+ρ)  e0α[2+η+β (2 η)(1+η)]g
e0α(1+β )(r+δ )2(1+η)(1+ γη)
> 0
if (a  c)(1 η)(r+ρ)> e0α(2 η)
∂ 2s
∂δ 2
= 2rf(a  c)[1+β (1 η
2)](r+ρ)  e0α[2+η+β (2 η)(1+η)]g
e0α(1+β )(r+δ )3(1+η)(1+ γη)
< 0
if (a  c)(1 η)(r+ρ)> e0α(2 η)
∂ s
∂ρ
=
(a  c)δ [1+β (1 η2)]
e0α(1+β )(r+δ )(1+η)(1+ γη)
> 0
∂ 2s
∂ρ2
= 0
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∂dss
∂ r
=
2α[e20δ
2ν+(1+η)(1+ γη)2]
δ 2ν(1+η)ρ(r+ρ)2
> 0
∂ 2dss
∂ r2
= 4α[e
2
0δ
2ν+(1+η)(1+ γη)2]
δ 2ν(1+η)ρ(r+ρ)3
< 0
∂dss
∂δ
=
4α(1+ γη)2
δ 3νρ(r+ρ)
> 0
∂ 2dss
∂δ 2
= 12α(1+ γη)
2
δ 4νρ(r+ρ)
< 0
∂dss
∂ρ
= 2fe0δ
2ν [(a  c)(r+ρ)2  e0α(r+2ρ)] α(1+η)(r+2ρ)(1+ γη)2g
δ 2ν(1+η)ρ2(r+ρ)2
< 0
∂ 2dss
∂ρ2
=
4f(a  c)e0δ 2ν(r+ρ)3 α(r2+3rρ+3ρ2)[e20δ 2ν+(1+η)(1+ γη)2]g
δ 2ν(1+η)ρ3(r+ρ)3
> 0
∂W ss
∂ r
= 2rα
2[e20δ
2ν+(1+η)(1+ γη)2]
δ 2(1+η)νρ(r+ρ)3
< 0
∂ 2W ss
∂ r2
=
2α2(2r ρ)[e20δ 2ν+(1+η)(1+ γη)2]
δ 2(1+η)νρ(r+ρ)4
> 0 if r > ρ
2
∂W ss
∂δ
= 2α
2(1+ γη)2(2r+ρ)
δ 3νρ(r+ρ)2
< 0
∂ 2W ss
∂δ 2
=
6α2(1+ γη)2(2r+ρ)
δ 4νρ(r+ρ)2
> 0
∂W ss
∂ρ
=
2αf(a  c)e0δ 2ν(r+ρ)3 α(r2+3rρ+ρ2)[e20δ 2ν+(1+η)(1+ γη)2]g
δ 2(1+η)νρ2(r+ρ)3
> 0
∂ 2W ss
∂ρ2
= 2αf2(a  c)e0δ
2ν(r+ρ)4 α(2r3+8r2ρ+12rρ2+3ρ3)([e20δ 2ν+(1+η)(1+ γη)2]g
δ 2(1+η)νρ3(r+ρ)4
< 0
Appendix B
Expected Profits and R&D Investments — Cournot and linear demand
The equilibrium conditions for the four classifications of R&D (Cooperation vs. Non-
Cooperation with and without information sharing: NC, C, NCI and CI), assuming Cournot
competition and linear inverse demand, are as follows.
Case 1 (NC)
Firm i’s expected profit is obtained by replacing the Cournot equilibrium profits (Table 5.1)
in equation (5.1):
Epi i(pi; p j)(NC) =
2a2 9ν p2i +4aεh(2pi  p j 1)+2ε2h2(3p j 4pi p j+1)
18 : (8)
Equilibrium from the first order condition (5.3) yields:
pi = p j = p(NC) =
4aεh
4ε2h2+9ν : (9)
∂ p
∂h =
4aε(9ν 4ε2h2)
(4ε2h2+9ν)2 : (10)
It can be easily shown that ∂ p

∂h > 0 if
ν > 4ε
2h2
9 : (11)
This always holds under Assumption A2, which can be expressed in terms of the specific
functions as ν > a29 . The equilibrium investment in R&D always increases with an increase in
the marginal emissions damage
We obtain the expected profit at the profit maximising investment level by replacing (9) in
(8):
Epi i(p(NC); p(NC))(NC) =
1
9 [(a  εh)
2  32a
2ε4h4
(4ε2h2+9ν)2 +
12aε3h3
4ε2h2+9ν ]: (12)
If h6 h6 h, then
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p(NC_h) =
(5a 2εh)(a+2εh)
a2+8aεh 4ε2h2+36ν : (13)
Similarly, the expected profit at the profit maximising investment level is:
Epi i(p(NC_ h); p(NC_ h))(NC_ h) =
9ν(a4+192a3εh 160a2ε2h2+64aε3h3 16ε4h4)
18(a2+8aεh 4ε2h2+36ν)2 (14)
+
2592(a  εh)2ν2 8a2(a  εh)2(a2+8aεh 4ε2h2)
18(a2+8aεh 4ε2h2+36ν)2 :
If h> h, then
p(NC_h ) =
9a2
5a2+36ν : (15)
Assumption A2 will ensure an interior solution.
The expected profit at the profit maximising investment level is:
Epi i(p(NC_h ); p(NC_h ))(NC_h ) =
81a4ν
2(5a2+36ν)2 : (16)
Case 2 (C)
The expected JOINT profit is obtained by replacing the Cournot equilibrium profits in equa-
tion (5.7):
Epi(pi; p j)(C) =
4a2 9ν(p2i + p2j)+4aεh(pi+ p j 2)+2ε2h2(3pi+3p j 8pi p j+2)
18 :
(17)
Equilibrium from the first order condition (5.9) yields:
pi = p j = p(C) =
εh(2a+3εh)
8ε2h2+9ν : (18)
We obtain the expected JOINT profit at the profit maximising investment level by replacing
(18) in (17):
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Epi(p(C); p(C))(C) =
5ε2h2(4a2 4aεh+5ε2h2)+18ν(a  εh)2
9(8ε2h2+9ν) : (19)
If h6 h6 h, then
p(C_h) =
a2+16aεh 8ε2h2
2(a2+8aεh 4ε2h2+18ν) : (20)
Similarly, the expected JOINT profit at the profit maximising investment level is:
Epi i(p(C_ h); p(C_ h))(C_ h) =
a2(17a 8εh)(a+8εh)+288ν(a  εh)2
72(a2+8aεh 4ε2h2+18ν) : (21)
If h> h, then
p(C_h ) =
9a2
10a2+36ν : (22)
The expected JOINT profit at the profit maximising investment level is:
Epi i(p(C_h ); p(C_h ))(C_h ) =
9a4
40a2+144ν : (23)
Case 3 (NCI)
Firm i’s expected profit is obtained by replacing the Cournot equilibrium profits in equation
(5.12):
Epi i(pi; p j)(NCI) =
2a2 9ν p2i +2εh(εh 2a)(1  pi)(1  p j)
18 : (24)
Equilibrium from the first order condition (5.14) yields:
pi = p j = p(NCI) =
εh(2a  εh)
εh(2a  εh)+9ν : (25)
We obtain the expected profit at the profit maximising investment level by replacing (25) in
(24):
Epi i(p(NCI); p(NCI))(NCI) = (26)
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=
2a2ε2h2(2a  εh)2+9εhν(2a  εh)(4a2 2aεh+ ε2h2)+162ν2(a  εh)2
18[εh(2a  εh)+9ν ]2 :
Same as above if h6 h6 h:
If h> h, then
p(NCI_h ) =
a2
a2+9ν : (27)
Similarly, the expected profit at the profit maximising investment level is:
Epi i(p(NCI_h ); p(NCI_h ))(NCI_h ) =
2a6+27a4ν
18(a2+9ν)2 : (28)
Case 4 (CI)
The expected JOINT profit is obtained by replacing the Cournot equilibrium profits in equa-
tion (5.16):
Epi(pi; p j)(CI) =
4a2 9ν(p2i + p2j)+4εh(εh 2a)(1  pi)(1  p j)
18 : (29)
Equilibrium from the first order condition (5.18) yields:
pi = p j = p(CI) =
2εh(2a  εh)
2εh(2a  εh)+9ν : (30)
We obtain the expected JOINT profit at the profit maximising investment level by replacing
(30) in (29):
Epi(p(CI); p(CI))(CI) =
4a2εh(2a  εh)+18ν(a  εh)2
18εh(2a  εh)+81ν : (31)
Same as above if h6 h6 h:
If h> h, then
p(CI_h ) =
2a2
2a2+9ν : (32)
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The expected JOINT profit at the profit maximising investment level is:
Epi i(p(CI_h ); p(CI_h ))(CI_h ) =
4a4
18a2+81ν : (33)
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Appendix C
Proof of Proposition 5.3: Given the equilibrium choice of R&D investment in the case of co-
operation with information sharing vs. no information sharing, equations (5.18) and (5.9),
and denoting D= 2pi11 (pi10+pi01) and B= 2(pi11 pi00), the equilibrium R&D invest-
ments can be written in a simplified form as:
p(C) =
B D
ν+B 2D ; (34)
and
p(CI) =
B
ν+B
: (35)
The expected equilibrium firm’s profits, equations (5.16) and (5.7), can also be written in
a simplified form as:
Epi(CI) =
2B(B+2ν)pi11 ν(B2 2νpi00)
(ν+B)2
; (36)
and
Epi(C) =
2B(B+2ν)pi11 ν(2DB+B2 2νpi00)
(ν+B)2
: (37)
Firms prefer information sharing (Epi(CI)i > Epi(C)i ) if
Epi(CI) Epi(C)i =
4Dν(pi11 pi00)
[ν+2(pi11 pi00)]2 > 0=) pi
10+pi01 < 2pi11: (38)
If the firm’s R&D investment is higher under information sharing (p(CI) > p(C)) then
D[(ν+B) 2B]> 0, which results in the condition (5.20).
Proof of Proposition 5.4: Given the equilibrium choice of R&D investment for the four organ-
isational structures of R&D (see Appendix B), if h6 a2ε :
p(NC)  p(NCI) = εhf6a(3ν 2ε
2h2)+ εh[9ν+4(2a2+ ε2h2)]g
[9ν+ εh(2a  εh)](4ε2h2+9ν) > 0;
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p(NC)  p(CI) = 2ε
2h2[4a(2a 3εh)+9ν+4ε2h2]
[9ν+2εh(2a  εh)](4ε2h2+9ν) > 0;
and
p(NC)  p(C) = 3εh[4ε
2h2(2a  εh)+3ν(2a 3εh]
(8ε2h2+9ν)(4ε2h2+9ν) > 0:
If a2ε 6 h6
a
ε :
p(NC_h)  p(NCI_h) = a
2[4εh(2a  εh)+45ν ]
[9ν+ εh(2a  εh)][a2+4εh(2a  εh)+36ν ] > 0;
p(NC_h)  p(CI_h) = 4εh(2a  εh)(2a
2 9ν)+45a2ν
[9ν+2εh(2a  εh)][a2+4εh(2a  εh)+36ν ] > 0;
and
p(NC_h)  p(C_h) = 9[a
4+4εh(2a  εh)(a2 4ν)+16a2ν ]
2[a2+4εh(2a  εh)+18ν ][a2+4εh(2a  εh)+36ν ] > 0:
If h> aε :
p(NC_h )  p(NCI_h ) = 4a
4
5a4+56a2ν+144ν2 > 0;
p(NC_h )  p(CI_h ) = 8a
4+9a2ν
10a4+117a2ν+324ν2 > 0;
and
p(NC_h )  p(C_h ) = 45a
4
50a4+540a2ν+1296ν2 > 0:
Proof of Proposition 5.5: Given the equilibrium expected profit for the four organisational
structures of R&D (see Appendix B), if a2ε 6 h6 aε :
Epi(C_h) Epi(NC_h) = 9fa
2[a2+4εh(2a  εh)]+16ν(a  εh)2g2
16[a2+4εh(2a  εh)+18ν ][a2+4εh(2a  εh)+36ν ]2 > 0;
Epi(C_h) Epi(NCI_h) =
a2εh(2a  εh)[εh(2a  εh)(a2+72ν)+18a2ν ]+81ν2fa4+16εh[a2(2a+3εh)  εh(4a  εh)]g
144[εh(2a  εh)+9ν ]2[a2+4εh(2a  εh)+18ν ] > 0;
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and
Epi(C_h) Epi(CI_h) = 9a
2ν [a2+16εh(2a  εh)]+2a4εh(2a  εh)
144[2εh(2a  εh)+9ν ][a2+4εh(2a  εh)+18ν ] > 0:
If h> aε :
Epi(C_h ) Epi(NC_h ) = 225a
8
16(5a2+18ν)(5a2+36ν)2 > 0;
Epi(C_h ) Epi(NCI_h ) = 41a
8+774a6ν+4617a4ν2
144(a2+9ν)2(5a2+18ν) > 0;
and
Epi(C_h ) Epi(CI_h ) = a
4(2a2+153ν)
144(2a2+9ν)(5a2+18ν) > 0:
Proof of Proposition 5.6: The expected welfare when firms share and do not share informa-
tion can be obtained by substituting the values for the specific functions in the welfare
equations, as follows.
If h6 h :
Ew(p) =
1
9f4a
2 8aεh(1  p) 9ν p2+4ε2h2[1+(3 4p)p]g; (39)
and
Ew(p)(I) =
1
9 [4a
2 8aεh(1  p)2 9ν p2+4ε2h2(1  p)2]: (40)
The investment in R&D that maximises welfare with no information sharing, equation (39),
is given by
pw =
2εh(2a+3εh)
16ε2h2+9ν : (41)
The expected maximum welfare corresponding to the above level of investment can be de-
termined by substituting (41) into (39).
The investment in R&D that maximises welfare with information sharing, equation (40), is
given by
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pwI =
4εh(2a  εh)
4εh(2a  εh)+9ν : (42)
The expected maximum welfare corresponding to the above level of investment can be de-
termined by substituting (42) into (40).
If h6 h6 h :
Ew(p)(h) =
1
9 [a
2(4+ p  p2)+4εh(1  p)2(εh 2a) 9ν p2]; (43)
and
Ew(p)(I_h) = Ew(p)(I) =
1
9 [4a
2 8aεh(1  p)2 9ν p2+4ε2h2(1  p)2]: (44)
The investment in R&D that maximises welfare with no information sharing is given by
pw_h =
a2+8εh(2a  εh)
2[a2+4εh(2a  εh)+9ν ] : (45)
The investment in R&D that maximises welfare with information sharing is given by
pwI_h =
4εh(2a  εh)
4εh(2a  εh)+9ν : (46)
If h> h , then
Ew(p)(h ) =
p
9 [a
2(9 5p) 9ν p]; (47)
and
Ew(p)(I_h ) =
p
9 [4a
2(2  p) 9ν p]: (48)
The investment in R&D that maximises welfare with no information sharing is given by
pw_h =
9a2
2(5a2+9ν) : (49)
The investment in R&D that maximises welfare with information sharing is given by
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pwI_h =
4a2
4a2+9ν : (50)
For h< 2a5ε , the difference in social welfare when firms share and do not share R&D infor-
mation (equations (39) and (40)) is given by
Ew(p)(I) Ew(p) = 49εh(2a 5εh)(1  p)p]: (51)
From the above equation, it is clear that this difference is positive when h< 2a5ε .
For h > a2ε ; the difference in social welfare when firms share and do not share R&D infor-
mation (equations (43), (44), (47) and (48)) is given by
Ew(p)(I_h) Ew(p)(h) = Ew(p)(I_h ) Ew(p)(h ) = a
2
9 (1  p)p:
This difference is always negative, implying that welfare can only be maximised when firms
do not share information.
Proof of Proposition 5.7: The relevant welfare differences are as follows:
Ew(C_h ) Ew(CI_h ) = a
4(20a6+1008a4ν+13014a2ν2+37179ν3)
36(2a2+9ν)2(5a2+18ν)2 > 0:
Ew(C_h ) Ew(NCI_h ) = a
4(5a6+297a4ν+21627a2ν2+95499ν3)
36(a2+9ν)2(5a2+18ν)2 > 0:
Ew(C_h ) Ew(NC_h ) = 45a
6(25a4 45a2ν 648ν2)
4(5a2+36ν)2(5a2+18ν)2 > 0 if ν <
5(
p
33 1)
144
a2:
133
Appendix D
Social Welfare — Cournot and linear demand
The social welfare for the four classifications of R&D (Cooperation vs. Non-Cooperation
with and without information sharing: NC, C, NCI and CI), assuming Cournot competition and
linear inverse demand, are as follows.
Case 1 (NC)
Considering the general expression for welfare(39) and substituting the equilibrium R&D
investment level (9), yields
Ew(NC) =
4
9f(a  εh)
2  48a
2ε4h4
(4ε2h2+9ν)2 +
4aε2h2(a+3εh)
4ε2h2+9ν g: (52)
If h6 h6 h, then
Ew(NC_h) =
9ν(27a4+464a3εh 296a2ε2h2+64aε3h3 16ε4h4)
9(a2+8aεh 4ε2h2+36ν)2 + (53)
+
5184ν2(a  εh)2 16a2(a  εh)2(a2+8aεh 4ε2h2)
9(a2+8aεh 4ε2h2+36ν)2 :
If h> h, then
Ew(NC_h ) =
243a4ν
(5a2+36ν)2 : (54)
Case 2 (C)
Considering the general expression for welfare(39) and substituting the equilibrium R&D
investment level (18), yields
Ew(C) =
80ε4h4(4a2 4aεh+5ε2h2)+9ε2h2ν(76a2 92aεh+91ε2h2)+324ν2(a  εh)2
9(8ε2h2+9ν)2 :
(55)
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If h6 h6 h, then
Ew(C_h1) =
9ν(67a4+480a3εh 496a2ε2h2+256aε3h3 64ε4h4)
36(a2+8aεh 4ε2h2+18ν)2 (56)
+
a2(17a 8εh)(a+8εh)(a2+8aεh 4ε2h2)+5184ν2(a  εh)2
36(a2+8aεh 4ε2h2+18ν)2 :
If h> h, then
Ew(C_h ) =
9(5a6+27a4ν)
4(5a2+18ν)2 : (57)
Case 3 (NCI)
Considering the general expression for welfare(39) and substituting the equilibrium R&D
investment level (25), yields
Ew(NCI) =
4a2ε2h2(2a  εh)2+9εhν(8a2 2aεh+ ε2h2)(2a  εh)+324ν2(a  εh)2
9[εh(2a  εh)+9ν ]2 : (58)
If h6 h6 h, then
Ew(NCI_h) = Ew(NCI): (59)
If h> h, then
Ew(NCI_h ) =
4a6+63a4ν
9(a2+9ν)2 : (60)
Case 4 (CI)
Considering the general expression for welfare(39) and substituting the equilibrium R&D
investment level (18), yields
Ew(CI) =
4[4a2ε2h2(2a  εh)2+9εhν(4a2 2aεh+ ε2h2)(2a  εh)+81ν2(a  εh)2
9[2εh(2a  εh)+9ν ]2 : (61)
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If h6 h6 h, then
Ew(CI_h) = Ew(CI): (62)
If h> h, then
Ew(CI_h ) =
4(4a6+27a4ν)
9(2a2+9ν)2 : (63)
